A few pictures of Special Economic Zones from Gurgaon, India and Suzhou, China.

Labels: china, development, globalization, india, political economy

This is an excerpt of the documentary, "Manufactured Landscapes," which I am going to show in my class on globalization as we discuss citizenship in special economic zones. The factory is locacted in Fujian province, China.

Labels: films, globalization, political economy, teaching, technology

Google has posted some interesting pictures from LIFE magazine. I particularly like the shots of Nehru dressed in Western suits.

Why do I like these photos?

I guess it is because these photos blur the categorical dichotomy whereby India is constructed as part of the "Orient." I try to teach my students that India's elite have been "modern" (i.e. willing to discretely categorize and compartmentalize the life world) for centuries and share many elements (for good or ill) of a "western" outlook on the world.

I would not argue that Nehru depicted as a Westerner is a more authentic representation, but it does seem that this aspect of Nehru had to exist under erasure as the nationalist movement demanded that he embody the nation. In other words, later images of Nehru adorned in his "native" attire are unconvincing; his "Western" self was never erased, only crossed out (a la Heidegger) or covered over. Perhaps this erasure of the Western self is a metaphor for India's elite writ large. Their "idea of India" eludes the Orientalist cyclops.

Labels: india, south asia, web technology

"The event on which the interest of the story depends is exempt from the disadvantages of a mere tale of spectres or enchantment. It was recommended by the novelty of the situations which it develops; and, however impossible as a physical fact, affords a point of view to the imagination for the delineating of human passions more comprehensive and commanding than any which the ordinary relations of existing events can yield."

-Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley

The most popular trope in contemporary Pakistan is that the state has created a Frankenstinian monster which it may no longer be able to control or put down. In fact, there are over a thousand articles in the Lexis-Nexis database which used both keywords monster and Pakistan in the last ten years. This monster is, of course, Islamic radicalism which the dominant organs of the state (i.e. the military and intelligence services) have been fostering on and off for decades as a mechanism to subvert democracy and project power into neighboring territories.

Unfortunately, this narrative of an uncontrollable monster is somewhat of a myth. The Pakistani government has not made any serious effort to dismantle key terrorist organizations (e.g. Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed) operating on its soil, to execute their leadership, or to seize and liquidate their property. In fact, the government has been willing to permit terrorist organizations to simply change their names as a response to foreign pressure to ban these organizations. The Pakistani civilian government, military, and intelligence services are all well aware of the headquarters and leadership structures of organizations like Lashkar-e-Toiba, which renamed itself Jamat-ud-Dawa, after being banned in 2002. Far from declaring war on all extremist groups, the Pakistani state has achieved a modus vivendi with some of the most notorious ones.

In public, the Pakistani state seeks to convince critics that its externally mandated war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda also includes a full scale assault against all cross-border terrorist organizations operating on Pakistani soil. Foreign journalists, who are not well schooled in the differences between militant groups, are easily confused. But it is not that difficult to see through the deception. As a rational actor, the Pakistani state has no interest in eliminating all terrorist organizations operating within its territory. The Pakistani military and intelligence services selectively benefit from the presence of some of these organizations. These radical groups may be used to foment instability (in Kashmir and Afghanistan) and discipline democracy. Their presence and occasional street protests can also be used as a means of securing resources from the United States by conjuring media images of an emerging anarchy or Islamic revolution. Although the presence of many of these organizations is currently a liability, they will undoubtedly be useful again when the US retreats from the region. Hence, it is in Pakistan's interest to keep radical groups around but encourage them to maintain a low profile.

But even if the Pakistani story is akin to a myth, perhaps the story tells us something about Pakistani society. In other words, I am interested to understand what work this complex allusion does for the Pakistani elite.

First, the narrative shows a desire by the story tellers to claim the mantle of victimhood. Pakistan's elite are eager to negate charges of criminal neglect and conspiracy by pointing to its own victimization by extremist organizations. And while Pakistani civilians are increasingly victims of extremist violence, the state is still not quite able to convince the world of its innocence, perhaps because the metaphor itself implies a measure of guilt on the creator of the monster. The status of innocent victim is somewhat easier to accord when the story is recounted by Pakistani elites who are not associated with the state, as these elites often use the story as a criticism of both the monster and its creator(s).

Second, the myth reveals deep disgust toward the religious fundamentalists brought to life by elements within the state of Pakistan. One will recall that the horror of Dr. Frankenstein's monster stems from his fabrication of a living being from several dead bodies. The monster is monstrous because it exists in a nether region between death and life, and because it is the product of mingling parts from separate wholes. In essence the monster represents a fundamental categorical confusion and contradiction. One wonders if the repetitive allusion to the Frankenstein myth does not reflect a similar belief that the members of extremist groups themselves merely pre-figure death, i.e. that they are not quite living human beings. As Jasbir K. Puar and Amit S. Rai have argued, paraphrasing Judith Butler in a different context, the terrorist is "always already dying." Their desires are structured by death; they are technologies of death.

Third, and quite predictably, the monster while clearly loathed by the elite is also occasionally portrayed as a moral, misunderstood, generous, noble savage. Of course, this slippage between a romantic creature and an object of disgust is a contradiction. But perhaps this is why the monster metaphor is so apt: the allusion to Frankenstein's creature helps to hold together this tense contradiction of sentiments.

