

To: NFL Committee on LD Rules and Recommendations

From: R. Eric Barnes

Date: May 20, 2006

Dear Members of the NFL Committee on LD:

I am thrilled that the NFL is continuing its commitment to excellent debate by reexamining the rules and guidelines that it offers concerning Lincoln-Douglas debate. I participated in LD for four years just after its inception and I've been involved with the event ever since: starting the LD team at Chapel Hill High School, publishing the LD textbook *Philosophy in Practice*, creating the nation's first LD urban debate league, and most recently serving as the first facilitator for the Lincoln-Douglas Education Project. However, today I write to you on my own behalf, as a lover of debate, and not as a spokesperson for the LDEP or anyone else.

It is no exaggeration to say that I could not have come to where I am today without LD debate. I am currently an Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Public Policy at Hobart and William Smith Colleges. I am also a member of the Law & Society program and the founding coach of the HWS Debate Team. LD inspired my interest in philosophy, but more importantly it taught me how to create my own arguments, anticipate others' objections, and clearly respond to those objections. I arrived at college several steps ahead of those without this experience, and my terrible grades in high school prove that LD was responsible for these skills. My ongoing commitment to debate stems from my gratitude and from my certainty that it can help others as it helped me.

Now that I teach college students fresh out of high school, I have another perspective on the benefits that former debaters have gained from debate, as well as the deficiencies of students without debate experience, which LD could have remedied. LD encourages the kind of critical inquiry and advanced intellectual engagement that debaters are very fortunate to experience prior to college. Since almost all LD debaters go on to college, it is reasonable to see the educational goals of LD as directed toward preparing them for success in college, and many of my remarks below will be grounded on the assumption that the primary goal of the activity of debate is to educate students, with a particular eye toward the kind of skills that they will need in college.

There are several issues that I want to talk about. Although they are all important, my two primary concerns are: 1) What constitutes winning an LD round; and, 2) What is the proper role of value premises and value criteria. I've written about both of these issues in the past, and I was as clear as I knew how to be then, so doubt that trying to rewrite these ideas in this letter would do anything but obscure my message. So, I hope that you don't mind me simply attaching two previously published works and then highlighting their key points in this letter. My secondary concerns are: the use of evidence, point standardization, LD purity, and speech time limits. In addition to this, I have also included a copy of the NFL Appendices with embedded comments, which I hope will prove useful to you.

The Rostrum article is short and I hope you are able to read it. Its main point is that there should be a clear judging standard (ideally, an official rule) stating what constitutes winning an LD debate, and that this should be: "The affirmative is responsible to show that the resolution is more likely true than false, and the negative, to show that it is more likely false than true." A useful instruction to judges would be: *As you decide each round, ask yourself, "If I had no prior beliefs about this resolution, would the round as a whole have made me more likely to believe the resolution was true or false?"*. The article

shows that this standard does not rule out any significant forms of argumentation. To emphasize that this approach does not limit students' intellectual freedom, I specifically show how postmodern theories, relevant kritiks and other argument strategies are permitted by the above standard. Even if you may believe that these are not generally persuasive approaches to arguments, this just means that they won't be successful, not that they should be excluded by the rules. At the same time, I show that the 'anything goes' approach of not adopting any judging standard is seriously flawed. Games and sports need rules, and one of the most important rules to establish is what constitutes winning. The most obvious, and also correct, answer is that the winner is the one whose debating in that round would convince an unbiased judge to believe that the resolution was most likely true (or false). Of course, other rules are needed as well, but this one is particularly important. To preserve the educational value of LD in the face of recent trends, a rule like this is a top priority.

Another important issue concerns placing the concepts of the value premise and values criteria in the official NFL guidelines. Right now they have a very prominent place in the LD guidelines. The abridged chapter from my book addresses the problems surrounding using value premises and criteria in LD, and what might be about these problems. I've edited the chapter from my book down to a considerably shorter length, but if you are unable to read even this much, then please just read section 5. Of course, the strong stance I take here concerning the value premise and criterion is justified by the surrounding sections, so I hope you will find the time to read those as well. Even though I am very critical of the VP and criterion, I want to make clear that I am not asking this committee to pass any rule or guideline that takes a stand *against* these concepts. I simply ask that the NFL be silent on the issue, unlike the current guidelines, which actively call for their use. The numerous problems with the value premise and criterion are described in section 5 of the chapter, so I won't repeat them here. As the attached chapter makes clear, we will still have 'value debates' if we don't include the traditional 'value premise', indeed they will simply be more clear and more realistic.

I understand that taking a strong stance against the usefulness of the value premise and criterion may sound radical and may make me seem like someone whose thinking is on the fringe. In one sense, this may be true, since many people in the LD community seem to hold these concepts in high esteem. However, in the broader academic community, my stance is entirely mainstream and uncontroversial. I know of nobody outside the larger debate community (and almost nobody outside the Lincoln-Douglas community) who has any idea what a value premise or value criterion is. From this, we can safely conclude that these concepts are not the uniquely good means of developing arguments about LD resolutions. Other forms of argument must be at least as good, and indeed, many are much better. In fact, this evidence indicates that the LD community simply created a bunch of jargon that no one else uses or needs. Consider that none of the famous theorists you read in doing LD research ever uses these concepts. The extraneous jargon wouldn't be so bad if it didn't get in the way (to some extent) of students learning how to construct arguments in the straightforward and jargon free way that their college professors will demand. From experience I can assure you that although former LD debaters are much better arguers than their non-debate peers, it takes considerable work to break them of the desire to incorporate these concepts (explicitly or implicitly) into their college papers – and their other professors have no idea where this jargon is coming from. If the NFL's LD guidelines make no mention of the value premise and criterion, coaches can more easily choose to move away from these concepts. They might not, but they should, and you can help them make this very positive move. But you don't even need to buy that to agree that these concepts should be omitted from the rule, all you need to accept is that other styles of argumentation should be allowed to compete fairly in a marketplace of ideas without being disadvantaged by a set of rules that explicitly favors one style of argument. So, I strongly recommend that all references to the value premise and criterion be deleted from the rules.

As a historical conclusion to this issue, let me add that after the publication of my book, I discovered part of the origins of the term “value premise” in debate. The term is central in a Rostrum article by Dr. Jimmie D. Trent entitled “Value Premises: An important Part of Argument”. The article was originally printed in a publication called *Issues* in November 1967, but was later reprinted in the April 1991 *Rostrum*. Trent uses the term “value premise” to refer to value laden propositions (i.e., complete sentences). This use of the term represents the original (and correct) use of the concept of a value premise in debate, which was shorthand for: “a premise (i.e., an assumption in the form of a sentence) that has to do with values (i.e., morals or other normative ideas)”. The term “value premise” was later misunderstood and interpreted as shorthand for: “a value (i.e., a thing which people care about) upon which one’s argument is premised (i.e., built upon)”. The misinterpretation gained a foothold in LD because it provided a structure for students to use, and even though it was a flawed structure, the students needed some structure. The value criterion came along later (while I was involved in LD) and was just an inevitably confused attempt to make sense of the original confused concept of the value premise. The wide disagreement about what the criterion is supposed to do reflects this. Once using these became orthodoxy in LD, it readily perpetuated itself. Perhaps I am being too optimistic, but I hope that the current mood in LD of questioning what was once considered orthodox, though sometimes misguided, may allow the event to move away from this mistake.

Having discussed the two primary concerns, allow me to move on to the secondary (but still important) concerns: point standardization, evidence, LD purity and speaker times. I have encountered such dramatic and fierce disagreement about the nature and proper use of points that my best recommendation might be for you to table this issue until you have a lot more time and nothing else on the agenda. I will outline my own views on points but say little to defend these views. Indeed, my primary request about points would be that there you create some clear standards articulated on the key issues, even if these standards are not the ones I endorse.

In order for points to serve their function well, the most important thing is for judges to all be on the same page regarding the foundational point issues of range, distribution, relativity and meaning of points. Nothing will take the inherent subjectivity out of points, but this subjectivity is unfairly multiplied when the foundational issues are not settled first. There should be a standard range for points, whether 20-30, 25-29, or whatever, and this should allow for enough different scores to make reasonable discriminations between debaters. Offering 11 possible scores is surely adequate, but offering 5 isn’t enough (though 25-29 with half-points is fine). A significant current problem is different judges using different ranges, which is unfair to debaters. Judges also need to be encouraged not to shrink the range by avoiding the edges entirely, which brings us to the issue of point distribution. Once we have a range, judges need to know (roughly) how to distribute their points. If the range is 20-30, should 25 be the average score at the tournament (ideally), and how many 20s or 30s could reasonably be expected? Relativity is also important. Judges need to know if a 25 at local novice tournament X means the same thing as a 25 at a very good varsity tournament. If some judges relativize points and others don’t, then debaters are not getting a fair shake. Finally, there is the issue of the meaning of points. What is the judge rating when using points? Is it oratory skill, overall performance, or something else? This requires a little more discussion, and here I will tip my hand a bit more.

The best way to determine what points should be used to represent is to look at how they are used and thereby discover their function. Knowing their function in the event will help decide which way they should be used. The fundamental reason tournaments need judges to assign points is to allow the tab room to break ties created by equal records and to determine: pairings in preliminary rounds, who breaks to elimination rounds, and where debaters are seeded. All these functions have to do essentially with rating which students are debating better, based on their performances at the tournament. In other words, which debaters are doing better at LD debate? The primary tool for determining this is who has won

more rounds. But that is a coarse guide, so we need more information, and we use points. The question is this: To rank debaters after preliminary rounds, do we want to know who is merely speaking better, or do we want to know who is debating better overall? Clearly, when trying to determine who has done better, we want information about debaters' overall performance and not merely about their speaking ability. So, tournaments need points that reflect debaters' overall debating skill and not just one aspect of that skill. Because this is the essential function of points in LD, judges should be instructed to assign points based on overall performance instead of merely on speaking ability. More controversially, this implies that low point wins should be deemed to be unacceptable in LD, because it cannot be the case that a debater both did an overall better job of convincing the audience than his opponent and yet lost the round. It is still permissible to allow ties in points because a judge can reasonably claim that the debate was too close to warrant a difference in points, since the points provide such a coarse scale.

My own view on the other foundational points issues can be put briefly, since I omit their defense. The point range should be a traditional 20-30. Tournament should strive for a point distribution that averages 25, and overall takes the shape of a normal statistical distribution, with more points given in the middle and somewhat fewer near the extremes (just as one would expect to usually happen with grades in a class). Lastly, judges should be told to make their points relative to the tournament and division, since adaptation to this relative scale is not too hard for veteran judges, while adaptation to an absolute scale is almost impossible for new and less experienced judges.

Moving on to the next issue, for as long as I can remember there has been a concern about how evidence should be used in LD. I've attached a one page excerpt about this issue from my book that explains my reasons, but my conclusion is that there should be no *rules* requiring or limiting the use of evidence in LD. *Authoritative evidence* (i.e., quotes from famous people) is clearly appropriate if explained and not overused. And, the more controversial *empirical evidence* is also entirely appropriate in many circumstances. If the topics are well selected, coaches and students will find that excessive use of evidence is only harmful to their debating. So, please ensure that NFL guidelines and other documents (e.g., the ballot) do not require or restrict the use of evidence, though it is fine if non-binding suggestions are made to coaches that excessive use of evidence is unproductive.

