[Crossposted at Duck of Minerva]

In the latest round of the ongoing blood feud between the US military/intelligence agencies and the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan or TTP), it appears that the TTP's leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, was killed by a Predator drone attack in mid-January. The assassination was apparently in “revenge” for the murder of seven CIA operatives at a forward operating base in Afghanistan by Hakimullah's associate and Jordanian double agent, Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi. Of course, Al-Balawi had claimed that his suicide bombing was in retaliation for the assassination of the former leader of the TTP, Baitullah Mehsud, by a CIA drone in August 2009. The US and Pakistan targeted Baitullah Mehsud because he was allegedly behind the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007 and a series of suicide bombings and armed attacks in Pakistan. Baitullah had claimed that his attacks were only in retaliation for US drone attacks facilitated by the American puppet regime in Pakistan... Thus the origins of this blood feud recede into a murky history of drone attacks and suicide bombing counter-attacks.

 To understand the feud, one needs to understand that the relatively precise and virtually unstoppable suicide bomber is considered the military equivalent of the predator drone in the eyes of the Taliban. Hence, there is a cycle of carnage unleashed with each drone attack.

So who was this latest target, Hakimullah Mehsud? Should his death be considered a significant victory in the war?

Haikmullah (also known as Zulfiqar; real name: Jamshed) Mehsud was reportedly first captured and interrogated by Western forces (either NATO or CIA) in the Shawal district of North Waziristan in a raid on March 9th, 2007 according to Pakistani and Chinese media agencies. The illegal incursion by two military helicopters into Pakistani territory led to the ritualized faint murmurs of protest and indignation from the Pakistani government. NATO would later deny any involvement in the kidnapping without denying that the incident may have happened. At the time, Hakimullah was merely known as a cousin and confidante of Baitullah Mehsud, the head of the TTP. Through an apparent "catch and release" policy for junior terrorists, Hakimullah was let go.

Although he was most likely illiterate, the young and handsome (in a swashbuckling, Captain Jack Sparrow-ish sort of way) Mehsud became a spokesman for the TTP organization. He appeared on a local news station (Khyber News) in October 2008 to refute rumors of the death of his cousin. He then transferred from the Taliban's communications desk to become a commander in the field. By November 2008, he rose to become the head of the Taliban in the Orakzai, Khyber, and Kurram Agencies of Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). However, even as he rose in the ranks of the Taliban, he continued to hold press conferences and grant interviews to local journalists -- a sharp contrast with his introverted cousin, Baitullah. The brash commander particularly enjoyed showing off the Humvee he had captured from NATO forces by raiding their supply lines.

Despite his oddly charming personality, it was clear that Hakimullah was also ruthless. He claimed to have had several men beheaded for spying on the Taliban. He instituted a strict interpretation of sharia' and enforced a ban on the movement of women outside of their homes in the Orakzai Agency.

The first attempt by the US to kill Hakimullah with a Predator drone was in April 2009. In revenge for this failed attempt, Mehsud unleashed a wave of suicide attacks and threatened that there would be at least two suicide bombings per week in retaliation.

Hakimullah was appointed to head the TTP network by a shura (council) after the assassination of his cousin by a drone in August 2009. Notably, Hakimullah held a press conference flanked by his new lieutenants to announce his promotion and he vowed to avenge the drone attack ... a vow that his associate, al-Balawi, helped him to fulfill on the last day of 2009. Hakimullah would live for only one more month as American drones narrowed in on him.

At the end of the day the short three year career of the brash and ruthless Mehsud is relatively inconsequential in the broader war. The contrast between Hakimullah and his predecessor only illustrates the wide range of personality types which can assume a leadership position within the Taliban. The skill set Hakimullah used to lead the Taliban organization in the field were not particularly unique or demanding -- he was little more than an illiterate, brutal, and narcissistic gangster. When the camera pans back from the current assassination, it is clear the overall US strategy of leadership decapitation has failed to make a noticeable dent in the operational capacity of the organizations and networks that call themselves the Taliban. If anything, the Taliban appear to be growing bolder on both sides of the Durand Line that separates Pakistan and Afghanistan. For each commander who is killed, a new leader will rise and take his place after a short period of disorganization. The Pakistani government and media hypes each new leader (while selectively ignoring other militant "assets"), transforming a small fish into a whale; the leader comes to the attention of American forces which begin plotting an assassination with the assistance of Pakistani officials and local informants. After a few failed attempts and some collateral damage, which embitters the local population and helps to recruit more militants, the US usually succeeds in bringing down their man. The Americans trump their kill as a success in the war. Unfortunately, very little is actually accomplished as the cycle resets with each successful assassination, the structural positions are re-loaded, and the game begins again.

A leadership decapitation strategy only makes sense when one is confronted with a highly centralized organization led by a small number of capable leaders and a mass of fighters with low morale -- this is clearly not the situation of the organizations and networks targeting Americans and their client regimes in South Asia. The US military and intelligence community continues to confuse a policy of revenge killings for a viable military strategy to defeat a broad based and conscious rebellion.

Labels: drone, nato, neo-taliban, pakistan, pashtun, security, south asia, taliban, us

Indians and Pakistanis say that Afghanistan is the New Kashmir. I wonder if anyone has told the Kashmiris.


Photo: Kashmiri Muslims pray by the body of Wamiq Farooq, 14, during his funeral procession in Srinagar, India, Monday, Feb. 1, 2010. Violent anti-India protests erupted in Indian Kashmir's main city Monday a day after Farooq was killed when police fired tear gas shell hitting on his head, police and locals said. (AP Photo/Dar Yasin).

Labels: india, kashmir, south asia

Photo: Front row from left to right, incoming Afghan foreign minister Zalmay Rasoul, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan Kai Eide, the Aga Khan, Afghan President Hamid Karzai, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, incumbent Afghan Foreign Minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta, and British Foreign Secretary David Miliband, pose for a group photograph with other delegates, including U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, standing behind Karzai, in London, Thursday, Jan. 28, 2010. Major world powers opened talks Thursday seeking an end to the grinding conflict in Afghanistan, drafting plans to hand over security responsibilities to local forces and quell the insurgency with an offer of jobs and housing to lure Taliban fighters to renounce violence. (AP Photo/Alastair Grant, Pool).


Sometimes I am astounded at the lack of fresh ideas in diplomatic circles. The current London Conference is aimed at securing Western support for opening a new round of negotiations with the Taliban. This plan will fail. How do I know? Efforts were made by the US, its allies, and its client regime in Afghanistan to negotiate with “moderate” Taliban in:

• October 2003 (Karzai regime), 
• February 2005 (Karzai regime), 
• April 2007 (Karzai regime), 
• September-December 2007 (Karzai regime and Britain), 
• January 2008 (Karzai regime), 
• November 2008 (Karzai regime),
•  March 2009 (Saudi Arabia), 
• September-November 2009 (Britain),
• January 2010 (Karzai regime in Maldives).

All of these attempts failed to get the Taliban to lay down their arms and join the Karzai regime.  Why? Because the Taliban have absolutely no incentive to negotiate.  They are on the verge of victory against the US and NATO.  The cost of wearing down the foreign forces is negligible for the Taliban. Moreover, they know that the puppet regime of Hamid Karzai does not have the resources to sustain the fight after foreign forces leave. The Taliban have ample financial resources, a large supply of recruits, and a shadow government waiting in the wings -- so why negotiate?

These meetings about opening "negotiations" are a sign of desperation.  The West is merely hoping for an honorable peace rather than a humiliating retreat as a clear defeat will only encourage radical Islamists in other troubled regions.  Meanwhile, the Karzai regime is desperate to play for time and more financial resources since it knows that the government cannot govern beyond the capital.  Karzai supports negotiations to reconcile and reintegrate as a way to attract more funding and resources from foreign donors.

What would fresh thinking entail?  First, it would examine the way in which the international system of states perpetuates the problem.  The current state of Afghanistan is incapable of asserting sovereignty within its territorial boundaries.  Second, it would privilege the role of regional actors over global powers at least into the foreseeable future.  This would mean that groups of neighboring states would need to establish zones of occupation akin to post-war Germany until the process of rebuilding state capacity and social stability is completed.  Rebuilding state capacity and civil society in a country that has had three decades of war may take nearly a half-century.  Third, it would recognize the limited resonance of Western political concepts and instead seek to create a government which is more consonant with the dominant religious and cultural traditions of Afghanistan.  A progressive Islamist state is likely to more effectively  compete for the allegiance of the Afghan people than a nominally democratic regime imposed by secular/Christian countries.