Fourth, the idea of a monster conjures a shifting internal balance of power or perhaps a sense of disempowerment. At another level, perhaps the discourse also reveals a fear of foreign intervention in the face of an incompetent and impotent state apparatus which "cannot control" what it created. I do not think this is a plea for help ... far from it. It is a plea for sympathy, patience, and a demand to obtain resources to improve state capacity.

Finally, I would argue that the reference to Frankenstein's monster is a means of pointing to the inherent pathological potential of religion. Whereas Shelley's text was intended as a critique of the science and technology associated with the Industrial Revolution, the Pakenstein myth is a critique of the inability of fundamentalist religious ideology to generate well rounded human beings. In other words, religious ideology is the alchemical "science" of the Pakistani state. The supplanting of the indigenous, mystical Sufi religious tradition in favor of more conservative interpretations of Islam, particularly since the Zia regime, have produced perverse individuals. These monsters could not have been created without this perverse "science" and it is perhaps not surprising that many Pakistanis now agree the only way to permanently prevent new monsters from emerging is to fix the content of religious ideology as it is imparted to new generations of school children.

Labels: failed states, pakistan, terrorism

I am already getting tired of reading and hearing that the terrorist attack on Mumbai was "India's 9/11." While I have no doubt that Indians have been traumatized, I think the comparison is overblown and it is dangerous.

The comparison is overblown because of the orders of magnitude in difference when one compares the level of casualties, particularly relative to total population. Of course quantities do not necessarily measure qualities, and I do not want to cater to American exceptionalism, but it is important to compare apples to apples.

The term "9/11" is also dangerous as it is increasingly a mechanism to justify a form of emergency rule in democratic societies. To say that an event is a country's 9/11 is to say that it is the final straw, the gloves are coming off, cliche, cliche, cliche... The phrase helps to justify all manner of unconstitutional and belligerent behavior. While I firmly believe that India should act with determination in brining the criminals who helped to organize the terror atattack to justice, it should also continue to act with restraint.

From a more sober perspective, the horrific attacks in Mumbai are closer on the sliding scale of horror to the Columbine and Virginia Tech massacres in the United States than to the multi-city attack carried out on 9/11. The perpetrators in Mumbai used assault rifles and grenades, not hijacked airplanes. The solution to protecting against this form of terrorism is actually far more challenging than the type of terrorism perpetrated on 9/11, because the targets used such low-tech weapons and basic strategies.

In other words, equating the Mumbai terrorist attacks with Columbine or Virginia Tech should not be viewed as a "demotion" of the relative scale of horror but an elevation of the challenge that India now faces. Guarding a metropolis against another Columbine is much more daunting than focusing in on guarding major airports.

Labels: india, terrorism

The full text of Secretary Rice's comments is available at the State Department's website.

Labels: failed states, india, pakistan, south asia, terrorism, us

Indian news source (Rediff.com, Times of India) are reporting that President-elect Obama agrees that India has the right to pursue terrorists across international boundaries.

Here is an excerpt from the Rediff.com article:

Obama, when reminded that during the campaign he had said if there was irrefutable evidence of Al Qaeda leaders and training camps in Pakistan he would go after them with or without Pakistan's permission and asked if India has that same right, replied, "Sovereign nations obviously have a right to protect themselves."

"Beyond that, I don't want to comment on the specific situation that is taking place in South Asia right now," he said, adding, "I think it is important for us to let the investigators do their job in making a determination in terms of who was responsible for carrying out these heinous acts."

Obama said, however, that: "I can tell you, my Administration will remain steadfast in support of India's efforts to catch the perpetrators of this terrible act and bring them to justice, and I will expect that the world community will feel the same way."

This is an interesting statement which could be read to show firm solidarity with India and general support for an expansive understanding of the right of self-defense. However, personally, I would not read this as a US "green light" for India to go ahead and dismatle LeT training camps and capture/kill ISI agents inside Pakistani territory for many reasons, not the least of which is that this is an off-hand statement by the President-elect rather than the sitting President. I think Mr. Obama is merely trying to avoid being drawn into the "tar pit" of South Asian politics (without sounding too hypocritical) while expressing moral solidarity for the victims of a heinous act of terrorism. The naive and ahistorical hope expressed by the President-elect that the investigation will point to other sources or that Pakistan will finally dismantle the terrorist networks on its soil, should also be carefully interpreted by the Indian press.

My hunch is that the US will continue to interpret any conflict between India and Pakistan as harmful to its own War on Terror. Pakistan has clearly intimated that any conflict with India will require pulling troops off of the Western frontier regions. This is both true and strategic blackmail of the US. Notably, the US is willing to be blackmailed by Pakistan as America still believes that it can dismantle terrorist networks only through a cooperative relationship with Pakistan's military.

I think the US approach is misguided/short-sighted and the US needs to exert far more direct leverage against Pakistan in conjunction with India and Afghanistan.