Concerning the next issue, LD purity, I have fewer concrete suggestions, but I do want to say a bit to help frame this somewhat nebulous issue. No one wants three different names for people doing the same kind of debating, just with different time limits. LD debate is different than other kinds of debate, and it should stay that way. It's not just different from policy debate and public forum debate – it's also different from all the forms of parliamentary debate, Karl Popper debate, etc. People often say that LD is unique because it focuses on propositions of value, but *all* of these other forms of debate also focus on propositions of value. What makes LD unique is its decision to stay away from a focus on the plan. The result of not focusing on a plan is that students are pushed to look at broad normative theories without getting too bogged down in the practical implementation of a plan. This makes LD unique, but being unique is not something good for its own sake. The good thing is that this style of debate encourages students to learn a broad range of theoretical knowledge about the history of intellectual thought on moral and political issues. Bringing students into direct (and even indirect) contact with the classic normative theories of the past 2500 years can be enormously beneficial in creating successful college students, critically engaged citizens and simply good people. While students who do other forms of debate do not ignore theoretical research entirely, they reasonably choose to spend a lot of time learning about policy and plan implementation on a very practical level. So, the 'LD purity' we may wish to preserve has to do with encouraging students to learn about the big picture (theoretical) perspective on the issues that they discuss whether they be contemporary issues or classic ones. The question is how we maintain this character of the event.

The two primary ways to maintain LD purity are by fostering judging and debating traditions, and by appropriate topic selection. The former can be accomplished in part by adopting the kinds of rules that I mention elsewhere in this letter, which encourage students to stick to the given resolution and encourage judges to reward students who present ideas in a manner that would be accessible to a generally intelligent audience unfamiliar with debate jargon (just as most theorists they read were trying to do). But rules are not enough. As we all know, responsible adult debate coaches need to guide their students in productive directions and train new judges (whether they be parents or ex-debaters) to provide the right incentives. The latter part of the equation, topic development and selection, is complex. It would be great if the NFL had some guidelines on what makes a good LD topic, but such guidelines are very hard to formulate. I have some ideas here, but none are adequately refined such that I would feel comfortable in sending them to this committee. My practical suggestion here is that this committee *not* try to deal hastily with this important and complex issue. Perhaps the best thing would be to suggest that in the next couple years a committee be set up for developing guidelines on how to create topics that will foster the unique character of LD debate and maintain a degree of purity in LD.

The last issue I'll discuss is the speaking times. I would strongly recommend that the 1AR be extended by one minute and that this be compensated by reducing the AC speech by one minute. It is widely acknowledged that the current speech times significantly favor the Neg debater. The Aff debater certainly needs more time in the 1AR, since it is now sandwiched between Neg speeches that are 175% and 150% as long. The Aff also does not need the time in the AC nearly as much, especially because it is the one speech that can be carefully crafted and repeatedly practiced in advance. I certainly do not suggest that this is the cure to all of the ills of LD, but it can be a part of the solution. At the very least, it will make spreading seem less inevitable in the 1AR. People will take time to adjust to it, but in the end, they will be better off for it.

One final reason to implement this change in speech time is to make a very practical and obvious change in order to signal that the deliberations and actions of this NFL committee were not just an occasion for a bunch of people to blow off steam. It will then be very clear when a future tournament is following the recommendations of the committee. Everyone will need to note that the rules have changed. Because this rule change at a tournament can't be ignored, it will call greater attention to the other changes. For this reason alone it is worth implementing a change in the speech times, even if it is some different change than what I suggest. Do not underestimate the importance of this kind of signaling when trying to change entrenched practices. By altering the speech times as suggested here, you'll be improving the event structurally, and you'll be sending the message that changes have been made that need to be heeded.

In closing, I would very much like to thank this committee for their efforts in maintaining and improving Lincoln-Douglas debate. I appreciate the great amount of time you are devoting to this task. Students can gain great things from participating in this form of debate, and we as educators can play a very important role in ensuring that they get as much from it as possible.

Sincerely,

R. Eric Barnes

(From the April 2006 Rostrum)

For a Truth Burden in LD

By R. Eric Barnes

I remember back in the early '80s, when I was an LD debater, a clever debater friend of mine noticed that one ballot said at the bottom something like, "The better debating was done by _____." He correctly noted that this wording entirely ignored the *resolution* of the debate, and he suggested that (if taken literally) this ballot would allow a debater to win by giving a brilliant set of arguments that had *absolutely nothing* to do with that resolution. If, for instance, the negative debater totally ignored the affirmative case and presented brilliant articulate arguments in favor of selling Alaska back to Russia, then she might still win the round, even if the resolution was about eminent domain – for it may be true that she did the better debating! Indeed, this same strategy could be adopted even by an affirmative debater. Of course, we never did this back in those days. We didn't take the ballot instructions seriously, just as most judges today ignore the ballot instructions, but we did see the problem with this criterion for what counts as winning an LD debate. That's what I want to talk about: What *constitutes* winning in LD?

First, let's talk about one answer that misses the point. While it is trivially true that the winner is the one for whom the

judge votes, that's not the interesting issue. The interesting question is the one that takes up the judge's perspective before he has made his decision. Judges in this position generally take great care to try to discover the right answer to the question, "Who won?" Indeed, if there weren't better and worse answers to this question, then there would be no point in the judge doing anything but flipping a coin! As judges, we all implicitly accept that there is a better answer to the question, "Who won?"; we work hard to get this answer right on the ballot. So, the real question is, what should judges consider when deciding a debate?

This is a complicated question, and I don't propose to answer it completely at this time. However, a partial answer is defensible in this small space. This answer depends on several assumptions about the nature and virtues of LD debate. In particular: 1) LD should be fair to both debaters; 2) LD should contain clash; and 3) LD should function as an effective educational tool for our students. Let's see where these assumptions lead us.

Everyone agrees that debate should include clash. If we want to encourage clash, then we can either insist that both debaters support opposing sides for some

What Constitutes Winning?

predetermined topic, or we can insist that the negative debater challenges *whatever* topic the affirmative debater proposes.¹ It is both fairer and more educationally valuable for high school students to have a predetermined topic (the resolution) and be able to prepare for both sides of that topic in advance. This allows for better research and preparation, and it encourages debaters to appreciate both sides of the issues that are chosen. So, that implies that the debate should be about the resolution. Since debaters want to 'pick up the ballot', they will do what is necessary to convince judges to pick them as the winner. Thus, because we want to encourage debate about the resolution, judges should reward debaters who do debate about the resolution.

Knowing that judges should reward students who debate the resolution does not mean that we know what constitutes winning the round. However, it gets us closer to an answer than you might suspect. To see this, it helps to introduce a bit more precision. Resolutions are not topics; topics are much vaguer things. If the resolution is something like, "The use of the state's power of eminent domain to promote private enterprise is unjust" then the *topic* is eminent domain, but the *resolution*

narrows the focus of the topic and *takes a stand* on it. If students are to take sides and debate the actual resolution, then they need to offer arguments about whether the resolution is more likely to be true or false. Debating about something else (even something else concerning the same broad topic) is avoiding fair clash and reduces the educational value of the event.² In other words, the arguments that both debaters offer should directly concern whether the resolution is more likely true or false. As judges, we should regard any argument that is not relevant to this question, as not relevant to the debate and therefore worthy of being ignored. If LD is to be good educational debate, then we must insist that debaters offer arguments that are relevant to the truth or falsity of the resolution and reward the debater who offers the better relevant arguments with the win.

So, at the end of a debate, if an unbiased audience would be convinced that the resolution is more likely true than false, then the AFF has won the debate; if the audience would be convinced that the resolution is more likely false than true, then the NEG has won. That's a significant part of the answer to what constitutes winning an LD debate, even if it isn't the whole story. More needs to be said about who the audience is, but that's a topic for another day. Right now, let's discuss the implications of what we've gotten so far. We know that demonstrating that the resolution is true or false is the key to winning a round, or in other words, we know that the AFF and the NEG have equal

'burdens'. Talk of burdens in LD immediately puts some people on edge, so it is worth making clear what is and is not at stake in the claim being made.

The whole point of burdens is to establish what debaters and judges can take for granted. We all agree that if debater A shows that an opponent's argument is based on a false assumption (e.g., the Holocaust did not happen), then the judge should not give any credence to that argument. We do not expect debater A to *also* provide arguments showing that judges shouldn't give credence to arguments based on false assumptions. Down that path lies regress and madness. Similarly, we can certainly expect debaters to show why an opponent's argument is irrelevant to the resolution, but it is unreasonable for judges to expect them to *also* provide arguments showing that judges shouldn't give credence to arguments that are irrelevant to the resolution. Just showing that the argument is irrelevant is all that they need to do. That's one major impact of accepting truth burdens.

The most important thing to make clear is that very few arguments that anyone might want to make are irrelevant by this standard. Let's consider the current topic again: "The use of the state's power of eminent domain to promote private enterprise is unjust." A very 'creative' debater might want to use some postmodern theory (or just her own analysis) to claim on the NEG side that the state does not exist. This seems a little bit silly to anyone who has lived in the modern *civilized* world for a little while, but perhaps we are

all suffering from a mass delusion perpetrated by capitalist ideology, so let's just see what our theory of LD burdens has to say about this argument. If the state does not exist, then the state's power of eminent domain does not exist. Something that does not exist (e.g., the Loch Ness monster) cannot be unjust. Therefore, if the arguments work and the audience is convinced that the state does not exist, then this debater will have persuaded the audience that the resolution is more likely false than true. The theory of burdens under consideration thus has nothing to say against using postmodern theories in LD, so long as they are shown to be relevant.

Another kind of argument I'd like to consider are 'kritiks'. There are many different kinds of kritiks, and some are relevant to a given topic while others are not. Similarly, there are many different kinds of arguments based on the theories of Immanuel Kant (or anyone else), some of which will be relevant to a given topic while others will not. The standard is the same for all kinds of arguments: Does the argument have any implications for the likelihood that the resolution is true? Kritiks are not denied a hearing any more than any other kinds of arguments are. For example, a kritik claiming that justice (and, by simple extension, injustice) does not exist would imply that the eminent domain resolution is false. So, that kritik is perfectly acceptable.

On the other hand, what if a debater offered a kritik saying that *the act of the judge voting*

for the NEG debater legitimizes and empowers an oppressive political regime, and so the judge must vote AFF? This claim, however unlikely, might be true, but this would not imply anything about whether the resolution itself was more likely to be true or false. So, this kind of argument would be dismissed as irrelevant. But this is as it should be, for the kritik just discussed is no different in kind from an argument claiming that voting for the NEG is unacceptable because it will have another kind of bad consequence in the real world. For example, it might increase the reputation of coach X who is on verge of taking control of the NFL with the clandestine plan of eliminating LD. Even if this were true, and voting in this way would have this effect, it would be irrelevant and should not be the basis for a judge's decision. In the same way, a referee in the Super Bowl should not be influenced by the fact that team Y has pledged to give all their profits to feed starving children if they win the game. That would be a good consequence, but a good referee will ignore that fact and rule on the merits of the plays on³ly according to the rules of the game. Things are no different in judging debate. The only arguments that matter are those that impact the likelihood of the resolution being true or false.