Labels: afghanistan, karzai, pakistan, south asia, taliban, us

Photo: The flag of "Free Pakhtunistan" flies in front of a plaque in the main street of a new part of Kabul, near the royal palace, Afghanistan, in Nov. 1961. The Afghan government champions the cause of a separate Pakhtunistan, to be carved out of the western part of West Pakistan. (AP Photo/Henry S. Bradsher).


The current war in Afghanistan is actually a layered set of complex conflicts. Beneath the US led war on terror is an on going proxy struggle between India and Pakistan (not to mention the on going struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia). The Government of India favors a sovereign and autonomous Afghanistan; the Government of Pakistan would like to regain the hegemonic dominance it attained over Afghanistan under the Taliban regime in the late 1990s. Although the Taliban was difficult to control, they were essentially clients of the Pakistani state. It is important to emphasize that while the Taliban has been heavily dominated by Pashtuns, it is primarily an Islamist organization.

An autonomous Afghanistan has always been a direct threat to Pakistan because Afghanistan has longstanding irredentist claims on Pakistani territory. In other words, the government of Afghanistan would like to annex a significant section of Pakistan which is ethnically Pashtun. The government of Afghanistan has never recognized the 1893 Durand Line drawn by the Britons to separate what was then British India and Afghanistan. In fact, Afghanistan was the only country to vote against Pakistan's admission to the United Nations. The vote reflected Afghanistan's dissatisfaction with the territorial claims of the Pakistani state. It has even been argued that Afghanistan turned toward the Soviet Union in the seventies to advance the Pashtunistan issue when it realized that Pakistan, backed by the US, was not willing to negotiate the issue.

While tensions have existed from the outset, Pakistan's focus on acquiring "strategic depth" within Afghanistan became an acute concern after it was territorially dismembered in the 1971 civil war that led to the creation of Bangladesh. Without a sympathetic regime on its Western flank, Pakistan would be unable to challenge India's regional superpower status, particularly over the unresolved territorial dispute in Kashmir.

With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the banner of Islam was unfurled by Pakistan to shift attention away from the nationalist/irredentist "Free Pashtunistan" issue and to create a client state in Afghanistan. Even today, as the Taliban attack the Pakistani state and people on a routine basis, many Pakistanis continue to make a distinction between "good" and "bad" Taliban. There is a deep seated belief that once the fickle Americans leave the region, Pakistan will once again need to "neutralize" Afghanistan. The recent revival of Pashtunistan Day celebrations within Afghanistan, which had been generally ignored after the Soviet withdrawal, surely confirms and heightens entrenched anxieties in Islamabad (Afghan Islamic Press News Agency, 31 August 2005).

Thus, Pakistan is unwilling to accept a regime in Afghanistan that is devoid of a significant "moderate Taliban" faction. The aim is to prevent the reemergence of the Free Pashtunistan demand as a bilateral issue. For their part, many important Afghan politicians still support the irredentist demand for a free Pashtunistan, even if Afghanistan is currently too weak to bargain effectively with Pakistan. President Karzai himself made gestures toward the Pashtunistan issue in 2008 by suggesting that a monument and minaret should be erected to the former Prime Minister and President of Afghanistan, Mohammad Daud Khan (Prime Minister 1953-1963; President 1973-1978), who was an ardent Pashtunistan supporter. Of course, there are also Afghan critics who believe that the Pashtunistan issue distracts from more pressing issues of reconstructing the war torn state.

So the real question is whether there is a demand for Pashtunistan within the Pashtun tribal areas of Pakistan. There are an estimated 25 million Pashtuns living in Pakistan (~15% of the population) compared to approximately 14 million in Afghanistan (~40% of the population). The flag of free Pashtunistan was raised in areas such as Waziristan and Baluchistan in 1949. Whether significant segments of the Pashtun people (since an ethnic group should not be treated as a monolithic entity) still aspire to the nationalist cause is debatable.

Even Dr. Said Alam Mehsud, the leader of the Pashtun Awareness Movement, concedes that the Pashtun masses no longer support the "lofty" goal of a free Pashtunistan. Instead, he argues, "The Pashtun want a life of dignity, job opportunities, peace, and access to justice," (Weekend Australian, 25 July 2009). He believes that autonomy is sufficient to offset the demand for secession from Pakistan.

Therefore, it is not surprising that in recent years, on the Pakistani side of the border, the demand for a separate Pashtun state has been replaced (among some key political leaders) by a more moderate demand to rename and integrate Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) as Pashtunistan and to create an open border with Afghanistan. In exchange, the proponents of this demand (led by the Awami National Party) have offered to recognize the Durand Line as the legal border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

However, continuing US and Pakistani military interventions and incursions into the Pashtun areas may reignite either stronger (i.e. less moderate) nationalist passions on both sides of the Durand Line or they may strengthen the Taliban's Islamist movement (a third possibility is the emergence of an "Islamic Pashtunistan," see Hindustan Times, 12 May 2009). A stronger and reinvigorated Taliban is looking more and more likely given that the Taliban have formed an extensive network on both sides of the Durand Line. Of course, it now seems increasingly unlikely that the majority of the Taliban can be transformed back into clients of the Pakistani state. If anything, many segments of the new Taliban and affiliated networks seem determined to take the fight to Islamabad as often as necessary.

Real politik logic would therefore dictate that India might be able to work with the new Taliban to bog-down Pakistan and thereby continue India's ascent to regional hegemony, but an Islamist movement is the oddest bed-fellow for a nominally secular/Hindu dominated democracy. In any case, India is well known for supporting the enemies of the Taliban throughout the nineties. Any agreement with the Taliban would be a short-sighted pact. Moreover, Indian policymakers seem increasingly concerned that Pakistan may be too weak and too close to fragmentation, A further dismembered Pakistan would be an even greater headache for India than the status quo. Finally, continuing regional instability threatens India's global market integration and thwarts India's regional aspirations by maintaining the presence of extra-regional powers in South Asia.

The Indo-Pak-Afghan rivalry has become as complicated and messy as ever. While India will continue to support an autonomous and sovereign state in Afghanistan, ironically it may now also have to step up covert support for the nascent democratic regime in Pakistan in its struggle against the Taliban.

Labels: afghanistan, pakistan, pashtun, pashtunistan, reconciliation, security, south asia, taliban, us

Photo: Afghan National Army soldiers, right, and United States Marines from Golf Company, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Regiment, 2nd MEB, left, stand at attention during the playing of the Afghan national anthem at a flag raising ceremony of the new combat outpost in the village of Dahaneh Friday, Aug. 14, 2009 in the Helmand Province of Afghanistan. The ANA will occupy the outpost. (AP Photo/Julie Jacobson)


At a certain point in every imperial occupation, the occupier becomes frustrated with their lackeys. The imperialist will moan:

"Why can't they fight their own war?"
"Why won't they help themselves?"
"When will they take responsibility for their own country?"
"When will they stand up so we can stand down?"

The amnesia required to ask these questions would be startling if it weren't so common. The logic involves forgetting that the occupying forces overthrew the existing government and installed a puppet regime. The imperialist must convince themselves that their use of military force is actually part of a civilizing mission. It is only in this way that one can imagine that the subjects of occupation actually want to fight for the occupier and their puppet government. At this point the occupier assumes the role of a parent offering some tough love to a spineless son.

Very rarely does the occupier ask more fundamental questions:

"Why should they fight to achieve the objectives we set out?"
"Why don't we pay them the exact same salary that we pay our own soldiers?"
"Why don't we completely integrate their forces and ours?"
"Why don't we let their officers command our soldiers?"

To answer such questions honestly, one would need to admit that imperialism is at the heart of the Occupation.

At other times, the imperial frustration hinges on the assumption of native barbarism. In this scenario, the occupied subject is inhibited from their natural instinct to fight by foreign methods and training. The imperialist will argue that the native will actually fight more effectively, as they have for decades or centuries, if we just get out of the way. The critique here shifts slightly from paternalistic condescension to a Machiavellian manipulation of the political economy of violence. The objective also switches from the creation of "modern and professional" army to a desperate struggle to defeat the insurgency. Nevertheless, the fundamental question as to why these subjects should fight to impose our vision remains unasked and unanswered.