Labels: failed states, india, obama, pakistan, south asia, terrorism, us

The Obama administration's foreign policy strategy for South Asia will either tilt toward Pakistan or India; it cannot and should not seek to be neutral or balanced. Any talk of seeking a "balanced" strategy in the region is a de facto capitulation to Pakistan, since these are not even remotely equal states in terms of their political culture, political institutions, military strength, or economic potential.

The US will need to choose its main ally in the region (although it certainly can and should be friendly to both countries if Pakistan makes more progress in reforming its intelligence services, military institution, educational infrastructure, and outlawing extremist religious parties). The US cannot continue to play both sides of the fence -- and Indian diplomats should make this logic clear to their new counterparts in the Obama administration. If the US wants to finally dismantle the terrorist networks that emanate from the region (as opposed to making only short term gains without fundamental changes), continue to obtain access to a major emerging market, and acquire an enduring alliance partner for its soft containment of China, the US will need to tilt toward India.

Here is the core of a pro-India South Asian foreign policy strategy:

1. No Issue Linkage: The link between terrorism and the "Kashmir issue" is spurious. It is important to understand that the cultivation of terrorist organizations by the Pakistani government is: A) a rational (if amoral or immoral) strategic response to a small industrial base which cannot generate the military resources to match the potential of the Indian political economy; and B) the manifestation of the failure of state and nation formation in Pakistan. In other words, Pakistan's use of terrorist militants in Kashmir and the rest of India is a strategy to pin down a much larger military and a means of creating the semblance of a domestic national purpose. The Kashmir issue should be kept separate from issues of terrorism in order to avoid a quid pro quo blackmail by the Pakistani government. If Indian counterinsurgency actions in the portion of Kashmir that it administers violate human or civil rights, those violation can and should be administered through India's judiciary. Although Pakistan is an ethnocracy, it has no legitimate claim to serving as the homeland for South Asian Muslims (nor would the majority of Muslims in South Asia accept such a status for Pakistan, particularly since 1971).

2. Regional Hegemony: The US will need to accept sub-regional (i.e. sub-continental) hegemony by India. The alternative to sub-regional Indian hegemony is letting a secular liberal democracy be pinned down by a state which has rational, strategic and economic incentives to use militant groups; in other words, it involves conceding defeat in the War on Terrorism. At the heart of the use of terror as a tactic is not religion or ethnic grievance but a political economy of violence that must be understood by the US. The only way to end this cycle of militancy is to disabuse the Pakistani military of its ambition of achieve parity with India. The way to permanently disabuse the Pakistani military of its ambition is to firmly support Indian sub-regional hegemony, including a strong Indian presence in Afghanistan which will force the Pakistani military to focus on internal integrity rather than power projection.

If a pro-India policy is formulated, the immediate US concern will be how to exert leverage against Pakistan. It is important for Americans to remember that the US has many levers of influence; it is not necessary to sell out the Indians to achieve American objectives in the war on terror. The most important carrots which can be offered to Pakistan are clearly access to US markets, educational assistance, and military training in counterinsurgency. The US should resist any transfer of military hardware which is not specifically intended for counterinsurgency efforts(i.e. no more fighter jets or tanks). The sticks to prod Pakistan to do what it should have been doing all along, include increased violations of Pakistan's territorial sovereignty, a curtailment of bi-lateral and multi-lateral financial assistance, diplomatic isolation, and placing Pakistan on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. While a roll-back of Pakistan's nuclear option may be desirable, it is not currently feasible. A "Kosovo" option for the provinces of FATA, NWFP, and Baluchistan can be put on the bargaining table if Pakistan still does not cooperate.

It was said by Vice President-elect Biden that the Obama administration would be tested early in his tenure. It is clear that test has come even before he has taken office. Now, it is time for the Obama team to formulate a clear South Asia policy.

Labels: american politics, failed states, india, ir, obama, pakistan, political economy, south asia, terrorism, us

Like most of the rest of the world I have been watching the horrifying Mumbai attacks off and on for three days. At times, I have simply not been able to keep watching.

It is clear to me that these attacks, although planned months in advance, were most likely ordered this week by elements within the Pakistani intelligence services (ISI) in response to gestures of peace and reconciliation by the Pakistani civilian government (not unlike the Pakistnai military's Kargil adventure in 1999 in the midst of an Indo-Pak peace process). The ISI and the Pakistani military have almost no interest in conflict resolution with India, as the perpetuation of a permanent enemy is their raison d'etre.

I hope that India will react with equal measures of restraint and determination.

The Pakistani government has already agreed to India's request to send the head of the ISI to Mumbai to aid in the investigation. It would be useful if the Pakistani government and military reiterated their renunciation of the use of terrorism to achieve political objectives (particularly in regard to the Kashmir issue) and promised to surrender any and all conspirators involved in the attacks to the International Criminal Court.

The US and Europe can help by adding pressure on the Pakistani government and military by threatening to veto the distribution of the second tranche of Pakistan's emergency IMF loan if the government does not cooperate fully. As a negotiating tactic, the US Congress should reopen the debate and hold hearing so as to determine whether or not Pakistan is a state sponsor of terrorism.