Some readers might wonder why I am going so far in defending postmodern arguments and kritiks. They might prefer a theory of burdens that ruled them out. I must say that although I agree that many rounds may be muddled by poorly understood

postmodernist jargon and sloppily constructed kritiks, there is no theoretically sound reason for excluding these kinds of arguments *as long as they can be shown to be relevant to the resolution*. In fact, this theory rules out very few arguments that debaters are inclined to make, but it does encourage debaters to clearly explain the link between their arguments and the truth or falsity of the resolution, and this should make all judges happier.

Finally, to see the generally open-minded nature of the claim that the debate should be about whether the resolution is more likely true or false, consider the old issue of balance arguments. Some resolutions compare the value of two things, such as, "Liberty is more precious law." In this case, the NEG needs to argue that it is more probable that "It is not the case that liberty is more precious than law" (or, put more colloquially, "Liberty is *not* more precious law"). Logically, showing this is *easier* than showing that "Law is more precious than liberty" because it allows you to argue that they are equally precious (they are 'balanced'). I agree wholeheartedly with the conventional wisdom that balance arguments are bad *as a strategy*, however, they are acceptable means of negation *in principle*. Since these arguments are relevant to the resolution, they are not out of bounds. A 'truth burden' (as it is sometimes called) just discourages the most flagrant abuses, like the kind that my old high school friend imagined, and which a few debaters recently seem to be trying. It does not significantly

limit the substance of debate *on a resolution*.

In essence, judges shouldn't vote for debaters whose arguments are not relevant to the resolution. This isn't yet the same as saying what the AFF and NEG 'burdens' are, but it isn't a far step away from it. The claim that the AFF needs to support the resolution is just a loose way of saying that the AFF needs to offer arguments showing that it is more likely true than false. This is not particularly controversial. What is more disputed is that the NEG needs to offer arguments showing that the resolution is more likely false than true. More often than not, the resistance to this claim comes from people who believe that the NEG just has to refute what the AFF has said.

From an educational perspective, allowing the NEG to win by simply refuting the AFF arguments and not adding any constructive NEG arguments will encourage students to ignore half the interesting intellectual ground surrounding a topic, since the two sides often approach these topics from very different starting places. Students will be better educated if the NEG must present independent arguments showing that the resolution is false. Imagine someone who claimed to fully understand the abortion issue when all she knew were the constructive arguments in favor of the pro-life position and direct criticisms of those arguments. This person would be in for a rude awakening. She would be ignorant of half the debate, because the pro-choice position includes many constructive arguments of its own that go

beyond criticism of pro-life arguments, and these pro-choice arguments can, in turn, be criticized. So, educationally, we owe it to our students to demand more from the NEG. Moreover, it is *fairer* to expect that the NEG take on an *equal* burden (to show that the resolution is more likely false than true) because it is easier to call another's argument into question than it is to support your own.

If actual judges like you evaluate LD rounds by asking the central question, "Would the arguments just offered convince an impartial audience that the resolution is more likely to be true or false?", then the competition will be fairer, the debates will have better clash, and our students will learn more. Any one of these is an adequate reason for adopting this perspective on judging, but the conjunction of all three is certainly conclusive.

R. Eric Barnes is a professor of philosophy at Hobart and William Smith Colleges in Geneva, NY, where he is also a member public policy studies program and the debate coach. He is the author of Philosophy in Practice: Understanding Value Debate. He is currently the facilitator for the Lincoln-Douglas Education Project. He received his Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of North Carolina.

¹ Making the AFF challenge the NEG doesn't work for obvious temporal reasons. Interestingly, the second option is not as bad as one might suspect, and it actually works rather well with college debaters in the American Parliamentary Debate Association, as long as a few other rules are added about what counts as a legitimate topic – but nevertheless, this is clearly not what LD debate is about, nor should it be.

² Someone might object here by claiming that there is equal educational value in learning to respond to non-resolutional arguments. This objection is based on the true assumption that there is *some* educational value in debates that stray from the resolution, but as a whole the objection fails because there is *less* educational value in non-resolutional debates. In school (especially college) and in life, one of the key analytical skills is the ability to stay on topic. In other words, students need to learn what counts as an objection, a response, a counter-argument, and an irrelevant tangent. If judges vote on non-resolutional arguments, they encourage their use in LD, and the students are discouraged from making these distinctions and thereby learning these key analytical skills.

Chapter 8: How the Pros Debate About Values

There is a group of people who make a living debating about values and there are numerous prestigious journals devoted to providing a forum for these debates. These people are professional philosophers and the debates take the form of books and (more commonly) articles published in professional journals. Although people such as lawyers, doctors, clergy, and politicians do often deal with moral issues - none of their jobs primarily concern the analysis of value arguments and theories. This is the domain of the professional moral philosopher.¹ Moral philosophers are concerned with answering the same sorts of question that are posed in Lincoln-Douglas debate, and both coaches and debaters can learn much from their methods of arguing.

It is my aim in this chapter is to provide insight into what makes an argument about values a good argument so that LD can move away from certain ill-founded traditions towards a more realistic and educational style of debate. To this end, I first analyze professional value argumentation, and then relate the professional style to the traditions of LD. Finally, I demonstrate how these traditions can be modified to improve the event of Lincoln-Douglas debate.

...

§ 1: The Need for General Moral Principles

When a philosopher wants to argue for a proposition of value, she does so by an appeal to a general moral principle. Ideally, this general moral principle is a fully developed moral theory or is at least implicitly related to such a theory.² A good philosophical argument clearly identifies the general moral principle that is being appealed to and then explains how the principle applies to the value proposition that is being argued for. For example, one might want to argue for the proposition: It is morally wrong to perform euthanasia. In this case, one might appeal to the general moral principle: *It is always morally wrong to intentionally kill an innocent human being*. After identifying this general principle one needs to explain exactly how it applies to the proposition by adding claims (minor premises) such as these: *Performing euthanasia is the killing of a suffering person; Performing euthanasia is an intentional act; A suffering person is a human being; A suffering person is innocent*. Together these minor premises give you the claim: *Euthanasia is the intentional killing of an innocent human being*. Schematically, the argument looks like this:

1. Performing euthanasia is the killing of a suffering person. (Premise)
2. Performing euthanasia is an intentional act. (Premise)
3. A suffering person is a human being. (Premise)
4. A suffering person is innocent. (Premise)
5. Euthanasia is the intentional killing of an innocent human being. (from 1-4)
6. It is always morally wrong to intentionally kill an innocent human being. (Premise)
- ∴ 7. It is morally wrong to perform euthanasia. (from 5 & 6)

¹ In this chapter I use the terms "professional" and "philosopher" interchangeably. Although there are other professions which involve analyzing moral questions (e.g., lawyers and clergy), only the moral philosopher has as his sole concern analyzing moral arguments. To the extent that others engage in such an analysis, they are engaging in philosophy.

² Throughout this chapter I speak of general principles *and* theories in a way that might suggest that they are different kinds of things. In fact, a moral theory is simply a general moral principle which is so general that it applies to most situations, and which explains the nature of morality as well as which things are moral and immoral. Moral theories are just a special kind of general moral principle.

I will also tend to write as if there is only one general moral principle in each argument. This is certainly not always the case. There must be at least one, but there may be more than one.

In this example, step 6 is the general moral principle, and one cannot move from step 5 to step 7 without it. Steps 1 through 5 are factual, not normative (i.e., value) claims, and it is a basic principle of logical argumentation that one cannot conclude a normative claim from only factual claims. The moral principle in an argument, as in step 6, connects the factual part of the argument to the normative conclusion.¹

Often arguments are much less explicit in their appeal to general moral principles, but the principles are no less necessary to the argument. For example, one might be trying to affirm (i.e., conclude) the value proposition that *democracy is the morally best form of government*. It might be argued that democracy is the form of government that is least susceptible to violent conflict and provides the highest standard of living for its citizens. Even if it were granted that democracy does minimize violence and maximize the standard of living, and even if democracy were the best form of government, the argument would still be incomplete. To make it complete, one needs to connect the factual claims (about democracy providing the highest standard of living and the least susceptibility to violent conflict) with the value laden proposition that democracy is morally best. What is needed is a moral principle. The implicit moral principle seems to be that *the morally best form of government is the one that provides its citizens with the best life*, or something to that effect. Schematically, the completed argument would look like this:

1. Democracy is the form of government that is least susceptible to violent conflict. (Premise)
2. Democracy provides the highest standard of living for its citizens. (Premise)
3. A government that minimizes the likelihood of violent conflict and provides for the highest standard of living, provides its citizens with the best life. (Premise)
4. The morally best government is the one that provides its citizens with the best life. (Premise)
- ∴ 5. Democracy is the morally best form of government. (Conclusion)

In actuality, many people will offer this argument by simply stating the first two premises and the conclusion - and they will assume that the audience will fill in the missing premises needed to make the argument work. This does not mean that those missing moral premises are not necessary simply because they are left out. As I stated previously, every argument for a value proposition needs a moral principle as a premise whether it is explicit or implicit.

Good philosophers always explicitly state the general moral principles to which they are appealing. There is good reason for them to do so. First, their arguments will not be complete (i.e., valid) without stating a moral principle. Second, their arguments will be more easily understood by their audiences by making the general principle and moral theory an explicit and obvious part of their argument. The first point just mentioned is established by the accepted doctrine that it is absolutely necessary to include a normative (i.e., value laden) premise in order to reach a normative conclusion.² The second point is of particular importance when one needs to convey complex arguments to an audience in a very limited amount of time. Clearly, the more explicit the foundation of the argument is, the more clearly an audience will understand it. A further point worthy of attention is that the more general the general moral principle is to which one appeals, the stronger one's argument is. This point requires a bit of explanation, which I provide in the following section.

§ 2: The Importance of Generality

More general principles have a greater justifying power than less general principles. The idea that more general (i.e., broader) principles make for stronger arguments is not unique to value debate and moral arguments. This idea applies equally in the rest of philosophy and in science as well. Take the simple assertion: *My pen will fall when I let go of it*. I can argue for this assertion by appealing to a general principle: *Objects denser than air fall when their support is removed*. The argument that results

¹ Almost all LD resolutions have been normative claims, and they all should be. So, all arguments presented both the affirmative or the negative them need a moral principle within them to be logically valid.

² This is very widely accepted principle of reasoning.

will be somewhat compelling, but it will be a weaker argument than one which appeals to a more general principle,...