Labels: afghanistan, imperialism, nato, security, south asia, us

Photo: Afghan presidential candidate Abdullah Abdullah, top rival of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, displays the allegedly fraud ballot papers during a news conference at his residence in Kabul, Afghanistan, Tuesday, Aug. 25, 2009. Six Afghan presidential candidates, including one being floated as a potential "chief executive" for the next government, warned Tuesday that fraud allegations threaten to undermine the recent election and could stoke violence. (AP Photo/Rafiq Maqbool)


We have lost the war in Afghanistan. It will take another five to ten years for most Americans to admit it, but the failure to hold a credible election means it's effectively over... of course, we will drag this out, but after eight years this is the definitely the begining of the end. A strong state and functional economy has not been built, the ancien regime has been scattered but not vanquished, the drug trade was not sufficiently diminshed, the ideology of secular liberal democracy was not sold to the majority of Afghans. Progress was made on all of these fronts, particularly in the last two years, but it was clearly too little too late. If the elections had been credible, at least some of these structural failings could have been ignored for a few more months.

So the question now is what have we learned? At least provisionally, here are a few lessons:

1. Victory is declared just before the real fight begins. Whenever the US declares a military victory, it is time to settle in for a long fight.

2. The Powell Doctrine is dead. First, there are limits to the use of overwhelming force. In fact, flexing one's military muscle and superior air power can backfire and create more enemies than the conflict began with. Second, clearly defined exit strategies have a way of disappearing once a war/occupation gets underway. We wanted to hand this occupation off to the UN and then NATO, neither strategy worked out. Starting a second war to mask the failure to find an exit strategy is the worst possible solution. The rules of war should be clearly understood at the outset: you break it; you fix it. If you don't know how to fix it, don't break it.

3. Be wary of generals asking to double troop strength and administrators asking to double development assistance. The logic behind the rhetoric of "doubling" is dubious (why not "1.73" or "triple" or "quadruple"?) and generally a sign of utter incompetence or complete desperation.

4. Decentralized organizations are much more difficult to defeat than centralized organizations. Moreover, a centralized organization like the Taliban (1996-2001) can reorganize itself as a decentralized organization (2001 - Present). The pursuit of strategies designed to knock out centralized organizations (e.g. leadership assassination) when dealing with a decentralized organization are an indication of a failed military strategy.

5. The discipline of political science does not have much useful to contribute on the process of building a strong state. The process has been carefully studied, but there are no blueprints. The only states America has rebuilt successfully already had a strong state tradition. Weak states can be rebuilt as strong states (e.g. Korea under Japanese occupation; Taiwan under the KMT), but the process is very difficult to replicate.

6. Holding elections before building strong institutions and providing security is a major gamble for breathing room. Of course this was known before the elections were held. At the end of the day, elections are not a substitute for the hard work of institution building and security provision. Elections are necessary but not nearly sufficient for the establishment of a well governed democracy.

Labels: afghanistan, south asia, taliban, us

My article on the US media's coverage of the election in Afghanistan is available at Himal Magazine.

Labels: afghanistan, elections, south asia, us

Photo: An Afghan woman adjusts her scarf made from an Afghan flag, while attending a gathering held by the Afghanistan Women Council to discuss presidential candidates in the upcoming election in Kabul, Afghanistan on Tuesday, Aug, 11, 2009. Afghans will head to the polls on Aug. 20 to elect a new president for the second time in the country's history. (AP Photo/Musadeq Sadeq)


The difficulty in watching, hearing, and reading about the repression of women's rights in Afghanistan is that so few in Euromerica or Afghanistan actually even attempt to let those affected by repressive policies speak for themselves. Women, conceived as a monolithic collectivity, and women's rights continue to be used as a justification for imperialism in a manner that denies the history of women's activism in Afghanistan. Of course, there are dangers for women and women's rights activists in speaking out in Afghanistan, but there is an eerie parallel here with Spivak's critique of the colonial condemnation/nationalist defense of sati:

"Between patriarchy and imperialism, subject-constitution and object-formation, the figure of the woman disappears, not into a pristine nothingness, but into a violent shuttling which is the displaced figuration of the "third-world woman" caught between tradition and modernization,"

- Gyatri Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?"

Whether such subalterns can in fact speak and know their conditions, is another debate...

Labels: afghanistan, rights, south asia, women

File Photo: Village elders listen to U.S. soldiers of the 82nd Airborne during a meeting in Chinar Village in Ghorak district of Kandahar province Southern Afghanistan, Tuesday, March 13, 2007. (AP Photo/Rafiq Maqbool)

"When a country is being subverted, it is not being outfought; it is being out-administered." - Bernard B. Fall, 1965

By now it is well understood that "good governance" is the key to an effective counter-insurgency and stabilization strategy in Afghanistan. In fact, one of the few differences between the Obama and Bush administrations is the relative weight attached to non-military methods vs. military methods in the occupation of Afghanistan. Even though the Obama administration has continued the policy of a troop surge planned by the preceding administration, its goal is to place greater emphasis on improving local governance. Ambassador Eikenberry has requested $6.6 billion in nonmilitary spending. Eikenberry has explained that this amount is necessary to show the "results" demanded by Congress in 14 months (Washington Post, 12 August 2009).

It should be noted that the US has already spent $38 billion on reconstruction since 2001, although half of that money was actually spent on training the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. Moreover, annual nonmilitary spending has been about a tenth of military spending in Afghanistan. International donors have funded governance projects for the last three years, however the emphasis on improving the capacity of governors, police chiefs, district chiefs failed to improve governance (Vanda Felbab-Brown, "2009 Afghan Elections and the Future of Governance," Brookings, 13 August 2009).

Nevertheless, since there is now more than adequate funding in the pipeline and a commitment to prioritize nonmilitary methods of counterinsurgency, the real question is what is "good governance" at the local level and how can it be set up?

We as Americans tend to equate good governance with an idealized image of our own political system, i.e. a liberal constitutional democracy with a high level of transparency and accountability in policy making and implementation processes. It is believed that democracy and legality foster more durable bonds of loyalty and hence "legitimacy." Of course, in reality, a system of governance need not be democratic or even benevolent to be effective in fostering obedience and development... this is amply evident to any serious student of comparative politics. Nevertheless, it is difficult for most Americans to be critical of the noble lies on which the republic was founded.

In general the most cost effective mode of imperial governance is to formalize and reinforce existing systems of government (particularly for the purpose of revenue extraction). This was the classic approach developed by the East India Company toward its conquered territories in South Asia.

US administrators have generally rejected the "East India" approach. They argue that decades of war in Afghanistan have almost completely destroyed prior systems of administration even at the local level. Moreover, the residual system of governance from the Taliban era was viewed as wholly inadequate and highly regressive, particularly in relation to the rights of women -- which was a major post hoc rationalization for the war. So the US and its allies have chosen to rebuild the framework of governance at the national and sub-national levels. (There are some inconvenient parallels here with the PDPA and Soviet approaches to building a "modern" socialist state in Afghanistan after the Saur Revolution in 1978, especially in regard to the mandate for including women in government). Much of first seven years of occupation were devoted to rebuilding a national and provincial government. Village level governance was not prioritized by the US but other donors did make attempts to improve local governance. The result of this neglect is that a series of contradictory bodies were established with access to donor funding at the provincial, district, and village levels (Sarah Lister, "AREU Briefing Paper, April 2005, p. 1).

The objective of the Obama administration is to rebuild local shura councils for day to day administration at the local level and create "development councils" to help decide which development projects a locality would prefer in their area. The administration has also decided to continue a policy begun under the Bush administration to economically co-opt local leaders. The leaders of the local councils and tribal leaders are provided a stipend (reportedly $200 per month) to encourage them to act as informants on the activities of local Taliban militias.

The difficulty with creating a system of local governance from the ground up is that there are varied traditions of local governance throughout Afghanistan. There is also a complex relationship between the central government, the provinces, and local leaders. Decision making within the state apparatus is (at least on paper) highly centralized, but relatively decentralized in practice. Provincial governors have very little budgetary discretion (Sarah Lister, "AREU Briefing Paper," April 2005, p. 3), but may wield great power, particularly if they earn revenue from the drug trade.

Thus one key issue is calibrating local governance structures to existing traditions of governance. The other issue is discovering the proper level of centralization or decentralization to promote efficient solutions to solve coordinations problems (i.e. economic development) and create security. The challenge as laid out by the US is creating a state which has sufficient capacity to encourage development and security; while also being sufficiently decentralized to promote meaningful participation and accountability.