Hopefully the situation can be calmed and the perpetrators and planners brought to justice without a need for armed conflict. However, I am pessimistic that little more than scape goating and issue deflection will emerge from the Pakistani government in the long run. India will have to decide how many more times it can let its civilians and visitors endure such tragedies.

Labels: failed states, imf, india, obama, pakistan, south asia, terrorism

A Time magazine interview with President-elect Obama, in which he briefly discussed the Kashmir issue is troubling Indian strategic analysts this week. And while I am an Obama supporter, I agree with the Indian analysts on these issues. Here is what Mr. Obama said:

[Barack Obama] ... So, building a different relationship with the Pakistani government, the Pakistani military, the ISI. Working with Pakistan, this government to deliver for its people so it gains legitimacy, in all regions of the country. Working with Pakistan and India to try to resolve, and Kashmir, crisis in a serious way. Those are all critical tasks for the next administration. Kashmir in particular is an interesting situation where that is obviously a potential tar pit diplomatically. But, for us to devote serious diplomatic resources to get a special envoy in there, to figure out a plausible approach, and essentially make the argument to the Indians, you guys are on the brink of being an economic superpower, why do you want to keep on messing with this? To make the argument to the Pakistanis, look at India and what they are doing, why do you want to keep on being bogged down with this particularly at a time where the biggest threat now is coming from the Afghan border? I think there is a moment where potentially we could get their attention. It won’t be easy, but it’s important.

From the Indian perspective, the Kashmir issue is a dispute between India and Pakistan (notably neither the Indians nor the Pakistanis see it as a three way dispute involving the indigenous voice of all the Kashmiri people). The Indian government lost its faith in a UN brokered solution in the early days of the conflict. The US also came to be seen as unhelpful and untrustworthy after the first time it was brought in as an "honest broker."

The real problem expressed by President-elect Obama, in the eyes of Indian analysts, is that he appears to have already mentally succumbed to blackmail by Pakistan. In other words, Mr. Obama's outlook seems to give in to Pakistani pressure for a resolution to the Kashmir issue in a quid pro quo exchange for their cooperation in the war on terrorism. Given that elements in the Pakistani intelligence services have openly funded ruthless terrorist organizations and backed the Taliban since the mid-nineties, this is a rather serious lapse in the President-elect's judgment. If the Pakistani government did genuinely renounce terrorism in 2002, then it should provide support against militants unconditionally. An end to Pakistan's reliance on militants will make the Indian government more likely to work for a negotiated solution to the dispute, and some fresh thinking on the issue has emerged since 2002.

In my opinion, President-elect Obama is mistaken in his belief that the Kashmir dispute is at the heart of the militancy problem in the region. The underlying problems are actually much more complex, they are the product of inadequate nation and state formation in Pakistan after the 1947 Partition and again after the 1971 Civil War. India's (occasionally brutal) domination of Srinagar is mainly used as an excuse which serves to provide the semblance of a coherent national project and purpose for the state and people of Pakistan. (There are actually strong parallels here between the Palestinian issue and the overstated states of the Middle East.) Western politicians prefer to imagine that regional instability can be solved through a peace accord and a ceremonial handshake. However, actually fixing the root problem, i.e. tackling the issue of nation and state re-building after some false starts, may take decades of grassroots effort and the harshest reality is that some post-colonial states may simply not be feasible or "fixable" in their current parameters. (Of course, none of this should be seen as excusing the violation of human rights by Indian counter-insurgency forces in Kashmir).

The interview continues:

[Q] Sounds like a job for Bill Clinton.

[BO] Might not be bad. I actually talked to Bill, I talked to President Clinton about this when we had lunch in Harlem.

This is wishful thinking. While former President Clinton remains popular in India for his accomplishment of setting a new course in Indo-American relations in 2000, he simply does not have the stature to act as a Special Envoy on the Kashmir issue. His administration achieved the success that it did, by learning to butt out of issues that it did not understand and to listen to the local actors instead of trying to force a solution to regional problems.

At the end of the day, the President-elect will need to keep in mind that the relationship with India is multifaceted. America is hoping to rely on India as an integral part of its soft containment policy (although this does not mean that India will let itself be used as a cat's paw) and the US has growing economic ties to India. Mr. Obama will need to do more listening and less dreaming about dangerous places to send Bill Clinton.

The interview continues...

[Q] …Should we be talking to the Taliban? I don’t mean you.

[BO] You know, I think that this is one useful lesson that is applicable from Iraq. The Great Awakening, the Sunni Awakening changed the dynamic in Iraq fundamentally. It could not have occurred unless there were some contacts and intermediaries to peel off those who are tribal leaders, regional leaders, Sunni nationalists, from a more radical Messianic brand of insurgency. Well whether there are those same opportunities in Afghanistan I think should be explored. I can't guarantee that they are and one of the problems that we had and we've historically had, the Russians historically had it, the British historically had it, is our intelligence there is poor and our understanding of the culture is poor. And our understanding of the tribal and clan ties that exist there are complicated. But the Afghans don't see things in the same black and white terms on many of these issues that we legitimately do because we're concerned about our safety and our security. But what we're going to have to do is to have folks on the ground who do develop that understanding, I was very impressed with McKernan, very impressed with a lot of the folks who are there. My impression is that those who have a chance to stay there a little bit longer and develop clear understanding of the formidable complexities are going to achieve a lot more than simply us rotating in folks on a rapid rotation and I think that people on the ground tend to agree with me on that.