In moral arguments the same reasoning applies. For example, one could argue that abortion is immoral by appealing to any of the following principles: 1) *It is immoral to kill anything that has the potential to become a person*; 2) *It is immoral to intentionally kill innocent human beings*; 3) *It is immoral to violate the categorical imperative*. Appealing to the first principle makes for a weak argument because the audience has little reason to accept it unless they are already inclined to accept the conclusion.¹ The principle is so narrow that appealing to it gives almost no force to the argument. Appealing to the second principle makes for a much stronger argument because it is likely to be accepted by many people who are not inclined to agree with the first principle. One might reasonably claim that the truth of the second general principle is confirmed (i.e., made more probable) by each correct 'prediction' it makes. That is to say, each intentional killing of an innocent human being (actual or hypothetical) that is immoral serves as a verification of this principle - just as each case of an unsupported object falling confirms Newton's theory. Since there are so many cases in which such killings seem immoral, the general principle seems to be well confirmed, and is thus a strong basis for an argument. Appeal to the third principle may make for the strongest argument of all. By appealing to a comprehensive moral theory such as Kant's, one's argument is based on a principle which is not merely a generalization, but also an explanation of the nature of morality. To elaborate, the second principle claims to *identify* a certain *subset* of all immoral actions. In contrast, the third principle claims to identify the *entire set* of immoral actions and to provide an account of what makes them immoral. The third principle differs from the others not only in being more general, but also in its accounting for the *nature* of the subject (i.e., morality). Moral theories provide us with an account of *why* things are right and wrong, and this explanation lends credence to the theory. This makes an argument which appeals to such a theory *prima facie* stronger than an argument appealing to a mere generalization. All other things being equal, an argument will be stronger if it appeals to a more general principle or theory.

... Typically it makes the most sense to use the most general principle or theory that both supports your position and is reasonably defensible. Not only does a good moral argument require some moral principle or other, but it is also true that one should strive to employ more general principles.

§ 3: Criticizing Arguments

There are two ways to attack any argument, you can claim that one of the premises (assumptions) is false, or you can claim that the conclusion does not logically follow from the premises. In most cases you will criticize an argument by claiming that one of the premises is false, so I will elaborate on this type of attack. There are two types of premises that can be attacked, moral and factual. To see this, recall the schematic argument given previously:

1. Democracy is the form of government that is least susceptible to violent conflict. (Premise)
2. Democracy provides the highest standard of living for its citizens. (Premise)
3. A government that minimizes the likelihood of violent conflict and provides for the highest standard of living, provides its citizens with the best life. (Premise)
4. The morally best government is the one that provides its citizens with the best life. (Premise)
- ∴ 5. Democracy is the morally best form of government. (Conclusion)

In this case the moral premises are given in lines 3 and 4 - in other words, these are the general moral principles. The factual premises are given in steps 1 and 2. It is generally fairly clear how to go about criticizing factual premises once they have been identified. It is less obvious what is involved in criticizing moral premises and it has a direct bearing on what moral principles should be appealed to, ...

¹ An argument based on this general principle is weak because it is an important virtue of an argument that its premises are likely to be accepted by the audience you are trying to convince (i.e., those who don't already agree with you.)

... Disputes about empirical facts rely on appeals to evidence or to common knowledge, and these disputing these facts can be important in evaluating moral propositions, though these empirical disputes can also turn into uninteresting and unpersuasive he-said/she-said disputes in a debate. In contrast, disputes about general moral principles and moral theories have the potential to be developed into rich discussions about what is most important in life and what actions are acceptable in trying to achieve what is important.

...

To sum up this section: first, criticisms of moral premises are typically based upon counter-examples which provide evidence that the moral principle is flawed, which calls the argument based on that principle into question; second, criticisms of factual premises simply require plausible empirical evidence that is contrary to the facts upon which the argument is based; third, less general moral principles are less open to counter-examples, but moral general principles have advantages which weigh in favor of their use so that it is typically better to favor the use of more general principles and theories.

§ 4: Analogies to Lincoln-Douglas

From the analysis of professional value argumentation, several analogies can be drawn to the current traditions in Lincoln-Douglas. Because LD has few documented rules outside of the speech times, the standards for LD are based largely on traditions that have evolved along with the event. Four issues are of central concern because they are primarily what define how the event is currently practiced. These issues surround the traditions of the value premise and the different conceptions of a criterion.

The Value Premise

The concept of a value premise is taken to be of central importance to LD, and it has become deeply entrenched in people's understanding of the event. In some ways, the value premise is just like the general moral principle in professional philosophy. A value premise is supposed to be the fundamental normative claim in the LD speech, just as a general moral principle is the fundamental normative claim in a professional argument. It has a central place in the constructive speech and it is commonly demanded by an opponent if it is not provided initially, just as general moral principles are placed and demanded in professional arguments. There is no doubt that the origin of the value premise in LD lies in the recognition of the need for appeal to a general moral principle in a value debate. Just as a philosophical argument cannot be valid without a general moral principle, an LD constructive seems to require a value premise. Both are almost universally demanded by their respective audiences.

Even though these concepts are similar, they are different in many ways, particularly regarding how that are employed. The most striking difference is that a general moral principle is always a complete proposition; whereas, a value premise is usually stated as a single term which refers to a concept commonly taken to be a value. For example, a general moral principle might be "Paternalism is never justified" and the classic value premise is "justice." This is not merely a grammatical distinction, though in some cases it may seem like it. In some cases it may be that the one word value premise is simply shorthand for a genuine principle. For example, "justice" may be shorthand for, "It is always moral to do what results in the most just outcome." So long as the value premise is interpreted as a proposition that functions as a general moral principle, the value premise is serving a proper function, even if not as clearly as it might.

The Value Criterion

There is also an analogy between the value criterion in LD and certain important parts of moral arguments. The value criterion is a frequently misunderstood and misused aspect of an LD speech. Essentially, the value criterion is supposed to explain how the debater intends to achieve his value premise. For instance, if a debater's value premise is justice, his value criterion might be equal opportunity. This means that he intends to show that by upholding his side of the resolution, justice will be achieved through achieving equality of opportunity. Traditionally, the value criterion is expected to be

a single term also referring to a commonly held value. Again, the essential idea is that the value criterion is the first step in the link between the value premise and the conclusion. Of course, in philosophical arguments, each step is expressed in a proposition instead of a single term - but again, the grammatical difference might indicate a shorthand. The value criterion "equal opportunity" (when given under the value premise of justice) may be shorthand for the proposition "In order to achieve justice, one must achieve equality of opportunity." This makes sense of the use of the value criterion in LD. However, it is worth pointing out that this sort of value criterion is also a general moral principle, just as the value premise is.

The Criterion for Judgment

Confusingly, debaters in some regions of the country tend to include a criterion for judgment, and not a value criterion. To add to the confusion, though they are similarly named and exclusively used (i.e., never used together), they have almost no conceptual relation or similar place in the logical structure of a case. The fact that they both tend to be mentioned at the beginning of a speech is not logically relevant. A criterion for judgment functions as a means of evaluating the values being debated to discover which values are more valuable. For example, Jeffrey Wiese in *Lincoln-Douglas Debate: Values in Conflict*, suggests four different criteria for use in LD, three of which are philosophical moral theories.¹ A criterion for judgment is supposed to let one decide which is more valuable: love or money, equality or justice, life or quality of life, etc. In this way, the criterion for judgment functions 'over' the value premise, and its function is to provide a way of comparing values which might otherwise seem incommensurable. Using an example from Wiese's text, it may happen that an affirmative debater is defending individual rights and using a value premise of liberty - while the negative debater is defending societal rights and using a value premise of protection. Either debater might introduce a criterion for judgment such as utilitarianism, and argue that her value creates more utility than her opponent's value and so should be preferred. As this example shows, the existence of a criterion of judgment is dependent on the existence of the value premise, but it is also a way of connecting the value premise to a philosophical theory. In this way, the use of a criterion for judgment is supported by analogy to professional moral argumentation because it encourages one to connect one's argument to a moral theory.

§ 5: Serious Problems

Although the traditions of using value premises, value criterion, and criterion for judgment can be partially justified by analogies to professional philosophy, there are problems created by the current employment of these traditions. Major problems result from pervasive misunderstandings regarding the proper use of the value premise and value criterion.

The problems stem primarily from the expectation that the value premise be **a value**. What arguments need are premises, and normative arguments need normative premises (i.e., general moral principles). A value, such as justice, cannot be a premise and can have no bearing on an argument, until it is embedded in a proposition. By merely stating a value as the value premise, the audience must assume that the value is a shorthand for a proposition. However, the exact nature of this shorthand is rarely made explicit, because the debaters simply don't grasp what is going on. They have been told that they need a value premise, and they are given a list of commonly accepted values from which to choose. The choice is typically made based on which value sounds best with their case, and the value chosen is typically *justice*. Debaters certainly do not choose a value premise based on which serves as the best shorthand for their general moral principle. Most debaters don't even know what the general moral principle implicit in their case is, and they are given little incentive to articulate this crucial part of their argument. All they need to say in most rounds is, "My value premise is justice." If pushed by their

¹ These criteria are: cost benefit analysis, utilitarianism, deontology, and futurism (an adaptation of Nietzsche's theory). The last three are all philosophical moral theories, and the first should probably be counted as one also since it is hard to distinguish from consequentialism.

opponent, they can give one of several virtually vacuous definitions of "justice" and claim that their case supports this nebulous concept. In short, the value premise in today's LD round has almost no relation to the crucial element of value argumentation, the general moral principle. The problem is that in order to deserve such a prominent place in the debate the value premise needs to serve the function of a general moral principle - but because a value premise is not a proposition, it cannot adequately serve this function.

Unfortunately, the condition of the value criterion is even worse. I grant that debaters must be taught that they need to provide logical links between their conclusions and general moral principles, and the insistence on a value criterion does serve this purpose to some extent. However, there are problems with the value criterion that are caused by the same thing that caused problems with the value premise. Students are expected to inject into their speech a single term referring to a value, and this is supposed to be the value criterion. I grant that this can work in a sort of a shorthand fashion, as in the example given previously about equal opportunity and justice. However, the current traditions confuse debaters and mislead them into thinking that a value can provide a logical link apart from being within a proposition. There is no good reason to believe that most logical links from general moral principles to conclusions can be adequately conveyed by referring to things that are commonly considered to be values. Once again debaters are left choosing a value criterion from a list of accepted values on the basis of which one 'sounds good.'

There are further results of the misleading nature of the current traditions of the value premise and value criterion: 1) *multiple arguments become awkward*; 2) *the point of conflict is obscured*; 3) *irrelevant stock issue debates are common*, and; 4) *some arguments are virtually ruled out for not having a connection to typical values*. First, multiple arguments become awkward because they often do not appeal to the same general principle and are not connected to a single value. Traditionally there is a single value premise and a single criterion. A debater who has two (or more) good but substantially different arguments for one side, sometimes must choose to either abandon one of the arguments or face charges that one argument does not connect to the value premise and criterion.

Second, these two traditions also serve to obscure the point of conflict by making it seem like the conflict is between two values, when more often it is between two moral theories or principles. The basis of the disputes that underlie most resolutions are theoretical differences, such as deontological versus consequentialist, or competing interpretations of political theories regarding the legitimate role of the state. These disputes cannot be adequately captured by pitting one value term against another, yet the current traditions encourage this.

Third, the value premise part of a debate typically turns into *whose value is more valuable*, and this entirely misses the real point of conflict in most cases. The value premise is the primary stock issue in LD, though people also use the value criterion as a stock issue. Much more often than not these stock issue debates are totally irrelevant to the substance of the issue. However, the tradition encourages such issues to be taken as voting issues, which is absurd given how off point this part of the debate generally is.