Unfortunately, most Americans have little understanding of how our federal republic became a great industrial and military power. Even fewer Americans have studied the developmental states of East Asia in any detail. This is not to imply that either the US or the East Asian Tigers are remotely appropriate "models" for the current regime in Afghanistan. However, it does indicate that the contemporary American impulse for decentralization, liberalization of markets, and participatory politics may be counter-productive to the objective of state building and development at this time. Good governance is essential to defeat the insurgency, but a serious debate needs to be undertaken on how to achieve improved governance in the context of a systemically corrupt government with weak state capacity at all levels. Holding elections and soliciting local participation in an ethnocracy will not create accountability or reduce corruption. More likely, elections will increase corruption as power brokers who are able to deliver ethnic or tribal "vote banks" gain greater control of the reigns of government. Soliciting local participation on selecting foreign funded development projects will not institutionalize a sustainable mechanism for resolving coordination problems. Given time constraints imposed by Congress on the current occupation, the US may need to choose between creating a state which has sufficient capacity to encourage development and security or promoting citizen participation and the appearance of democratic accountability.

Labels: afghanistan, counterinsurgency, south asia, us

Video: ISAF Media.


Over the last few weeks, I have been studying the US military's use of social media for propaganda and community building purposes. Facebook now has fan sites devoted to ISAF (International Security Assistance Force), USFORA (US Forces in Afghanistan), the new US embassy in Kabul, EUCOM, USO, FORSCOM, CENTCOM, etc.

The target audience for these sites appears to be the loyal families and friends of soldiers and diplomats. What interests me is the characteristics of the community that posts responses to the news items.

The majority of comments are simply wishes and prayers for the success of the various missions and the safe return of their loved ones as well as expressions of gratitude for the service of the soldiers. (There are also regular posts by new comers seeking to locate a family member and/or the activities of a particular platoon, which cannot be revealed for security reasons). In other words, the majority of those who comment are relatively apolitical well wishers. However, I have noticed some interesting patterns among those who post comments more frequently:

1. Many of those who post frequently seem to be frustrated that the type of "good news" and "good works" covered by these fan sites are not featured more frequently in the main stream media (MSM) in the US and the media in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Others believe that the MSM at home and abroad is simply unfair and biased against NATO forces. For example, here is a comment from a story reporting that ISAF evacuated a child injured by a roadside bomb:

GR: "When we kill, by mistake, civvies there are frequently protests in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Is the populace continually informed of civilian casualties caused by Islamic terrorists ?"

There is no attempt to ascertain why a professional newspaper editor might refuse to run media content produced directly by the military. In essence, there seems to be little awareness that the fan sites are disseminating propaganda. (In the comment above, there is also an assumption that occupying forces only kill civilians by mistake rather than as part of a deliberate strategy to shift risks onto the civilian population in order to limit harm to occupying forces. The believe that US forces are paladins is usually accompanied by the characterization of the enemy as unconstrained and ruthless.).

2. There is a deep distrust of the people of Afghanistan. The most racist and insensitive comments are quickly deleted by moderators (one racist comment I saw called the Afghans "sand niggers" before it was deleted by moderators). However, there is a rather constant stream of comments which seek to imply that the people of Afghanistan are ungrateful and likely to switch sides or back stab the coalition in the future. For example in response to the comment above, a different individual wrote:

CMVF: "To me Civves there are just future terrorists so no biggie."

It should be noted that there is occasional push back against the repeated slurs about the occupied population. For example, in response to CMVF's post, we see:

KRN: "That's asinine [CMVF]. Those civilians are a large part of the reason we're there in the first place- so they can be free and safe to run their country without Taliban and other terrorist influence. Shame on you."

Another commenter adds:

TM: "Wow [CMVF], pretty sure you don't have any loved ones serving or you might not have made that comment. My son, a Marine, when asked about how he feels about possibly killing someone, said the "bad guys" don't weigh heavily on the mind but killing or injuring an innocent does. Obviously the Taliban have no such discretion. A child is always an innocent. And the Taliban could be saying all of our kids will grow up to be racist or the part of the KKK or whatever other looney group is ascribed to America......and you'd be the first to argue against that."

3. There is a general confusion between the category of insurgent and terrorist (or the more frequently used label on these fan sites: "Islamic terrorist"). There seems to be a pervasive belief that all of the enemies of the occupying forces are ipso facto terrorists. Even if an insurgent uses standard guerrilla tactics against military targets, they are labelled as terrorists or Islamic terrorists. (The attempt to forge a link between one of the largest religions in the world and terrorism generally goes unchallenged.)

4. There seems to be a general confusion as to why the US and NATO forces are involved in the war. For example, in a discussion of a video showing basic training for the Afghan National Army, one commentator noted:

JE: "[LB], its not about toleration, its about history. People need to want help to help them. We gove [sic] them "democracy" They vote for who their Trinal [sic] leader tells them to, blindly. I talk to them every day. Our nation is in a financial meltdown. we have spent so much money in Iraq nad [sic] now here, but we have a massive forclosure [sic] and unemployment rate to deal with. We give their Police a bonus to come cover the election in the south, after they get the bonus, one quarter defects out of the south and keeps the money. You read media shit about this place, I am here. That is how it works here."

This is the rhetoric of the white man's burden. The commentator (a US soldier in Afghanistan) does not understand that the mission of the US in Afghanistan was to impose regime change with bayonets. When the local population does not accept an alien and imposed form of governance, they are viewed as hostile to the generous, enlightened, and good natured occupying forces. There is an assumption that a rejection or reworking of the imposed form of governance implies a retreat towards blind obedience rather than an attempt to syncretically adapt an instrument of liberal democracy to more familiar modes of governance.

The commentator is not critical of the claim that US forces are there to give the gift of democracy (much less the idea that democracy can be given by an occupying army or the conflation of elections with democratic governance more broadly). Of course, even a cursory investigation into the initial appointment of the head of state after the Taliban were overthrown should pose sufficient questions about the relative importance attached to democracy by the US.

There is also frustration expressed about the unwillingness of the local people to "want to help themselves." The commentator does not understand why the Afghan soldier or police officer is not sufficiently motivated by an economic bonus to risk his life implementing a form of government desired by the occupying forces. The assumption here is that the American soldier is benevolently risking his life to give the gift of democracy. There is no attempt to question why the Afghan soldier or police officer who is paid a pittance should not be paid the same salary and lifetime benefits as the US soldier for taking the same risk. When I engaged this commentator and informed him that in fact the ANA and ANP take greater risks and have suffered much higher casualties than coalition troops, he replied that his main concern was about the waste of money in trying to train individuals who will do things their own way anyway.

It seems that for those who come to believe the propaganda they are fed by the military, their world becomes increasingly frustrated. Like the Han Chinese who are occupying Tibet and Xinjiang, the Russian Soviets in Central Asia, or the Indian armed forces in the vale of Kashmir, the occupiers cannot understand why the local population resents and resists their will. While the propaganda may sustain the morale of family and friends, it generates increasing hostility (and/or paternalism) toward the occupied population.

Labels: afghanistan, homefront, south asia, us

File Photo: Hamid Karzai is seen in this undated photo. (AP Photo)


Some aspects of Hamid Karzai's early biography are rather well known: his ethnic, tribal, and family heritage; his college education in India; etc. However, the details of his early career are sketchy after he earns his MA in political science in 1983 and before his appointment as Chairman of the governing committee at the Bonn Conference in December 2001. Most of the details of this period which are commonly known are intended to paint a portrait of a moderate nationalist who has consistently sought to liberate his country rather than an elite, corrupt, opportunistic, and co-opted individual.

Karzai has stated that he joined the mujahideen resistance to the Soviet occupation in 1983, at the age of twenty-five. However, he was clearly not a traditional freedom fighter. In fact, he never fired a weapon during the resistance or at any time in his life (Sinno 2008, p. 259). Moreover, Karzai lived in Pakistan and not Afghanistan during this period. Two years after joining the resistance, Karzai left Pakistan and enrolled in a journalism course in Lille, France.

Upon his return to Pakistan, he became the "Director of Information" for the National Liberation Front of Afghanistan led by Sibghataullah Mojaddedi. He explained to a journalist friend (Ahmed Rashid) that he picked the NLFA because he found the major fundamentalist factions supported by the Pakistani ISI to be distasteful.

In 1987, Karzai left the country again to participate in the International Visitor Leadership Program hosted by the US State Department. This program is part of the Fulbright-Hayes Act of 1961. Participants who are considered to be potential future leaders are selected for the program by US officials overseas. It seems reasonable to infer that Karzai's long standing relationship with the United States (and reportedly the CIA) began around this time.