I would argue (and I think most Indian analysts would agree) that any idea of "talking to the Taliban" is deeply problematic, particularly from a moral perspective. There is no such thing as a moderate Taliban, at least from a Western feminist and Western human rights perspective, and those voices need to be heard in any US policy decision of this nature. Moreover, a regime dominated by former Taliban in Afghanistan is probably not acceptable to any of Afghanistan's neighbors (except Pakistan) given the reputation of the Taliban for seeking to spread Islamist extremism and a history of atrocities toward minority communities and even foreign diplomats. I would assume that India, Iran, and Russia will not accept any regime dominated by former Taliban or other Pakistani agents, nor would the American people I imagine. Even the Chinese, who are a long standing ally of Pakistan, would probably not agree to a regime dominated by former Taliban types given China's concerns about its Uigher Province. The Taliban are not a legitimate government like Iran. Thus, this idea of dialogue with moderate elements is a non-starter. Unfortunately for the US and NATO, the Taliban needs to be fought and weeded out without alienating the civilian population. This will involve many more troops and an end to the use of unmanned drones.

There are tribal structures which could be used to dampen (through non-compliance) the efficacy of the Taliban insurgency, but that involves talking to Pushtun tribal leaders not the Taliban. The Taliban may be drawn from Pushtun stock, but they are not elder tribal leaders as far as I can tell. The whole idea of a talib-led (i.e. a student-led) movement is a repudiation of tribal and clan based warlordism in the post-Soviet era.

A more serious solution involves playing hardball with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and recognizing that the Taliban are merely pawns in a proxy war with Iran (and to a lesser extent, India). In this regard, America's polarizing and Israel-centric approach toward Iran needs to be reconsidered. As the US worked with Iran after 9/11 to overthrow the Taliban, cooperation is clearly possible and feasible, particularly if Khatami returns to power. Of course, engagement with Iran raises its own moral issues as Iran is known to have funded its own share of militants. Nevertheless, if a fresh page could somehow be turned with Iran (particularly if Iran turned its own page on sponsoring militants), a triumvirate with America, Iran, and India could foster lasting regional stability by declawing the Pakistani military and its misguided ambition for "strategic depth" in Afghanistan. Of course, the first steps in such a policy would involve much greater pressure on the flow of Saudi money through Pakistan and into Afghanistan. Moreover, the US would need to at least threaten Pakistan with isolation if it does not liquidate all militant outfits on its territory (stronger threats are probably necessary, but not credible given Pakistan's nuclear deterrent).

The fact that the President-elect would even contemplate talking to the Taliban indicates either a lack of historical understanding or an amoral Realist posture (which in this case is unfortunately more naive than strategic).

The Taliban issue is one of those rarities in international relations: it is a situation where moral clarity and strategic thinking reinforce one another. The Kashmir issue is more ordinary: it is a veil, not an underlying cause of regional conflict.

Labels: afghanistan, american politics, failed states, india, ir, obama, pakistan, south asia, us

It is likely that President Obama's administration will be one of the first American administrations since Ronald Reagan which will need to foreground policy toward South Asia, rather than relegating the region to a marginal strategic status. In other words, the administration may actually need to lay out a vision for the region rather than scurrying to stamp out regional crises as they emerge. The most obvious reasons for prioritizing South Asia is the wind-up of the war in Iraq and the promised shift in focus back to the unfinished and intensifying guerrilla war in Afghanistan (i.e. "The Long War") as well as increased US raids across the Durand Line into America's erstwhile client state, Pakistan. Moreover, South Asia is home to one of America's newest strategic and economic partners, India. The subcontinental behemoth symbolizes not only a set of well worn cliches about the virtues of liberal democratic governance and economic opportunities for capitalist developing countries in an era of globalization, but also a key strategic pivot in America's soft containment of a rising China.

What should South Asians, particularly Indians, expect from the new American administration? Will President Obama maintain the bi-partisan posture toward the regional hegemon set by the Clinton administration and carried forward by the Bush regime? Will the US-India civilian nuclear agreement passed under the Bush & Singh administrations help set a precedent for a new era of bi-lateral cooperation? Or, will the United States be drawn toward stabilizing Pakistan in a manner that once again harms relations with India diplomatically, economically, and strategically? In other words, will America return to trying to treat India and Pakistan on an equal footing despite vastly different capabilities and potential?

Early clues toward Obama's perception of the region seem to tilt toward a continuation of the Clinton-Bush posture privileging India. Obama's campaign staff seemed remarkably well attuned to South Asian issues throughout the campaign. In fact, the presidential candidate was one of the first Americans to express his condolences to the Government and people of India when one of the country's war heroes died over the summer. The kind words from Obama raised eyebrows in Delhi (and perhaps in D.C.) since the Obama team seemed more cognizant of South Asian issues than the sitting President's staff, not to mention the McCain Camp. It was clearly evident that Mr. Obama had employed a shrewd and sophisticated South Asia team, even though such an approach was superfluous in a national election campaign.