Finally, certain powerful arguments are virtually ruled out by these traditions. Some arguments employ general principles which are not based on a commonly held value, but which nevertheless yield value laden conclusions. Examples of this kind of argument are function arguments, which I discuss elsewhere in this textbook. In fact, the 'one argument case' given in Appendix B of this textbook is an example of an argument which would be stifled by requiring a value premise and value criterion. The concepts simply do not work with all arguments and it is unreasonable to discourage innovative and persuasive forms of argumentation by requiring that the current traditions be adhered to.

The criterion for judgment is in some ways the least problematic concept. To the extent that it encourages an appeal to moral theory for ultimate justification of moral principles, it is just fine. However, the problem is that the current understanding of the criterion for judgment is tied too closely to the use of a value, instead of a proposition, as the value premise. Moral theories were developed to justify moral propositions (of various generality), not to tell us which values are more valuable - which is an extremely odd question in the first place. Moral theories do not tend to justify or compare values, though they may in some cases - but it certainly is not something that works in most situations. The

problem with the criterion for judgment is that people take it to be doing a job (comparing values) that really needs to be abandoned in favor of another job (comparing general moral principles).

In sum, there are serious problems with the traditional employment of the value premise, the value criterion, and (by association) the criterion for judgment. The event would be better off with revised concepts in their stead. Of course, this is not the sort of reform that should be legislated from on high by the NFL. However, it is very important that the NFL revise the rules and guidelines so that they do not unfairly (and unwisely) entrench these flawed concepts into the event.

In the remainder of this chapter I present a number of suggestions as to how we can improve the traditions.

§ 6: Reforming the Traditions

Something similar to a value premise is needed in LD, but it needs to be such that debaters are encouraged to state propositions instead of single terms. This is necessary in order to steer them towards structuring arguments around general moral principles. The term "value premise" could accurately refer to a general moral principle, since "premise" refers to a proposition that is the basis of an argument (like a principle) and the word "value" indicates that it is normative (i.e., moral). Even so, the term "value premise" invites some confusion because one can read it as referring to *a value that is a premise* (which is what seems to have happened), instead of referring to *a premise that is value laden*. Something needs to be done to correct this misinterpretation. Because of the confusion associated with the term "value premise," a new term is needed to refer to the general moral principles debaters should be encouraged to include in their speeches. Perhaps a term like "value principle" would be appropriate, since "general moral principle" might be too cumbersome. Of course, the main point is not just to introduce a new term into LD, but rather to make a substantive change in the way debaters debate. The new term is merely a tool to encourage this new approach to debate. The main thing to emphasize is that debaters should be building cases around general moral principles or moral theories, and they should make these explicit in their cases.¹

The concept of the value criterion needs to be replaced. Good debaters have long understood the importance of strong logical links in their cases. The value criterion was useful to the extent that it encouraged making these links explicit, but it would be better if we simply stopped encouraging anything quite like a value criterion, and began encouraging a complete series of explicit logical links that made arguments easy to understand. As I said before, these logical links are what connect the value principle with the conclusion of the argument (i.e., the affirmation or negation of the resolution). Of course, an argument does not typically require a single logical link, but rather a series of links that string together to make an argument. In this way, the term "logical links" is more instructive than the traditional term "value criterion" which suggests a single thing. Of course, these logical links should be propositions and not single terms, and they need not be associated with any value at all. Logical links are simply the intermediate steps that are required to make an argument explicit and easily understandable.²

¹ Both moral theories and independent moral principles have a place in LD. I worry that I have given the impression (by consistently referring to general moral principles) that moral theories are less important than independent principles (i.e., moral principles not directly related to a comprehensive moral theory). In this chapter I have intended the term "general moral principles" to refer to moral theories as well as independent principles. As I stated earlier, there is good reason to prefer a comprehensive moral theory to a mere generalization. In light of this, debaters should be encouraged to appeal to moral theories. A debater's value principle can be the statement of a moral theory (e.g., *the right action is the one which maximizes utility* - which essentially states the entire theory of utilitarianism), or it can be a corollary of a theory that she formulates herself. In any case, explicit appeal to a moral theory should be encouraged. It may even be good to encourage a stock cross-examination question like "What moral theory do you base your claims on?" I'm not claiming that appeal to moral theory should be required, simply that it should be common.

² For examples, look back to the schematic arguments about euthanasia and about democracy. In the euthanasia argument, steps 1 through 5 would be considered the logical links. In the democracy argument, steps 1 through 3 would be considered the logical links.

After changing the nature of the value premise to be a value principle, the appropriate changes with regard to the criterion for judgment might naturally fall into place. Using as examples the schematic arguments given previously in this chapter, the criteria for judgment would be moral theories that offered support for the value principles being used. For example, to support one's use of the value principle, "Paternalism is never justified," one might appeal to utilitarianism as one's criterion for judgment. When trying to compare principles, debaters should naturally come to use moral theories, as philosophers often do. This would be a boon to the event, and such appeals to theories should be encouraged.

The likely problem with continuing to insist upon a criterion for judgment is that it may well become superfluous. If the value principle in an argument is itself a moral theory (instead of an independent principle) then there is no logical place for a criterion for judgment. It could serve no useful function in such cases. This invites misinterpretation and irrelevant stock issue clash. Even if a moral theory were not the value principle, a debater might want to offer a truly independent principle as her value principle, and so expecting a criterion for judgment (which employs a moral theory) would discourage this perfectly legitimate tactic. For these reasons, it would be best to abandon the criterion for judgment, and simply expect debaters to use moral theory to back up value principles when appropriate without having an *expectation* of there be a criterion for judgment.

§ 7: Conclusion

These changes - away from value premises, value criteria, and criteria for judgment - and towards value principles and logical links, will do much for the clarity and quality of debate. It should also be easier to teach debaters what to do because the new concepts are grounded in widely accepted standards of argumentation that are intuitive and easier to explain. The benefits to the students should also be substantial. Almost all LD debaters go on to college. In all academic fields, the style of argumentation is much closer to that which I suggest than it is to the current traditions. Debaters will be better prepared by using the concepts I suggest because they are far less idiosyncratic than the traditional LD concepts.¹

Lincoln-Douglas debate should continue to evolve and improve. Coaches need to take the initiative and steer the event toward these improvements. Changes of these sorts will not be immediate, but we can move towards a better style of debate by slowly altering certain traditions which do a disservice to the event. In the end, everyone will benefit from the improvements despite the inevitably awkward transition. The benefits of such a transition far outweigh the costs.

¹ Another way in which the event can change is by increasing its tolerance for constructive cases that thoroughly develop a single line of argumentation. Currently, most debaters will offer several (usually three) contentions, which are generally brief and sketchy arguments. This is fine at the novice and local level because it is difficult for students of this age to develop more refined and extensively defended arguments. However, at the national varsity level judges should be accepting of constructive cases that offer a single argument that is fully developed and extensively defended. This is the mark of a good thinker and advanced interlocutor. Once again taking a hint from professional academic practice, it is generally accepted that one good argument is better than three mediocre arguments. An intelligent audience ought to be more swayed by quality than by quantity of arguments, and so top level debaters should be encouraged to sometimes pick their strongest argument and fully develop it - leaving the less promising lines out of the case. This will facilitate better debate and a better understanding of what will be expected of them later on in their academic careers.

The Proper Use of Evidence

Traditions differ regionally regarding the appropriate place of evidence in Lincoln-Douglas. LD is supposed to be value debate, and it was created partly in reaction to the perceived excesses of policy debate, so there has been a widespread interest in preventing it from becoming like a one on one policy event. One way some people try to keep LD unlike policy is by restricting the use of evidence in the rounds. This is typically accomplished by tradition, though the most recent LD guidelines attempted to provide some small amount of guidance. LD practitioners in certain regions of the nation are much more accepting of evidence than are others because different traditions have developed locally. Some local traditions are quite intolerant of evidence while others probably rely too much upon it. Some prominent coaches have indignantly reproached judges for taking empirical evidence into serious consideration in important rounds. Before discussing the proper place of evidence in moral arguments, one needs to distinguish between two different kinds of evidence - authoritative and empirical. Authoritative evidence primarily includes quotes from theorists about understanding moral issues and which theories are best. Authoritative evidence is universally used and accepted as a legitimate part of LD, even though its value is often overestimated. Some people care more about it than others, but that is not my concern here.¹ Empirical evidence is what concerns me here, and this includes facts about the world and predictions about what is likely to happen in the future. Empirical evidence is used by professional philosophers, political theorist and public policy analysts as an essential part of their moral arguments. It has a place in LD as well.

Although coaches have reason to be wary of too much empirical evidence in LD, we cannot let this lure us into using formal rules or simple tradition to exclude such evidence from the event. Empirical evidence is incessantly heard in policy debate, and we wouldn't want to hear anything like a nuke war disad in an LD round. But these legitimate concerns have had the unfortunate effect of suppressing what can be an important part of value debate. Value debate is still debate about the real world, and sometimes empirical facts about the world are relevant to the resolution. When debating the morality of euthanasia, empirical evidence about terminal illness is relevant. When debating the justice of privileged communication, empirical evidence about its effects on the medical community is relevant. The relevance of empirical evidence is self evident as soon as one notices that one of the two primary types of moral argumentation is totally dependent on empirical claims. To make any consequentialist argument, one must make claims about what the consequences of various actions will be. To justify these essential claims, one has no other recourse than to appeal to empirical evidence, and the way to criticize these claims is also with empirical evidence. So, unless we choose to eliminate all consequentialist moral arguments from LD, one must accept that empirical evidence has a place in LD.

We cannot reasonably eliminate empirical evidence, but we do not need to do so in order to ensure that LD does not fall into a 'policy trap' of too much evidence and not enough logical analysis. There are two reasons why allowing empirical evidence will not lead LD down the path towards 'policy madness.' First, good coaches are able to teach their students to defeat those debaters who rely too heavily on evidence. This is not very difficult because evidence is typically used in consequentialist arguments, and a coach can give students instruction on how to defeat the moral underpinnings of such an argument.² Second, there is so little time in an LD round that someone concentrating on reading evidence will have very little time for providing analysis which is what ultimately convinces a good judge. Considering these two factors, there is no good justification for discounting relevant empirical evidence from an LD round.

¹ I can't resist pointing out that argument by appeal to authority is a weak and simplistic approach to the issues raised in LD. It is much more impressive to hear a debater explain *why* Locke supported the right to property than to hear a quote read which simply states *that* he supported it.

² Many other strategies exist for doing this well. The basic idea is simply to point out that the evidence debater is relying on the principle that *the ends justify the means*, and then to criticize this principle in the way that you would criticize utilitarianism. This is a remarkably effective means of defeating evidence oriented debaters.

NFL APPENDICES

**VALID FOR BOTH NFL DISTRICT AND NATIONAL
TOURNAMENTS**



NATIONAL FORENSIC LEAGUE

(October 25, 2005)



2006



ATTENTION: Use CURRENT update.

All obsolete copies should be ignored.

NFL APPENDICES

These sections are valid for both the NFL district and national tournaments.

APPENDIX II Judge Instructions

All Judges

1. All judges are to report to their assigned rooms at least five minutes before the time the contest is scheduled to begin.
2. Each judge's ballot is to be secured from contest official.
3. Read instructions on the back of the ballot.
4. **Do not confer with the other judges.**
5. Judges should not interrupt the flow of debates or contests in any way. They are to be there as silent evaluators and should not reveal their decision.