Karzai was first quoted in English language press reports in the waning years of the Soviet occupation of his country. In December 1988, the dapper spokesman expressed support for the negotiations being conducted in Saudi Arabia between the USSR and Afghan rebel factions. At that time, the Soviets hoped that the Saudis would restrain their mujahideen clients long enough to allow the USSR to retreat honorably. Rebel leaders sought to work with the Soviets to ensure a smooth transitional government which excluded the "hard core" communists, but included "moderates." The Soviets hoped that negotiations might ensure a non-aligned government rather than a revolutionary Islamic regime (Sunday Times, 4 December 1988). This rather simplistic approach to forming a government would be adopted by Karzai throughout his career.

Unfortunately, a smooth transition was not worked out and after the Soviets withdrew their troops, their client regime in Afghanistan attempted to defeat the rebels (relying heavily on continuing Soviet assistance). The battle finally ended in April 1992 as thousands of mujahideen took Kabul.

In early 1992, the NLFA's leader, Sibghataullah Mojaddedi, was chosen to be the interim President of Afghanistan and Karzai served as his advisor. [Mojaddedi would resurface after the collapse of the Taliban regime. In 2003, Mojaddedi served as the head of the Loya Jirga that approved the new constitution and designated the new interim government under Karzai. Notably, Mojaddedi attempted initially to silence women's voices for trying to put themselves on an equal footing with men. In 2005, Mojaddedi become the head of the upper house of the Afghan parliament. He was also appointed by Karzai to be the head of the National Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission to grant amnesty to all Taliban and Hizb-e-Islami members.]

By late 1992, Karzai was appointed as the Deputy Foreign Minister for International Humanitarian Help in the Rabbani government (he also served as the Acting Deputy Minister of the Interior). Karzai was frequently cited as a representative of the government in the early days of the Rabbani regime. In large part his command of English and refined manners made him a darling of the foreign media.

Karzai's had difficulty defending the new regime to the foreign press, particularly on the issue of women's rights:

"The only experience I have is with the resistance," he said. "The only reason I stay with it is so that people can continue to live the way they have. Men's clothing is a matter of their personal choice. As for women, unfortunately for them, they cannot continue to dress as they have. We are trying to protect everything from the flowers and the trees, to things at the highest level," (New York Times, 3 May 1992).

The Rabbani regime failed to restore peace among the warring factions. Even Kabul continued to be shelled by rival warlords. By 1994, Karzai fled the increasingly dangerous capital for Peshawar, stating "I can no longer risk living there." He claimed that members of the Rabbani regime, particularly the chief of the intelligence bureau, attempted to kidnap and interrogate him on orders from Ahmed Shah Masood. However, he did not explain why they would have done so (Associated Press, 10 January 1994).

As the situation deteriorated in Afghanistan, the Taliban emerged as a band of idealistic militants promising to restore order to the country. In an interview with Ahmed Rashid, Karzai stated he was an early supporter of the Taliban. He claimed that in 1994 he gave the Taliban $50,000 and a cache of weapons that he had hidden near Kandahar (Rashid 2008, p. 13). How a former rebel spokesman and deputy minister came into such a large amount of disposable income and weaponry was not explained. Apparently, upon receiving his generous support the head of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, considered appointing Karzai as his envoy to the United Nations. However, Karzai told Ahmed Rashid that he began to have second thoughts upon learning that the Taliban were shutting down schools for girls and operating under orders from the Pakistani intelligence service (ISI). When the Taliban came under the influence of Al Qaeda, Karzai claims that he began to organize against the Taliban.

From 1997 to 2000, Karzai appeared as a senior member of former King Zahir Shah's delegation in the US financed Rome Process. Karzai hoped that a Loya Jirga could be established to end the fighting in Afghanistan between the Taliban and rival warlords. Not surprisingly, the Taliban were less than interested in this proposal.

Around this time Karzai is curiously quoted in a classified US embassy telegram in 1998 after a cruise missile attack failed to knock out an Al Qaeda training camp inside Afghanistan. Karzai informed his American embassy contact that Bin Laden was "on the move" and that he and his father supported the US missile strikes.

Tragically, Karzai's father, a leader of the Popalzai tribe, was murdered in 1999 in Quetta, Pakistan allegedly by Taliban militants. In the younger Karzai's narrative, this act further strengthened his resolve to oust the Taliban regime.

In July 2000, Karzai testified before the US Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. He continued to promote the idea that a Loya Jirga (or grand council/constitutional assembly) war needed to be set up to find a solution to the insecurity in Afghanistan.

In 2001, Karzai met with several prominent warlords, including Hekmatyar and Masood, who seemed willing to attack the Taliban. Karzai told Ahmed Rashid that Hekmatyar offered to let him join the Northern Alliance or to supply him with weapons if he chose to take independent action in the south (Rashid 2008, 19). The latter claim seems implausible since it is clear that Karzai was not a warlord with any military experience.

Certain patterns emerge from this brief study of Karzai's forgotten years. First, while Karzai was "there at the creation" of two new regimes, he was not a particularly charismatic figure. Rather, his importance to different leaders was based on his language proficiency and polish as a communications specialist. He is eminently qualified as an international diplomat, but his early career poorly qualified him to serve as the president of an impoverished and war ravaged country. In other words, Karzai is more appealing to foreigners than his own people. His leadership positions were not based on his ability to inspire confidence in hardened rebel fighters or the masses more broadly. Second, Karzai's story reveals that he was quickly co-opted by foreign governments, particularly the United States. He regularly appears in possession of far greater disposable income and resources than seems possible for a man of his rank. To be blunt: he was quickly corrupted. While this might be considered as a personal failing of Karzai, or a systemic necessity in a highly factionalized society, it also shows a poor understanding of politics in the developing world by his handlers. Imperialists historically have sought to hand over power to individuals who seem to reflect their own values and mannerisms. The problem is that this is usually a recipe for creating an illegitimate regime that succumbs to authoritarianism or a revolution. Third, Karzai was opportunistic from the beginning. He showed a willingness to work with rather unsavory warlords in exchange for power from a very early stage in his career. While Karzai portrays himself as a moderate progressive, he has been willing to compromise women's rights to co-opt chauvinistic and thuggish warlords. Karzai cannot have his cake and eat it too. Karzai is not a progressive, at best he is a pragmatist or a survivalist.

Labels: afghanistan, karzai, pakistan, south asia, taliban, us

Photo: First mall in Kabul, Afghanistan. (AP Photo/Tomas Munita)


This too is Afghanistan. Often forgotten in the predictable images that portray Afghanistan as a medieval and militarized landscape, is the other Afghanistan which is rising very slowly and very tentatively.

This mall, which opened in 2005, has about 90 shops and is one of the only fully air-conditioned spaces in the country. It also boasts of having the only escalator in Afghanistan. There is a five-star hotel above the mall with 177 rooms starting at approximately $200 a night.

Given that Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries on earth, this mall is mainly a temple to capitalist consumerism... only the smallest minority could afford to buy the iPods or PlayStations or flat screen televisions on sale here. Few could even afford the imported shoes. Apparently, however, the bridal outfits can be rented for that special occasion.

So the real question is who does shop here? Journalists report that some of the shoppers are those Afghans who returned from exile after 2001 to help "rebuild" their country. Others are expatriate contractors and overpaid development workers (St. Petersburg Times, 26 November 2006). The rest are most likely warlords and corrupt government officials (or a hyphenated combination of both) and their family members.

The space of the mall should not be read through a Western lens. This is not a public space for the masses to congregate and perambulate; the average Afghan subject would probably not make it past security. Rather this mall seems to be a zone for Afghanistan's elite which resides behind compound walls. This is a class that seems to be generally alienated from its national surroundings. They seek parity with one another and a Globalized Gulfie elite that they meet mainly through satellite television and the Internet (Statesman, 3 February 2008).

I think it would be fanciful to believe that this mall will bloom or metastasize (depending on your political point of view) to cover every urban area in the country in the near future. It is more likely that this mall will remain a small capitalist shrine for the next decade or so. The mall will continue to serve a sheltered elite that longs to build an alternate future.

Like their Taliban rivals who renamed the country the Emirate of Afghanistan, the Afghan elite also long for a utopia by the same name. However, the elite's vision of an emirate is inspired by the Persian Gulf states rather than a Deobandi interpretation of an idealized Islamic state. In either case, neither group is particularly concerned about the res publica. Nevertheless, while neither the Taliban nor the elite have strong social roots in the country, the elite are far more dependent on foreign financing.