Candidate Obama's comments expressing a willingness to violate Pakistan's sovereignty if Pakistan was unwilling or unable to kill Osama bin Laden, also reflected a hard nosed approach toward Pakistan. In any case, Obama's comments, although diplomatically problematic, actually seemed more thought through than Senator McCain's argument during a presidential debate in which McCain actually stated that Pakistan was a "failed state" before Gen. Musharraf's coup d'etat.

Moreover, while some elite Indian conservatives might have regarded the Bush administration and the Republican party in a kinder light than elites in other countries, the general population was clearly intrigued and perhaps even inspired by the possibility of a cosmopolitan, charismatic, and African-American President of the United States. Stories that the presidential candidate carried around a "Hanuman" or "monkey god" charm and kept a portrait of the Mahatma on his wall also garnered a measure of goodwill amongst Indians. In other words, there seemed to be great potential for warm and cordial relations.

Nevertheless, an array of India's chattering class have expressed some reservations after learning of Mr. Obama's desire to limit the outsourcing of jobs to India as well as his desire to advance the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which India views as a way of restricting India's nuclear deterrent. (The CTBT issue is actually a red herring since even the US military does not support the treaty. Moreover, restricting India's nuclear arsenal runs counter to America's soft containment or congagement policy toward China.) Indians have also expressed concern, based on Mr. Obama's comments in a recent interview, that he might seek to meddle in the bi-lateral Kashmir dispute in order to placate and shore-up the ever fragile and paranoid Pakistani regime. Finally, the popular press in India has also perceived a diplomatic slight at the fact that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was not prioritized for a telephonic communication with the president-elect after the election. These fears are probably just overreactions (on a slow news day) to early missteps by an administration which has not even been sworn into office.

At the moment, the Obama transition team is preoccupied by the financial crisis which is roiling American markets. A more detailed strategic vision for global leadership is likely to emerge only as the financial markets begin to stabilize.

In the meantime, even nominal efforts to improve America's image in the world (e.g. closing the prison of Guantanamo Bay or firmly renouncing torture) will generally be well received by Indians. Indian elites clearly recognize that the reduction of tensions with the Muslim world may redound to India's benefit as it is the home to the largest Muslim minority in the world.

Personally, I am looking forward to seeing how President Obama's foreign policy team articulates their strategic policy for the area. The South Asian region is incredibly complex to negotiate from a diplomatic perspective and America has been caught flat footed time after time. I will try to document some of this articulation as the policies unfold over the coming months.

Labels: afghanistan, american politics, failed states, globalization, india, ir, obama, pakistan, south asia, us

Since this weekend's "lame duck" G20 Summit accomplished almost nothing substantive. Here are a few suggestions for the next G20 Summit which will meet in April with President Obama representing the US...

1. Expand the IMF's financial resources by expanding the required contribution of leading developing member countries. This would add to the emergency resources of the organization while also acknowledging the growing contribution of Asian members to the world economy. Of course, efforts along these lines have been made in the past, but far more needs to be done.

2. Discuss using the G20 as the model for the Executive Boards of the World Bank and IMF. This would give much needed popular legitimacy to the Bretton Woods organizations.

3. Emphasize a return to the Keynesian/Embedded Liberal roots of the IMF. If the US does decide to bail out Detroit, it will have to explain this decision to all of the other G20 countries anyway. It would be useful to set an honest, forthright, and moderate tone by rejecting George W. Bush's attempt to defend free market principles after years of protectionism. From a long term perspective, one of the best ways of moving away from neo-liberal dogma is to diversify the recruitment pool of the Fund to include a wider range of academic disciplines. President Obama could take the first steps in this regard by asking the Treasury Department to diversify the pool of US representatives on the IMF staff.

Labels: imf, political economy, world bank

The FT has a nice, short info-graphic on the IMF.

Labels: imf, political economy

For my students who are job hunting...

1. Change.gov "This website is designed to provide prospective applicants with information to help them apply for positions in the Obama-Biden Administration. President-Elect Obama will make appointments throughout the federal government. Some positions will require Senate confirmation while others will not. Some appointments will be made during the transition process and others during the early part of the new Administration."

2. Careers.state.gov "Students of all levels will find that the U.S. Department of State is a rewarding place to acquire skills that will last a lifetime. We have a variety of programs, from summer clerical positions to management fellowships, all of which allow students from high school to the post-graduate level the ability to participate in projects vital to the success of U.S. foreign policy. Overseas or in Washington D.C., there's a student program that matches your background and will help you to achieve your goals."

Labels: political science

[Curtain opens]

Student: Hey prof. I'm sorry I missed class, did I miss anything important?

Professor: Yes. [exits stage right]

[Scene]

Labels: teaching

"What is that gun firing for?" said Boxer.

"To celebrate our victory!" cried Squealer.

"What victory?" said Boxer. His knees were bleeding, he had lost a shoe and split his hoof, and a dozen pellets had lodged themselves in his hind leg.

"What victory, comrade? Have we not driven the enemy off our soil-the sacred soil of Animal Farm? "

"But they have destroyed the windmill. And we had worked on it for two years!"