Policy, Public Forum and L/D Judges

6. During the questioning periods in Policy and L/D, the time belongs to the debater asking the questions. The questions should be brief and the answers short and specific. The person answering the questions should not be permitted to refute, but should be limited to simply answering the questions. The questioner should not be permitted to comment on the answers.
7. During the "crossfire" questioning periods in Public Forum debate, the time belongs to all debaters to ask and answer questions. The first question of each crossfire period should be given by the first speaking team. The questions and answers should be brief and specific. Speakers should stand during regular Crossfire and should remain seated for the Grand Crossfire.
8. A judge must render a decision no later than 10 minutes after the final speaker concludes.

Speech Judges

9. If a contestant is not present when his/her number is called, the judge is to go on to the next one. When the tardy contestant arrives, s/he should be heard next. At some district contests, students are participating in another contest scheduled for the same hour and they cannot avoid being late. For the same reason, a student may have to leave immediately after speaking.
10. As students announce their subjects, the judge is to please write the title of the selection in the designated space on the ballot.
11. If a contestant exceeds the time limit, the contestant is not to be disqualified, but if the overtime is excessive, it should affect the judge's ranking as much as s/he deems proper.
12. If a contestant does not arrive by the end of the contest, the judge is to inquire about the absent contestant before s/he marks the ballot. Every contestant should be heard.
13. After all contestants have been heard, they are to be ranked 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 (no ranks alike) in the order of excellence. Number 1 is the best speaker.

14. The judge must be sure to double check the ballot, sign it, seal it in the envelope, and return it to the ballot table.

APPENDIX I Timing

NFL Time Limits

Debate

Aff. Constructive speech	8 min.
Aff. is questioned by a Neg. speaker	3 min.
Neg. Constructive speech	8 min.
Neg. is questioned by an Aff. speaker	3 min.
Aff. Constructive speech	8 min.
Aff. is questioned by the other Neg. speaker	3 min.
Neg. Constructive speech	8 min.
Neg. is questioned by other Aff. speaker	3 min.
Neg. Rebuttal	5 min.
Aff. Rebuttal	5 min.
Neg. Rebuttal	5 min.
Aff. Rebuttal	5 min.

DEBATE PREP TIME (per team) 5 min.
(Each debater must do *one and only one* Constructive, one period of questioning, one period of answering, and one rebuttal.)

Lincoln Douglas Debate

Affirmative	Constructive	6 Minutes
Negative	Cross Examination	3 Minutes
Negative	Constructive	7 Minutes
Affirmative	Cross Examination	3 Minutes
Affirmative	Rebuttal	4 Minutes
Negative	Rebuttal	6 Minutes
Affirmative	Rebuttal	3 Minutes

L/D PREP TIME (per debater) 3 min.

Public Forum Debate

First Speaker - Team A	4 Minutes
First Speaker - Team B	4 Minutes
Crossfire	3 Minutes
Second Speaker - Team A	4 Minutes
Second Speaker - Team B	4 Minutes
Crossfire	3 Minutes
Summary - First Speaker - Team A	2 Minutes
Summary - First Speaker - Team B	2 Minutes
Grand Crossfire	3 Minutes
Final Focus - Second Speaker - Team A	1 Minute
Final Focus - Second Speaker - Team B	1 Minute
PREP TIME	(per team) 2 Minutes

Speech Events

EXTEMP	Maximum 7 min.
EXTEMP PREP TIME	30 min.
ORIGINAL ORATORY	Maximum 10 min.
DRAMATIC INTERPRETATION	Maximum 10 min.
HUMOROUS INTERPRETATION	Maximum 10 min.
DUO INTERPRETATION	Maximum 10 min.
EXTEMP COMMENTARY	Maximum 5 min.
EXTEMP COMMENTARY PREP TIME	20 min.
PROSE	Maximum 5 min.
POETRY	Maximum 5 min.
IMPROMPTU	Maximum 5 min.
EXPOSITORY	Maximum 5 min.

APPENDIX III Ballot Instructions

status quo. ~~Therefore, decision rules are fair issues to be argued in the round.~~

Debate

In arriving at your decision take into consideration the following aspects of good debating:

Analysis: Getting to the heart of the question.

Proof: Supporting contentions with sufficient and convincing evidence.

Argument: Sound reasoning; logical conclusions.

Adaptation: Clashing with the opposition.

Refutation: Destroying opponent's contentions; reinforcing your own.

Organization: Clear, logical presentation of material.

Speaking: Effective delivery; favorable impact on audience.

Speaker Points:

The judge is to rate each debater's effectiveness on a scale from 18 to 30.

Public Forum Debate

1. Public Forum Debate is a team event that advocates or rejects a position posed by the resolution. A central tenet of the debate is that the clash of ideas must be communicated in a manner persuasive to the non-specialist or "citizen judge", i.e. a member of the American jury.

2. The debate should:

- display solid logic, reasoning, and analysis
- utilize evidence but not be driven by it
- present a clash of ideas
- counter the arguments of the opponents (rebuttal)
- communicate ideas with clarity, organization, eloquence, and professional decorum

3. Public Forum is a unique debate form. While Policy Debate focuses on a plan to solve the problem(s) posed by the resolution, and Lincoln Douglas Debate focuses on the core value of the resolution, Public Forum Debate focuses on advocacy of a position derived from issues presented in the resolution, not a prescribed set of burdens.

4. In Public Forum Debate, a plan or counterplan is defined by the NFL as a formalized, comprehensive proposal for implementation. Neither the pro or con side is permitted to offer a plan or counterplan; rather, they should offer reasoning to support a position of advocacy. Debaters may offer generalized, practical solutions.

5. New arguments in the "final focus" should be ignored. The "final focus" must be based on argument and issues previously addressed in the debate.

6. Logical reasoning, maturity of thought, and effectiveness of communication are of primary consideration. Evidence, examples, and analogies are to be used for the purpose of illustration.

7. In making a decision, a judge should be as objective as possible. Remember these are propositions upon which there may have strong feelings of which the debaters are unaware. Judges should adjudicate the round as it is debated, not as they personally feel.

Lincoln-Douglas Debate

1. Unlike policy debate, the resolution to be debated will be a proposition of value rather than a proposition of policy. Thus the students are encouraged to develop argumentation on the resolution in its entirety based upon conflicting underlying principles and values to support their positions. To that end, they are not responsible for practical applications; no plan will be offered by the affirmative.

2. There are no prescribed burdens in L-D as there are in policy debate; no "burden of proof" and no "presumption." There is no

2006 Ed.

3. Evidence is not a primary consideration in L-D Debate. Logical reasoning is of primary consideration as well as the maturity of thought. Examples and analogies are to be used for purposes of illustration only. The nature of proof should be in the logic and the ethos of authoritative opinion.

4. This event is not unrelated oratory; ~~as such~~ there must be clash concerning the major arguments in the debate. The clash must relate to the values argumentation. Cross Examination should clarify and advance argumentation.

5. Communication in L-D Debate should approximate superior speaking to community groups.

6. In making your decision, be as objective as you possibly can. Remember these are value propositions upon which you may have strong feelings of which the debaters are unaware. You should judge the round as it is debated, not as you personally feel. You might ask yourself the following questions:

- Which debater persuaded you that his/her position was more valid?
- Which debater communicated more effectively?
- Which debater logically supported his/her position more effectively?

Extemporaneous Speaking

The extempore speech should not be regarded as a memory test of the material contained in any one magazine article, but rather as an original synthesis by the speaker of the current fact and opinion on the designated topic as presented by numerous sources.

The contestant therefore should be held accountable for strict adherence to the precise statement of the topic drawn and dis-counted severely for shifting to some other phase of the topic on which s/he might prefer to speak. The information presented should be well-chosen, pertinent, and sufficient to support the central thought of the topic.

The material should be organized according to some logical plan to produce a complete speech within the time allowed. Delivery should be free from marked defects in the mechanics of speech -- poise, quality and use of voice, enunciation, fluency, bodily expressiveness -- and should be effective in enlisting and holding the interest of the audience.

The best extemporaneous speech combines clear thinking, good speaking, and interesting presentation to establish a definite thought with respect to the subject chosen.

Do not require a contestant speaking on a controversial subject to take a personal stand on that issue. S/He may do so, or s/he may elect to present both sides of the controversy as currently set forth in the public press. Judge him/her on the effectiveness with which s/he develops the subject according to his/her own plan.

There is NO minimum qualifying time for the extemp speech. Do not penalize a contestant for brevity unless s/he fails to cover adequately the subject s/he has chosen. Maximum time is seven minutes. Impose no penalty for slight overtime, but do so if in your judgment it is excessive.

Original Oratory

Since these orations have been written by the contestants delivering them, the judges should consider Thought, Composition, and Delivery. However, since this is a contest in speech rather than in essay writing, the emphasis should be placed on the speech phase. Thought and composition should be considered primarily in the way they are employed to make effective speaking possible.

The orator should not be expected to solve any of the great problems of the day. Rather, s/he should be expected to discuss intelligently, with a degree of originality, in an interesting manner, and with some profit to his/her audience the topic s/he has chosen. Any appropriate subject may be chosen but the orator must be truthful. Any non-factual reference, especially a personal one, **MUST** be so identified.

Although many orations deal with a current problem and propose a solution, the judge is expressly reminded that this is not the only acceptable form of oratory. The oration may simply alert the audience to a threatening danger, strengthen its devotion to an accepted cause, or eulogize a person. The orator should be given free choice of subject and judged solely on the effectiveness of its development and presentation.

The composition should be considered carefully for its rhetoric and diction. The use of appropriate figures of speech, similes and metaphors, balanced sentences, allusions, and other rhetorical devices to make the oration more effective should be noted especially. Use of American English should be more than correct; it should reveal a discriminating choice of words and altogether fine literary qualities. It should be especially adapted to oral presentation.

Delivery should be judged for mastery of the usual mechanics of speech – poise, quality and use of voice, bodily expressiveness, and for the qualities of directness and sincerity which impress the oration upon the minds of the audience. An orator should not be penalized for a few seconds overtime.

No particular style of delivery is to be set up as the one correct style to which all contestants must conform. Rather, each contestant is to be judged upon the effectiveness of his/her delivery, free to choose or develop whatever style will best give him/her that effectiveness with his/her particular oration. No visual aids are permitted.

Interpretation

The art of interpretation is to be regarded as recreating the characters in the story presented and making them seem living and real to the audience. Presentation shall be from memory and without the use of physical objects or costume.

A selection for interpretation must be a cutting from a single literary work: one novel, or one short story, or one play, or one or more poems. Monologues are acceptable. During the presentation, the contestant must name the author and the book or magazine from which the cutting was made. Adaptation may be for the purpose of transition. The selection should be judged for its appropriateness as contest material and its suitability to the particular contestant using it. The use of good literature should be noted favorably and a selection devoid of literary merit graded lowest.

This is a contest in interpretation. The contestants should be evaluated on poise, quality and use of voice, inflections, emphasis, pronunciation, enunciation, physical expression, and especially the ability to interpret characters correctly and consistently. Narrative, if included, should be vivid and animated so as to be an interesting and integral part of the story rather than just "filler" between portions of dialogue.

The final test of good interpretation is the ability to use all these factors so successfully and unobtrusively that the hearer forgets that this is a contest and in a created atmosphere is carried away to the time and place of the story being unfolded.