Labels: afghanistan, corruption, kabul, mall, south asia

Photo: Pakistani Pastun men read a copy of Taliban code of conduct in a Pakistani border town of Chaman along the Afghanistan border on Friday, July 31, 2009. A Taliban code of conduct that pledges to limit attacks on civilians and curb suicide bombings appears aimed at mustering support among the Afghan people and refurbishing the militants' international image ahead of peace talks widely expected after next month's presidential elections.(AP Photo/Shah Khalid)

Labels: afghanistan, neo-taliban, pakistan, south asia, taliban

Photo: Pakistani Taliban militants, who were arrested during a gunfight between Taliban militants and locals in Achin district, are shown to the media at the detention center of Jalalabad, capital of Nangarhar province, east of Kabul, Afghanistan on Saturday, July 18, 2009. Three Taliban militants and two civilians were killed in Friday night's gunbattle in Nangarhar province, Afghan officials said. (AP Photo/Rahmat Gul)


The label neo-Taliban was first popularized by the Economist magazine in 2003 (see Economist, 24 May 2003). The term originally seems to have been used to describe militants in Afghanistan who skirmished with coalition and government forces as well as aid workers even after the Taliban government was overthrown by the US backed Northern Alliance in 2001. The actual distinction between the neo-Taliban (2003-Present) and the paleo-Taliban (1994-2001) was unclear, except for the claim that the neo-Taliban included "tribal malcontents, drug traffickers, and other ill-educated chancers" (Economist, 4 October 2003) - a distinction without a difference.

By 2004, the neo-Taliban were linked in media reports to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) as well as the anti-government insurgency in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. Ahmed Rashid even claimed that the neo-Taliban were "recently trained in Iraq" (International Herald Tribune, 2 June 2005).

Eventually, the label was said to encompass four components:

"Most of the original top leaders who were never captured, including Mullah Mohammed Omar, who founded the movement. Other senior leaders include Mullah Dadullah, the former Taliban intelligence chief; Maulavi Obaidullah, the former defense minister; and Jalalludin Haqqani, a prominent commander of the struggle to drive Soviet troops out of the country in the 1980s and former Taliban minister of tribal affairs. Their fighters are said to include loyalists from the original movement and newly indoctrinated Afghan students from radical Islamic schools in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his Hizb-e-Islami party, the main recipients of U.S.- funded weapons that Pakistan funneled to the mujaheddin groups that fought the 1979-89 Soviet occupation. Hekmatyar, a fervent Islamist, was prime minister in the government of the mujaheddin parties that took power in 1992 and then began fighting among themselves. He fled to Iran after the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996. Returning after it fell, he called on his former foes to join him in battling the U.S.-led coalition and Karzai.

Pakistani Islamic extremists, foreign jihadists and al-Qaeda fighters from Chechnya, Uzbekistan, and Arab countries whom sympathetic Pashtun tribes in Pakistan's tribal belt sheltered after the U.S.-led intervention.

Afghan drug merchants, lumber and gem smugglers, and criminal gangs who cover their activities by portraying themselves as defending Afghanistan from non-Muslims," (Philadelphia Inquirer, 24 August 2005).

Thus, the label seemingly described a motley crew of fighters and bandits with only a loose command structure united by a general desire to oust foreign troops and destabilize the Karzai regime. These groups occasionally allied to fight government and coalition forces, but not to acquire territory. Their tactics included terrorism (e.g. beheadings) and elements from the guerrilla play-book (e.g. improvised explosive devices). Funding for the neo-Taliban was reportedly coming from private individuals in the Middle East and the Pakistani Intelligence Services (although the latter strongly denied the charge) as well as the sale of narcotics within Afghanistan.

By 2006, reports emerged that neo-Taliban groups were forming shadow governments in the tribal areas of Pakistan (Washington Post, 19 April 2006). Naturally, the idea of a shadow government indicated a greater measure of centralized organization. Even President Musharraf acknowledged that a wave of "talibanization" was occurring in the tribal areas. Ironically, the original Taliban had emerged from the same area that was now being described as "talibanized." Some journalists called the militants in the tribal areas "Pakistani Taliban" others used the label "Pakistani Neo-Taliban." The militants themselves sometimes accepted these labels and at other times claimed to be fighting for the "Islamic Emirate of Waziristan" (Newsweek, 21 July 2006; Of course, from a logical standpoint the label "Pakistani Taliban" seems awkward since few of the Pushtun militants seem to identify with the idea of Pakistan or the broader population outside of the tribal areas.).

At the very least, it was clear that there were strong and long-standing links and support networks between the Pashtun militants on both sides of the Durand Line separating Afghanistan and Pakistan. Moreover, these links became stronger as the Pakistani government, pressured by the US, moved in to its tribal areas to help eradicate rear bases for Afghan militants.

The growth of the neo-Taliban militias in southern and western Afghanistan as well as the tribal areas of Pakistan meant that American plans to hand over the conflict to NATO forces had to be delayed and ultimately scrapped. This indicated that the Americans had underestimated their opponents.

NATO forces began to analytically divide the neo-Taliban enemy into "tier one" and "tier two" Taliban:

"At this point, we refer to Afghanistan's enemies as Tier One and Tier Two insurgents," a Canadian military source at Kandahar Airfield told the Star on condition of anonymity.

"Tier One, to put it simply, is the hardcore. We believe they are a mix of the old Taliban fighters and products of the madrassa school system and they remain relatively small in number. But they are showing a degree of sophistication, including the ability to stage co-ordinated fights in groups of up to 20 fighters."

Tier One Taliban, the Canadians say, employ a broader range of weaponry, including use of 12.7 mm machine guns and an ample supply of rocket-propelled grenades. Their work can be seen in the almost daily attacks around Kandahar, including the ambush yesterday of a bus carrying a road construction crew, killing 19 labourers.

Tier Two Taliban, by contrast, equate roughly to "local hires" - young Afghan soldiers of fortune driven by despair and joblessness into the ranks of the insurgency.

"We're basically talking about people whose main motivation is work. They are handed an AK-47 with a couple of magazines of ammunition and sent out to do damage," the Canadian military source told the Star," (Toronto Star, 23 September 2006).

This analytical framework was intended to help focus counter-insurgency efforts. The goal was to buy off the second tier and kill off the first tier. However, the first tier was pretty hard to kill off and intelligence sources indicated that the tier two grunts were being paid salaries of $300 per month, nearly triple the salary of grunts in the Afghan National Army and five times the salary of Afghan National Police recruits.

Thus, it became increasingly evident that the "neo-Taliban" leadership is well funded and organized (probably based in Pakistan). Their grunts are even better paid than those working for the Karzai regime. And while the new Taliban force is about a quarter the size of the original Taliban, the resurgent organization has the ability to replenish its ranks even after numerous confrontations with NATO and Afghan government forces. The organization clearly has its own communications infrastructure and supply lines, which are being used to open new fronts against coalition and government forces.

Strategically, the organization knows it does not need to do anything more than wage hit-and-run operations inside Afghanistan to politically wear out the foreign troops. Within Pakistan, bungled attempts by the Pakistani army to pacify the tribal region as well as the Red Mosque seige have only strengthened and popularized the insurgency on both sides of the border. In other words, the organization is smart and understands the political economy of violence.

In recent weeks we have learned that the organization has issued a new manual to its fighters on the treatment of prisoners of war. The leadership has also threatened to kill regional commanders who are corrupt or who do not obey orders from the central leadership. Finally, the organization has developed a modicum of media savvy and the ability to produce media content (as demonstrated after the recent capture of a US soldier).

The idea of the neo-Taliban has grudgingly evolved from a derisive label to a concession that the enemy is actually more organized and strategic than the US or other NATO forces first assumed.

Labels: afghanistan, neo-taliban, pakistan, south asia, taliban, uzbekistan

Photo: British Foreign Secretary David Miliband gestures while speaking during a media conference at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Monday July 27, 2009. Miliband said Monday that the Afghan government must use the opportunity created by the allied military surge to reconcile with moderate Taliban guerrillas willing to join the political process. Twenty British soldiers have died in Afghanistan in July, the deadliest month of the war, setting off a heated political debate about Britain's role in the war and raising doubts over whether the military has the proper equipment. (AP Photo/Virginia Mayo)


There are probably no more than about 12,000 gun-toting members of the Taliban in Afghanistan arrayed against almost 180,000 combined troops of the European, American, and Afghan governments. The numbers alone do not even begin to measure how fully mismatched the fight is. The Taliban have no heavy artillery, no tanks, no armored transports, no helicopters, no fighter jets, no predator drones, and no cruise missiles... The Taliban have yet to overrun and hold a single NATO base.