"What matter? We will build another windmill. We will build six windmills if we feel like it. You do not appreciate, comrade, the mighty thing that we have done. The enemy was in occupation of this very ground that we stand upon. And now-thanks to the leadership of Comrade Napoleon-we have won every inch of it back again!"

"Then we have won back what we had before," said Boxer.

"That is our victory," said Squealer.

-George Orwell, Animal Farm

Labels: american politics

Labels: ir, teaching

Labels: ir, teaching

I am pushing our Faculty Information Technology Committee (FacIT) to begin a discussion of moving toward an Open Source Course Management System (CMS) and phasing out our proprietary software system, Blackboard. Sakai is my open source platform of choice because it is a system I have used in the past. Here are the major arguments in support of switching from a proprietary system to an open source system for those who believe in having course web sites:

1. An open source system is free. The funds currently being used to pay for licensing the proprietary software could be used to hire staff to aid in the transition to an open source CMS. It's simple: pay for people not for licenses.

2. The open source system works just as well as the proprietary system in my experience. In fact, after an initially steep learning curve, I found Sakai a little less difficult to use and there were a few additional features that I found useful.

3. Blackboard and WebCT are losing market share (six percent from 2006 to 2007 according to the 2007 Distance Education Survey). Thirty-one percent of the respondents to the survey were thinking of changing to a different CMS platform. This is good news, and it is in the interest of colleges and universities to promote market diversity. If the CMS market comes to be dominated by corporate conglomerates, then universities will have to pay the price of monopolies. In any case, there is strong support for the Open Source CMS from major universities.

4. Universities work together to develop solutions to problems. We pool our resources to manage study abroad programs and we share knowledge through journals and conferences. The open source CMS was created by funding from major universities and grant organizations. As we are the repository of the best minds in the country, why should we pay for technology we can build and upgrade ourselves through a cooperative approach? Why adopted the protocols of the business world?

5. If we want to show that our colleges are at the frontier of technology, shouldn't we at least be able to brand and modify our own CMS?

6. Sakai appears to be faster at fixing bugs than Blackboard.

Labels: teaching, technology, web technology

I'll be honest, I don't really like giving PowerPoint presentations in front of a class. I think students pay more attention and learn more when I work out my ideas with them on the chalk board or in a discussion with our chairs in a circle. But there are occasions when a PowerPoint lecture makes a lot of sense, such as in overviews of standard theoretical approaches (which I have to give every year) or in introductory level lectures that require the use of lots of maps or visual images.

In the past, I always tried to cram as much information onto the slides as possible. I practically outlined every strand of the argument I wanted to make. Of course, I knew this was a bad idea... it is clear even to the novice that PowerPoint is not designed for much more than a few bullet points (in very large font size) per slide. My excuse was that I just wanted to make the slides self-explanatory for students who missed the lecture. In reality, I was worried that I would forget to mention an important point or that I would fumble a transition to the next slide.

I have finally started experimenting with a minimalist approach to PowerPoint. The result so far is that the slides don't seem to be as boring. Nevertheless, like any editing, it takes far more time to create a minimalist slide than a detailed one.

By limiting the content the presenter gets foregrounded and PowerPoint recedes into the background as a mere visual/mental cue. I would ideally like to get to the point where I just have one topical word or relevant image per slide.

Of course, the PowerPoint format can lead to over-simplification ("dumbing down") of complex arguments and passivity on the part of the listener. However, fewer words per slide leaves more room for the speaker to breathe complexity back into the presentation.

I guess the trick to keeping the class lecture fresh and stimulating is knowing when and how much to use PowerPoint and when to stick to the old chalkboard... Here are the guidelines that I am developing for myself...

• I only use PowerPoint in my Introductory level courses. I don't use PowerPoint in my 200, 300, and 400 level courses after the first day (if I can avoid it). I devote those upper level courses to making students actively work through and critique the arguments in the readings.




• When I use a PowerPoint in class, I try to make sure that I leave a segment of the class session to return to the text or the chalkboard. Working the text and thinking things through on the chalkboard is integral to the craft of teaching. It not only lends drama to the classroom, it shows students that learning/teaching is an on-going and interwoven process. Taking teaching seriously is the essential difference between what we do in small liberal arts colleges and what passes for teaching in the large education factories.




• I don't use standard clip art cartoons, transitional animations, transitional sound effects, etc. I try to think of PowerPoint as a neater version of my hand writing on the chalk board. The seduction of PowerPoint technology is powerful, but it can also lead to gimicky presentations if those temptations are not managed carefully.




• I no longer allow students to bring laptops into my classroom and I do not post up my PowerPoint presentations. I encourage my students to learn to take notes by hand and to share notes with one another if they miss a point or a class. My hunch is that this makes students think more about what they are writing and appreciate the classroom experience. It also encourages them to represent their ideas spatially in diagrams. Of course, some students will end up doodling, but that is their choice. They may revisit their note taking techniques after the first quiz.

My only dilemma about these practices is that I do want to make my course content available as part of my support for the Cape Town Open Education Declaration. I guess that for the moment, since I make my syllabi and some class resources available for free on my web site, I am still doing my part in keeping my classroom open to the world. I offer as much on-line to my own students as I do to students in the global classroom.