Duo Interpretation

The art of interpretation is to be regarded as recreating the characters in the story presented and making them seem living and real to the audience. Presentation shall be from memory and without the use of physical objects or costume.

A selection for interpretation must be a cutting from a single literary work: one novel, or one short story, or one play, or one or more poems. In Duo Interpretation each of the two performers may play one or more characters, so long as performance responsibility in the cutting remains as balanced as possible. [If the selection is prose or poetry and contains narration, either or both of the performers may present the narration.] During the presentation, the team must name the author and the book or magazine from which the cutting was made. Adaptation may be for the purpose of transition. The selection should be judged for its appropriateness as contest material and its suitability to the particular contestant using it. The use of good literature should be noted favorably and a selection devoid of literary merit graded lowest.

This is a contest in interpretation. The contestants should be evaluated on poise, quality and use of voice, inflections, emphasis, pronunciation, enunciation, physical expression, and especially the ability to interpret characters correctly and consistently. Narrative, if included, should be vivid and animated so as to be an interesting and integral part of the story rather than just "filler" between portions of dialogue.

The final test of good interpretation is the ability to use all these factors so successfully and unobtrusively that the hearer forgets that this is a contest and in a created atmosphere is carried away to the time and place of the story being unfolded.

APPENDIX IV Citation rule for Electronic Retrieval of Contest Materials

At the NFL Executive Council 1996 Fall Meeting :

Moved by Roberts/seconded by Sferra "that electronically retrieved evidence used in any NFL contest event must conform to the citation standard of the Modern Language Association (recommended by the computer section of the NFL summer conference). Passed, unanimous.

The MLA Handbook for Writers of Research Papers Fifth Edition, by Joseph Gibaldi, provides these guidelines:

Citing Online Databases

Citations of publications from online databases require some elements that citations of printed sources do not:

Publication medium. Many databases online are also published in other formats and may not be exactly the same in each. You must therefore include the publication medium (Online) in your [citation]

Name of computer service or computer network. Online publications are accessed through a computer service - such as BRS, Dialog, Dow Jones News Retrieval, CompuServe, Nexis, OCLC, and Prodigy - or a computer network, such as the Internet. For your [citation] to be complete, you have to state the name of the service or network that provided your source.

Date of access. Since each online publication must be considered unique, you may need to indicate two dates in your citation. . . For example, if the online database indicates that the material you are using was originally published in the New York Times on 1 April 1993, you must, of course, include that date in the citation. In addition, to acknowledge that what you are using may differ from not only the printed version but also any past or future online version, state the date when you accessed the material.

Material Accessed through a Computer Service

Documents and data from online databases available through computer services can be divided into two groups:

- * Material that indicates publication information for a printed source or printed analogue
- * Material that does not indicate a specific print counterpart

Publication Information for a Printed Source

Many databases collect and present materials previously or simultaneously made available in print.

If a printed source or analogue is indicated for the material you are citing, your [citation] should consist of the following items:

1. Name of the author (if given)
2. Publication information for the printed source or analogue (including title and date of print publication)
3. Title of the database (underlined)
4. Publication medium (*Online*)
5. Name of the computer service
6. Date of access

Angier, Natalie. "Chemists Learn Why Vegetables Are Good for You." New York Times 13 Apr. 1993, late ed.: Cl. New York Times Online. Online. Nexis. 10 Feb. 1994.

Galloway, Stephen. "TV Takes the Fall in Violence Poll." Hollywood Reporter 23 July 1993: 16. PTS F and S Indexes. Online. Dialog. 14 Jan. 1994.

Guidelines for Family Television Viewing. Urbana: ERIC Clearinghouse on Elementary and Early Childhood Educ., 1990. Eric. Online. BRS. 22 Nov. 1993.

Stempel, Carl William. "Towards a Historical Sociology of Sport in the United States, 1825-1875." DAI 53 (1993): 3374A. U. of Oregon. 1992. Dissertation Abstracts Online. Online. OCLC Epic. 3 Dec 1993.

If you cannot find some of the information required—for example, the name of the computer service—cite what is available.

Angier, Natalie. "Chemists Learn Why Vegetables Are Good for You." New York Times 13 Apr. 1993, late ed.: Cl. New York Times Online. Online. 10 Feb. 1994.

No Printed Source Specified

If no specific printed source or printed analogue is indicated for the material you are citing, your [citation] should consist of the following items:

1. Name of the author (if given)
2. Title of the material accessed (in quotation marks)
3. Date of the material (if given)
4. Title of the database (underlined)
5. Publication medium (*Online*)
6. Name of the computer service
7. Date of access

"Comex Gold Contracts: Quotes from 4 Nov. 1992 to Dec. 1994." Dow Jones Futures and Index Quotes. Online. Dow Jones News Retrieval. 6 Nov. 1992.

"Foreign Weather: European Cities." Accu-Data. Online. Dow Jones News Retrieval. 20 Aug. 1993.

Glicken, Morley D. "A Five-Step Plan to Renew Your Creativity." National Business Employment Weekly. Online. Dow Jones News Retrieval. 10 Nov. 1992.

"Middle Ages." Academic American Encyclopedia. Online. Prodigy. 30 Mar. 1992.

"Time Warner, Inc.: Sales Summary, 1988-1992." Disclosure/Worldscope. Online. Lexis. 4 Jan. 1994.

"U.S. Population by Age: Urban and Urbanized Areas." 1990 U.S. Census of Population and Housing. Online. Human Resource Information Network. 3 May 1994.

If you cannot find some of the information required—for example, the name of the computer service—cite what is available.

Time Warner, Inc.: Sales Summary, 1988-1992." Disclosure/Worldscope. Online. 4 Jan. 1994.

Material Accessed through a Computer Network

- * Electronic journals, electronic newsletters, and electronic conferences (e.g., moderated forums, such as discussion lists)
- * Electronic texts

Journals and Newsletters

Your [citation] from an electronic journal, electronic newsletter, or electronic conference document should be similar to one for an article in a print periodical though there are a few necessary differences. The entry should consist of the following items:

1. Name of the author (if given)
2. Title of the article or document (in quotation marks)
3. Title of the journal, newsletter, or conference (underlined)
4. Volume number, issue number, or other identifying number
5. Year or date of publication (in parentheses)
6. Number of pages or paragraphs (if given) or n. page. ("no pagination")
7. Publication medium (*Online*)
8. Name of the computer network
9. Date of access

Alston, Robin. "The Battle of the Books." Humanist 7.0176 (10 Sept. 1993): 10pp. Online. Internet. 10 Oct. 1993.

Lindsay, Robert K. "Electronic Journals of Proposed Research." EJournal 1.1 (1991): n. pag. Online. Internet. 10 Apr. 1991.

Moulthrop, Stuart. "You Say You Want a Revolution? Hypertext of the Laws of Media." Postmodern Culture 1.3 (1991): 53 pars. Online. BITNET. 10 Jan. 1993.

Readings, Bill. "Translation and Comparative Literature: The Terror of European Humanism." Surfaces 1.11 (Dec. 1991): 19 pp. Online. Internet. 2 Feb. 1992.

Steele, Ken. "Special Discounts on the New Variorum Shakespeare." Shakespeare 2.124 (4 May 1991): n. pag. Online. BITNET. 1 June 1991.

At the end of the entry, you may add as supplementary information the electronic address you used to access the document; precede the address with the word *Available*.

Readings, Bill. "Translation and Comparative Literature: The Terror of European Humanism." Surfaces 1.11 (Dec. 1991): 19 pp. Online. Internet. 2 Feb. 1992. Available FTP: harfang.cc.umontreal.ca.

Electronic Texts

A great variety of texts, such as literary works and historical documents, are available through computer networks.

If you plan to study an electronic text. . . remember that not all texts are equally reliable or authoritative. Be sure to use a text that states the title, editor, and date of the edition serving as its source.

Your citation of an electronic text should contain the following items:

1. Name of the author (if any)
2. Title of the text (underlined)
3. Publication information for the printed source
4. Publication medium (*Online*)
5. Name of the repository of the electronic text (e.g., Oxford Text Archive)
6. Name of the computer network
7. Date of access

Hardy, Thomas. Far from the Madding Crowd. Ed. Ronald Blythe. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978. Online. Oxford Text Archive. Internet. 24 Jan. 1994.

Octavian. Ed. Frances McSparran. Early English Text Soc. 289. London: Oxford UP, 1986. Online. U. of Virginia Lib. Internet. 6 Apr. 1994.

Shakespeare, William. Hamlet: The Works of William Shakespeare. Ed. Arthur H. Bullen. Stratford Town Ed. Stratford-on-Avon: Shakespeare Read, 1911. Online. Dartmouth Coll. Lib. Internet. 26 Dec. 1992.

United States, General Accounting Office. Drug-Exposed Infants: Report to the Chairman, Committee of Finance, U.S. Senate. 6 Nov. 1992. Online. U. of Minnesota Lib. Internet. 1 May 1993.

At the end of the entry, you may add as supplementary information the electronic address you used to access the document; precede the address with the word *Available*.

[For further information see the *MLA Handbook for Writers of Research Papers, Fourth Edition*, by Joseph Gibaldi.]

APPENDIX V Debate Guidelines

Lincoln-Douglas Debate Guidelines

A decision should be based upon:

1. ~~Clear use of value argumentation throughout the round.~~
 - a. ~~Establishing of a value premise to support the debater's position in the round.~~
 - b. ~~Establishing of values criteria to support the debater's position in the round. Values criteria are a system upon which to judge values. These criteria may range in format, but the relationship between the value premise and criteria should be clear so that the resolution can be evaluated.~~
 - c. ~~Clash in the debate based upon the values criteria and/or the value premise.~~
2. ~~Application of the presented value to the specific topic at hand.~~
 - a. ~~Validity of logic in relation to the value as applied to the specific topic.~~
 - b. ~~Logical chain of reasoning, using the value, which leads to the conclusions of the affirmative or negative position.~~
 - c. ~~Clear explanation of the relation of the value to the specific topic.~~
3. Clarity of ideas in the debater's presentation expressed in an easy-to-follow structure to aid the listener's notetaking.
4. Presentation of contextual definitions. Each speaker has the option to define terms. Interpretation of definitions is a legitimate component of clash.
5. Debating the resolution in its entirety. Neither the affirmative nor the negative is to debate his or her position exclusively from the standpoint of isolated examples.
6. Effectiveness of delivery. The Lincoln-Douglas debater should be one who uses his or her oral communications skills to persuade the listener with logic, analysis, and mode of delivery. Delivery should approximate superior speaking to community groups.
7. Since this is debate, clash is necessary. With the exception of the affirmative constructive speech, neither speaker should be rewarded for presenting oratory unrelated to the rest of the debate. ~~Clash in the debate should be on one or more of the following as they are applied to the specific topic: the value premise, the values criteria, the argumentation.~~
8. The debate is to be judged on the overall presentation. Insignificant dropped arguments are not enough to give a speaker a loss in the round.
9. A judge's preference for ~~a particular value(s) position~~ should not enter into the decision. Objectivity must be the primary goal of any judge.
10. Persuasiveness and logic should be primary considerations of the Lincoln-Douglas debate judge. The nature of the event centers upon the value resolution. Arguments must be supported by reasoning and evidence. The arguments may be philosophic or pragmatic, but they must be linked to the value resolution.
11. The affirmative obligation is to support the resolution with ~~value(s)~~ and to clash with the negative position. The negative obligation is to clash with the affirmative position by using refutation ~~and/or opposing value(s)~~.