And yet we repeatedly hear talk of reconciliation and compromise with the Taliban from Western leaders and the Kabul government.

What is happening? The short answer is that there is a desire to expedite the conclusion of this war by all parties, except the Taliban. So why aren't the Taliban interested in a negotiated settlement?

First, it is important to note that the logic of the reconciliation strategy assumes that the Taliban are a fragmented group on the verge collapse. This is wishful thinking. In fact, the Taliban appear to be increasingly centralized (they've even issued a new manual to all of their fighters on how to treat prisoners of war) and the organization is hardly on the verge of defeat. Since the organization is relatively unified, a reconciliation process would need to negotiate directly with the central leadership of the Taliban. The problem for the Kabul government, which is almost completely propped up by foreign forces and foreign financing, is that Mullah Omar has rejected any reconciliation talks as long as foreign troops are present in the country (there is a historic parallel here with the mujahideen's rejection of the Afghan communist government's call for a ceasefire and national reconciliation in January 1987).

Second, even if Mullah Omar were in the mood to negotiate, there would still be a problem. The terms of the most recent reconciliation offer indicates that the government is only interested to negotiate with "moderate Taliban" or those who have no ties to international terrorism. This clearly excludes Mullah Omar and his immediate associates who have bounties on their heads.

Third, even if we suppose that a reconciliation process could be started with "moderate Taliban" leaders of some notoriety and legitimacy, there is no guarantee that such a process would endure. In neighboring Pakistan, the government has made multiple peace treaties with their Taliban only to have these treaties scrapped by one of the parties within a few months. While a truce or treaty is not the same as a reconciliation process, a true or treaty is usually a precondition for the start of a reconciliation process. One wonders why there is an assumption that reconciliation will necessarily result in a lasting peace. The most likely outcome from the start of a reconciliation process would be a fragmentation of the Taliban and a repudiation of any agreement by those who do not participate in the reconciliation process. At best this would weaken the Taliban, but it would not bring peace. The Taliban are not dumb and have anticipated this result of the reconciliation strategy, this is why Mullah Omar has forbidden any of his subordinates from negotiating with the Kabul government.

Finally, reports that the notoriously corrupt Karzai government has been willing to bribe Taliban leaders to secure temporary ceasefires before the upcoming election generally undermines the idea of a legitimate reconciliation process. If peace must be purchased, war is likely to return when the funding runs dry. Provincial Taliban will certainly take money from the Kabul government for a temporary truce, but this only increases their incentive to keep fighting.


Setting aside the absurdity of the reconciliation strategy, it is curious that any party to the conflict would want to include members of the Taliban in the legitimate government of Afghanistan. What does one say to the women and minorities who were oppressed by these thugs? Would one ask women and minorities to sit next to a Taliban legislator and try to have a rational debate on why the rights of women and minorities should be restricted? While it is true that the Taliban are Afghans, not all members of a nation have a right to participate in government... some belong in prisons. It is bad enough that the current Kabul government has included notorious warlords in critical positions, to add Taliban members would truly create a pitiful state.

The guiding spirit of the call for reconciliation is an abstract pragmatism divorced from both reality and morality. Unfortunately, there are enemies which must be defeated. Defeating the Taliban may not need to be done by the West alone, but it cannot be circumvented through wishful thinking.

Labels: afghanistan, nato, reconciliation, south asia, taliban, us

Labels: afghanistan, pow, south asia, taliban

File Photo: Men dressed to represent all Afghan ethnic groups stand during a parade in Kabul, Afghanistan on Thursday, April, 28, 2005. (AP Photo/Musadeq Sadeq)


What is to be done to rebuild Afghan society?

The goal, to borrow from Partha Chatterjee, is "to give to the empirical form of a population group the moral attributes of a community." Or to be more precise, the goal is to help the occupiers to see the ways in which the people of Afghanistan are attempting to do this for themselves.

There is a tendency to view the places we invade through the abstract concept of "population." In particular, people are reduced to demographic census data, particularly ascriptive ethno-religious categories. In Iraq, we were told that there were three relevant groups: Sunni, Shi'a, and Kurd. These identities were often treated as primordial and paramount, as if ideology or lived experience could not forge alternative or more salient bonds. These labels were attempts to frame "the other" as pre-modern, i.e. outside of history and ideology.

In Afghanistan, the population is commonly categorized as Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Aimak, Turkmen, Baloch, etc. Slightly more sophisticated treatments de-construct these groups down to the supposedly "atomic" level of the tribe. Of course, macro-ethnic categories are important for understanding a significant part of the history and some of the contemporary dynamics of the people. But these categories have rarely been sufficient for political mobilization. However, when these macro-ethnic categories are coupled with the occupier's mandatory ritual of elections, a simple calculus of power and legitimacy can be fashioned to further reify the foundational categories. In other words, this combination of categories and ritual allows the imperial power to ask and answer the question: "What is the proper combination of different ethnic groups in government to 'reflect' the population at large?" This is a strategy that reifies ethnocracy and at best produces a fragile consociational democracy (i.e. the Lebanese "solution") or at worst an overbearing control democracy (i.e. the Sri Lankan "solution").

There is an alternative concept which is often elided in this construction: the people as a community or set of communities (this is similar to but not identical with the rather fluid Afghani conceptualization of qawm). According to Chatterjee, the community is a group that makes collective claims based on appeals to ties of moral solidarity. The community however need not mimic the nation even though the modern state is suspicious of any moral solidarity that is not co-terminus with the nation.

Setting aside the suspicions of the state, we must look for the actual ways in which people come together to make demands and act politically. Why? Because the idea of governance that we seek to export will not work. The notion of civil society is a fictional legal construct wherever there is a marked distinction between the governing class and those who are governed. This distinction between the governing class and the governed is a function of legal and extralegal property ownership. In one of the poorest societies in the world, one should not expect that the fiction of bourgeois civil society will gain much traction without significant marginalization of the governed. Rights will need to be supplemented with entitlements and mechanisms will need to be developed to mediate the claims of the governed.

If democracy, as opposed to elected ethnocracy, is the objective, then an alternative strategy merits exploration. NGOs cannot merely be appointed to mediate and secure participation if the goal is to permit the practice of democracy among the governed.




File Photo: An Afghan disabled demonstrator lies on street during their protest in front of the presidential palace in Kabul, Saturday, May 8, 2004, Afghanistan. About 500 disabled demonstrators participated in the protest demanding their rights from the government. (AP Photo/Emilio Morenatti)

Labels: afghanistan, political society, south asia

Photo: A Marine Corps carry team carries the transfer case containing the remains of Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Jeremy S. Lasher, 27, of Oneida, N.Y., during a dignified transfer ceremony at Dover Air Force Base, Del., Saturday, July 25, 2009. According to the Department of Defense, Lasher, died July 23 of wounds suffered while supporting combat operations in Helmand province, Afghanistan. (AP Photo/Luis M. Alvarez)


There are regular updates about the numbers of US soldiers killed in the Afghan theater. The latest release states that 677 have been killed, of which 506 were killed in action and 171 in non-hostile action. The rather large number killed in non-hostile action could be the result of accidents, illness, suicide, or homicide. What is less reported are the number of soldiers wounded. To date there have been 1,196 wounded and returned to duty and 2,107 wounded and not returned to duty.

When combined with the rest of Operation Enduring Freedom (mainly Iraq), there have been over 5,000 US soldiers killed, over 18,000 wounded and returned to duty, and nearly 16,000 wounded and not returned to duty.

It is disturbing how little attention or political traction these deaths receive in the US. It is not surprising that many Americans do not care about the large number of Afghan and Pakistani civilians and soldiers being killed, but I still cannot quite understand why there is so little concern about the deaths and injuries of American soldiers in the public sphere, particularly beyond the communities of those who have served or have family members in the conflict. Beyond some token displays of sentimentality, the consequences of war have practically become a private affair in contemporary American society.