Okay, back to ruthlessly editing slides...

Labels: teaching, technology

For those of you keeping track, this means that India will now be giving over a billion dollars in aid to Afghanistan. This is pretty impressive for a developing country which really could use that money at home. On the other hand, India must be gambling that a billion dollars is a small price to pay to deny Pakistan "strategic depth" in Afghanistan and thereby reduce the number of casualties from militants in Kashmir and India more broadly.

Labels: afghanistan, india, pakistan, south asia

This is a basic little map I made while testing out a new bit of software from UMapper.com.  I am not quite sure how I will use this software in my classes, but it seems to hold some potential.

Labels: teaching, web technology

Unfortunately for my students, I don't ask multiple choice questions on quizzes. However, this feature might be useful in other classes.

Labels: teaching, technology

I am testing to see if I can add images to a blog post sent from my handheld device.

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"After flirting briefly with the idea of abandoning human rights in foreign policy altogether in favor of the fight against terrorism and communism, the Regan administration had found a different alternative to the Carter administration's human rights policy. The rights policy of the Carter administration had focused on the security of the person -- freedom from torture and arbitrary killing, for example -- a category in which many right-wing governments engaged in counterinsurgency had exceedingly poor records. The Reagan administration, however, argued that "democracy," largely identified with the holding of competitive elections, constituted the best protection of human rights. Communist regimes, of course, had exceedingly poor records in this area."

-Barnett R. Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan, 1995.

There is something brilliant in the way Rubin teases out this fundamental distinction between two inversely sequential orderings of American values in foreign policy. The current administration's hollow policy of promoting elections while undermining the protection of human rights at home and abroad is the natural outgrowth of privileging "democracy" (i.e. electocracy) before human rights.

It is amazing, almost Orwellian, that the protection of human rights has become sequentially secondary to the promotion of elections. It is understandable that ordinary citizens could be fooled by this clever rhetoric, but it is also evident that the discipline of Political Science has been deeply enmeshed in this agenda. Why does the discipline pay so much attention to regime types over human rights? Is an election meaningful if human rights are not protected? Is our democracy meaningful if we have a state that sanctions torture?

Labels: political science

I saw this rather racist series of advertisements while I was in India this summer (and similar ad campaigns in China last summer). There have been local efforts to ban and boycott this type of product, but with little success. I wonder if added pressure from American and European customers against this form of racist advertising would help put a stop to this. Imagine if such products were pitched to "persons of color" in the US or Europe?

One could argue that companies like Hindustan Unilever are only selling the products that people want, but I wonder about that line of argument since so many resources are being expended to create demand and channel insecurity towards this particular "solution."

Labels: globalization, india, south asia

So today's front page headline in the Hindustan Times is Obama's tribute to the recently deceased Indian Field Marshal and war hero, Sam "Bahadur" Manekshaw. While the tribute is touching and timely given that the state funeral will take place this week, it is rather odd coming from a presidential candidate rather than the sitting head of state. It is also highly unlikely that Obama would have known about Manekshaw's importance to the Indian people on his own, unless we are to imagine Obama is also a South Asianist.

What the tribute clearly indicates is the influence of his South Asia team. This may be a sign that if he is elected, he will give greater attention to South Asia.
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Professor Andre Beteille has an interesting op-ed about the concept of tribe in today's Telegraph. He argues that the concept is no longer applicable to groups like the Gujjars who have agitated to be placed on the government's list of scheduled tribes despite opposition by the Meena tribe.
Professor Beteille bemoans the lack of any attempt to consult objective experts before the government acquiesced. I found his argument rather absurd in a post-Foucauldian era. Do we really want Anthropologists as an arm of the state? Isn't it more interesting to understand what the concept of tribe means today rather than trying to use a 19th century concept to determine who is qualified for affirmative action? Finally, and not surprisingly, there is no discussion of whether the Gujjar tribe actually bears a stigma that results in systematic discrimination.
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The key to challenging the hegemonic discourse amongst India's middle class is the concept of merit. There is an assumption that those who do not have access to affirmative action have earned their positions at universities and goverment bureaucracies.

The discourse requires an examination of the education system and testing regime. While I don't have time to do this in detail, it is apparent to me that the Indian education system shares much in common with countries like China. Students spend an inordinate amount of time not only in class but in evening extra tutorials. The entire process is not only time consuming, it is expensive.

An obvious conclusion that one could draw is that the testing used to establish qualification for admission to higher education measures skills at memorization and test-taking more than aptitude. To the extent that any test can be manipulated by coaching, the test is failing to measure aptitude. Massive factual and formulaic memorization is facilitated by income spent on coaching classes. In essence, I am arguing that under the guise of merit one sees a mechanism for class reproduction. Merit in this context is merely a euphemism for the ability to afford coaching classes which are largely closed to the lower classes.

My main observation is that the need for social justice is generally neglected in the Indian papers I have been reading, while a rather cheap conception of merit is being advanced to protect class, caste, and communal privileges.

What strikes me is the general lack of a vigorous response in the public sphere against the reactionaries.

Thus, is it any wonder that the use of affirmative action comes to be seen as underhanded?