Debate Guidelines

A. -- A decision is not to be based upon:

1. *The merits of the question.* The judge should not be influenced by prejudices in favor or against the proposition.
2. *Partiality.* The judge should not be influenced by the reputation

of, or partiality for or against, either of the competing teams, their schools, or coaches.

3. *Preconceived notions on arguments.* The judge should not allow his idea of what the best affirmative or negative arguments or cases may be to influence the decision.

4. *Personal preferences on debating style.* A judge should not penalize a team if its style, either in case construction or delivery, differs from that which s/he personally prefers; but should evaluate all styles on the basis of effectiveness in **winning conviction**.

B. -- A decision should be based upon:

1. *Skill in analysis.* This includes not only the analysis of the proposition, but also analysis of the debate as it progresses.

2. *Use of evidence.* This includes the use of sufficient evidence and proper reference to source.

3. *Validity of argument.* This includes reasoning and conclusions drawn from the evidence presented.

4. *Clarity of organization.* This includes clear outlining of constructive arguments and easily followed handling of refutation.

5. *Effectiveness of delivery.* This includes all matters pertaining to oral presentation with special emphasis upon extempore abilities.

C. -- A team should be penalized for:

1. *An unfair interpretation.* If the interpretation is disputed by the negative, it shall rest with the judge whether or not the affirmative is supporting a tenable position.

2. *Discourtesy toward opponents.* Discourtesy should be penalized according to the seriousness of the offense.

3. *Falsification of evidence.* If a team falsifies evidence in support of a point, it shall lose the point, and if the falsification is obviously deliberate, the judge shall impose an additional penalty according to the seriousness of the falsification.

4. *Misconstruing an opponent's arguments.* A speaker who misconstrues and argument unintentionally should not be penalized more than the time wasted. If it is intentional, the team should in addition, forfeit the argument.

5. *Introducing new arguments into rebuttal.* The judges shall disregard new arguments introduced in rebuttal. This does not include the introduction of new evidence in support of points already advanced or the answering of arguments introduced by opponents.

6. *Speaking overtime.* When a speaker's time is up, the judge shall disregard anything beyond a closing statement.

D. -- There is general agreement among debate coaches on:

1. *Interpretation.* Judges should regard no interpretation of the question as official, unless the National Wording Committee issues an official interpretation and labels it as such.

2. *Technicalities.* The team shall debate the basic principles underlying the proposition. Too much emphasis should not be placed upon a technicality.

3. *Burden of proof.* A debate team need not destroy all opposing argument. It need only show that the preponderance of argument and evidence rests on its side.

4. *Affirmative burden.* An affirmative team need not destroy all negative argument. It need only show that the preponderance of argument and evidence rests on its side. This holds true equally for the negative team.

5. ~~Questions. A team need answer questions only when they are shown to be pertinent and consequential to the debate.~~

6. **Irrelevant arguments.** Arguments as to whether the proposition is constitutional, or whether it will be adopted are irrelevant.

7. **Direct Clash.** The negative team is primarily responsible for a direct clash, providing the affirmative team is not evading the proposition. The affirmative team is responsible for a clash on arguments advanced by the negative as evils in the proposition.

8. **Delayed replies.** An argument introduced in constructive cases should be replied to by the opponents in time to give the team which advanced the argument an opportunity to reply.

9. **Adaptation.** A high premium should be placed upon adaptive extempore debating. This should not excuse a team for lack of clarity in organization or for errors in the use of English.

10. **Persuasion.** A premium should be placed upon the ability of the debaters to utilize human interest and accepted premises. Fallacies committed in an attempt to gain persuasive power should be treated the same as other fallacies.

11. **Fallacies.** A judge should not discredit an argument as fallacious, unless the fallacy is exposed by the opposition, except in the closing affirmative rebuttal, when the judge shall discredit it upon discovering the fallacy.

12. **Constructive solution.** Credit should be given to the team which most nearly approximates a constructive solution to the problems.

13. **Point of order.** The negative team shall not be denied the right to rise to a point of order after the closing affirmative rebuttal. However, if they argue the point instead of stating the point, they shall be heavily penalized on the point. In this contingency, final disposition of the matter shall rest entirely with the judge. In general, this practice is to be discouraged.

Cross-Examination or Crossfire Guidelines

General

A. Purpose of Cross Examination

To clarify an obscure point in an opponent's case, to expose factual error or unsupported assertion, or to obtain damaging admissions are the purposes of cross-examination. It should not be used (as it is in law) to attack the witness' personal integrity.

B. Attitudes of Questioner and Witness:

Both should appear to be reasonable, cooperative and eager to please. Either one should be "marked down" for unpalatable sarcasm, obvious "stalling," or appearing to browbeat his opponent.

C. Relation to Case:

The virtue of any cross-examination decreases unless the results are tied to later speeches. The cross-examination should be an integral part of the debate, not a sideshow.

D. Delivery.

Both speakers must talk to the audience. Cross-examination takes the form of an exchange between two debaters, but basically, it is for the benefit of the listeners. In public debates it is vital that both speakers face the audience while questioning or responding.

In Public Forum Debate, speakers should stand during regular Crossfire and remain seated for the Grand Crossfire.

The Questioner:

A. **Controls the time,** and may interrupt the witness to request shorter or more direct answers, or to indicate that the answer s/he has given is insufficient.

B. **Must ask fair and relevant questions.** S/He should neither comment on the answers, argue with the witness, nor make speeches. S/He should use time for questioning alone, not for either constructive argument or summary. In fact, a conclusion is all the more effective if the audience reaches it without the questioner's help.

C. **Should have considerable scope** in the questions s/he asks. Since the time is his/hers, s/he may waste time if s/he wants to. The witness should answer even if the significance or relevance of the question is not immediately apparent to him/her.

D. **Should begin with common ground** on which agreement may be expected, and proceed to areas in which disagreement develops or the witness makes significant admissions. The questioner may well begin with the questions which reveal his purpose: "Do you maintain that the Nationalist Chinese Army stands as a bulwark against Communism in Asia?" "Yes." "And do you further maintain that recognition of Red China would weaken or destroy this bulwark?" "Yes." Agreement on such questions is almost certain, and the questioner clearly indicates the direction of his inquiry.

E. **Should develop an attack along the lines of his/her basic case.** S/He should limit the number of objectives s/he tries to reach. A series of at least five questions, probing a single issue of the debate thoroughly and following up the leads which the witness' answers provide, is preferable to a miscellaneous assortment of questions lacking interrelation and adaptation to the witness' answers.

F. **May not insist on a simple "Yes" or "No" answer** unless the question is simple, direct, and factual. Questions about why something is true are necessarily complicated and the questioner cannot expect the witness to answer them briefly. Factual questions are best, and the questioner can ask them in enough different ways to lend variety to the cross-examination.

G. **Should phrase questions with the verb first,** then the subject, and finally the object or modifying phrase: e.g. "Do you admit the Joseph R. McCarthy is the junior senator from Wisconsin?" S/He should avoid negative questions, or any phrasing with "not": "Do you not know that there have been thirty-seven violations of the Korean truce by the Red Chinese?" The answer to this can only be confusing.

H. **May remind the audience and the witness of a relevant fact** by beginning the question: "Are you aware that . . ." or "Are you familiar with . . ." However, the questioner's motive in putting such questions should be to put the witness on record concerning the statement involved, and not to present material.

I. **Should summarize a series of questions on an issue** by repeating an opening question: "Do you still consider, in light of these facts, that the Chinese Nationalist Army stands as a bulwark against Communism in Asia?" This calls for a "Yes" or "No" answer, clearly indicates that the Questioner has concluded that particular approach, and allows the members of the audience to draw their own conclusions.

The Witness:

A. **Must answer directly and briefly** any legitimate question. S/He should not question the questioner (except in using a rhetorical question as an answer), nor should s/he engage in "stalling" tactics.

B. **May refuse to answer a tricky or unfair question** -- "When did you stop beating your wife?" -- if s/he states a good reason for doing so.

C. **May ask questions to clarify a question** possibly giving the reasons for considering the question obscure, or may ask the questioner to stop making speeches and to continue the questioning.

D. **May clarify a question,** if to do so is appropriate. S/He should state the qualification before his answer: "Do you believe in the desirability of democratic elections?" "For people educated in the tradition and practice of democracy, yes."

E. **Can exercise some control over the question period** by controlling the timing of answers. If s/he feels that the questioner is dragging out the question period, s/he can answer rapidly, exposing the questioner's ineptitude.

F. Should not be afraid to admit ignorance if the question demands knowledge of an obscure fact.

G. Should answer without consulting his/her colleague or receiving help from him/her.

(Adapted from Cross Examination Debating by Dr. Robert P. Newman and Lloyd H. Fuge, University of Pittsburgh.)

APPENDIX VI. L/D Topic Selection

Report of Executive Council L/D Committee (1996)

"There should be a set number of members on the NFL LD Wording Committee. We recommend 9 members + co-chairs.

Nine members to serve staggered 3 year terms so that 3 are up for selection each year. This allows change, but insures that there will be some stability.

Co-chairs should be appointed and non-voting, except to break ties. Their job is to prepare topics for the committee's work.

Geographic distribution should be a concern in appointment to the committee. Nominations should be gathered from the widest possible sources. Self-nomination, nomination by districts, district chairs, Executive Council, etc. should be sought.

Appointment should be by the President based on recommendation from the Council LD Committee.

No one should serve on the NFL LD Wording Committee for more than six years.

Meetings should be held at the NFL National Tournament.

In case of vacancy the President will appoint someone to complete the term. Process will be subject to review in one year."

Sferra, C; Sterner; Ferguson

[Passed. Unanimous. Meeting of Sept. 1996.]

Executive Council Implementation

Moved by Belch/seconded by Roberts that "nominations for the L/D Wording Committee be received in the National Office by March 1, 1997. The Council L/D Committee (Sferra, chair, Sterner, Ferguson) will screen the nominees and present a list of twenty to the President at the Spring Meeting. The President will appoint the nine members and co-chairs to various terms by the end of April and notify them by mail. Passed, unanimous, (Brannan, for Sterner; Burton, for Sferra).

Moved by Keller/seconded by Roberts beginning in the 1998-9 school year the September-October L/D topic be the 5th place vote getter from the previous year's vote and the November-December topic be the 4th place vote getter from the previous year's vote. The third place topic in the current vote be the January-February topic; the second place in the current vote be the March-April topic; The first place topic be the National topic, each year. The topic vote will take place from September 1 to November 1 each year. In 1997-8 school year only the September-October topic will be the 6th place voted topic and the November-December, the 5th place vote getter in the 1996 vote. [The 4th place topic was used in November-December, 1996.] Passed, unanimous, Brannan for Sterner, and Burton for Sferra.

Moved by Keller/seconded by Ferguson to release the topic list at the end of the National Tournament. Passed, unanimous except Brannan, for Sterner, abstain.