Labels: afghanistan, casualties, south asia, us, wounded

File Photo: A U.S. soldier of the 101st Airborne Division destroys opium poppies growing in a field during a patrol with Afghan police in Tani district of Khost province, Afghanistan, Wednesday, April 16, 2008. (AP Photo/Rafiq Maqbool)


There has been a relatively constant interest in the media about the levels of opium production in Afghanistan. The revenue from the opium trade is properly understood as a lifeline for insurgents, warlords, and criminals. Hence, eradication of the crop is viewed as a way to expedite the counter-insurgency campaign.

The concern regarding opium cultivation is generally stated in the media without any context. In reality, aggregate levels of opium cultivation are trending downward. According to the UNODC's January 2009 report, 18 out of 34 provinces are poppy free and 4 more may become poppy free in the foreseeable future. Notably, 11 of those 18 provinces have weather conditions which are favorable to opium cultivation. Ninety-eight percent of opium production came from seven provinces in the south and south-west in 2008. The area with the highest level of production is Helmand province, but even there cultivation is decreasing.

Why is cultivation of this lucrative crop decreasing? The reasons are very complex and vary by province. Two major reasons, according to the UNODC report, are related to the rising price of wheat coupled with the declining price of opium, and the low availability of water to irrigate the water-intensive poppy fields due to drought in the south and south-west provinces. The latter reason is more plausible than the former since dry opium is selling for approximately $85.16 per Kg, while wheat sells for $0.60 per Kg (and rice is $1.12 per Kg). Of course, there are other reasons for decreased cultivation including a range of incentives and disincentives.

Incentive strategies for transitioning away from poppy cultivation are centered on providing farmers with improved seeds and fertilizer, as well as electricity, transportation infrastructure, irrigation canals, flood prevention dykes, etc. However, economic support and even direct cash advances to poor farmers may not work to curb opium cultivation in all provinces. The farmers may simply take the cash advance and raise both licit and illicit crops. The reason we know this scenario is probable is that while agricultural assistance has generally been correlated with reduced cultivation in most regions (and the absence of such assistance with continued cultivation), in the southern provinces agricultural assistance has not made a notable impact in reducing opium cultivation.

Disincentive strategies, such as crop eradication by government authorities, have some utility in deterring farmers according to surveys of farmers. But these strategies also encounter subversion as farmers know they can avoid crop eradication by bribing government officials. In any case, with over a hundred thousand hectares being cultivated in Helmand province alone, an eradication strategy by itself is highly unlikely to work. Excessive reliance on crop eradication will increase corruption and generally negate the notion that farmers are citizens rather than subjects of the state.

Thus, a broad strategy with multiple policy instruments is most likely to yield optimal behavioral changes among farmers. Farmers should not be treated simply as economic agents or as social miscreants. The most important factor correlated with reduced cultivation seems to be security. Areas which are the most secure are the least likely to cultivate opium, even where the weather and terrain favors opium cultivation. The reason for this correlation may have something to do with the role of legitimate governance in reinforcing the religiously informed ethics of farming communities. Secure areas are also more accessible to development agencies which makes incentive programs more visible to farmers in remote areas. However, too much weight should not be placed on the role of development agencies and incentive programs as several areas which are stable but not receiving assistance have reduced cultivation (farmers cite the drought as the major reason for reduced cultivation).

Ultimately, however, mitigating the cultivation of opium in Afghanistan cannot be handled without looking at the global dimensions of the narcotics trade. There needs to be a renewed effort to reduce demand for heroin in the high income countries. Without an effective demand management strategy, success countering opium cultivation in Afghanistan will only shift production from the Golden Crescent (centered around Afghanistan) back to the Golden Triangle (centered around Myanmar), which was the leading source of opium prior to 1991. Moreover, if demand surges, any progress which has been made to date will be undone.

Labels: afghanistan, heroin, opium, south asia

Photo: Afghan widows look on as they wait to receive food relief rations from a CARE International food distribution center in Kabul, Afghanistan on Wednesday, July 22, 2009. (AP Photo/Rafiq Maqbool)


I am not quite sure why, but I found this photo of widows in billowing burqas to be poetic.

Labels: afghanistan, burqas, south asia

File Photo: Afghan farmers work in an opium poppy field in Nawa district of Helmand province, south of Kabul, Afghanistan (April 25, 2009). (AP Photo/Abdul Khaleq)


I read a lot of commentary about the war and reconstruction in Afghanistan... far more than I probably need to. So much of what I read treats the problems of Afghanistan as if they originated from within the discrete territorial boundaries of the country. There is often a tone of frustration among Western pundits as if they were discussing the antics of an incorrigible child. This is a highly deceptive mode of analysis.

The three most important issues (i.e., drugs, corruption, and the insurgency) cannot be understood without looking outside the boundaries of the country. The production of heroin would not be such an issue if there were no demand in Europe and America. The crop is grown to earn hard currency, plain and simple. Similarly, the issue of corruption in the Kabul government is in part due to the overwhelming amounts of aid provided by international community. Aid is necessary to rebuild a war ravaged country, but to provide more aid than a developing country can productively absorb is a recipe for corruption. One should also question the neat line drawn between the puppet Afghan government and its foreign supporters. Finally, it is well known that the Taliban were strengthened and supported in their rise to power by the ISI of Pakistan. Even today, the insurgency would have little chance to survive without foreign sources of funding and the permeable border with Pakistan.

I have only read one intelligent article on this issue and not surprisingly it is written by an Afghan, Nushin Arbabzadah:

"As local wisdom has it, there are three types of people in Afghanistan today: al-Qaida (the fighters), al-faida (the enriched) and al-gaida (the fucked). Most Afghans belong to the third category.

From the perspective of Afghans on the ground, the west is part of this machinery of corruption which thrives on the continuation of the current situation. If the Afghan leadership is corrupt and incompetent, so is the western leadership involved in Afghanistan. If Afghan warlords ignore international standards of warfare and engage in torture, so does the US in Bagram and Guantánamo. If the Taliban endanger civilian lives by suicide attacks, so do the foreign troops by carrying out reckless air strikes. The lines between the bad and the good, the problem and the problem-solvers, have become blurred. Moreover, the problem-solvers have themselves become part of the problem; they are costly but ineffective. Every little project, from digging a well to conducting a research project, involves hiring an entourage of armed security guards.

Far from disarming the many Afghan militia gangs, the current intervention has created a new set of armed men who are highly trained and well-equipped. Their daytime job is to protect foreign problem-solvers. But in their spare time, they run their own criminal businesses, robbing and intimidating locals and recently, even killing a government official.

The local population are capable of doing many of the projects for a fraction of the cost (and without a single bodyguard) but they are not being employed. The civilian and military problem-solvers are cut off from the population they are supposed to help. They talk to each other but not to Afghans, unless the Afghans in question are part of the English-speaking elite. In the words of an MEP who I met recently, "We have good ideas; the only thing missing is the Afghans themselves."

From a local perspective, Afghanistan has become a laboratory where a disparate set of international military and civilian problem-solvers and their Afghan colleagues are trying out and dropping various ideas and making a comfortable living out of it. Not everyone is starving in Afghanistan. The al-faida are doing well."

At the end of the day, the Western countries are in Afghanistan not out of charity but because those states cannot adequately sustain their sovereignty from within their territorial boundaries. Unable to control the demand for illicit drugs, they must move to control the source. Unable to demobilize from the second world war, they must find new enemies. Unable to defend against asymmetric warfare, they must root out the terrorists' safe havens. This war stems from the weakness of the West as much as anarchy unleashed in Afghanistan after thirty years of war.

It is important to see this weakness in order to understand that Afghanistan is not just a problem to be fixed by Westerners or a laboratory for half-baked Western ideas on state and society building. The weakness of the West is complicit in prolonging this conflict and re-producing the problems it tries to solve. Weakness leads to underfunded troops, inadequate detention facilities, and opium crop eradication programs. This weakness is, at least in part, why the problems of Afghanistan have yet to be fixed.

Labels: afghanistan, corruption, heroin, south asia, taliban

Photo: This video frame grab taken from a Taliban propaganda video released Saturday, July 18, 2009 shows Pfc. Bowe R. Bergdahl, 23, of Ketchum, Idaho, who went missing from his base in eastern Afghanistan June 30. (AP Photo/Militant Video)


There was no bag over his head, he was not naked, no electrodes were attached to his genitals, no animals were being used to terrorize him, he was not bleeding or covered in excrement, there was no dog collar around his neck... in fact he was sitting in clean clothes, sipping tea and eating a meal. The images were deliberate and stage managed, but the message was a stinging rebuke of the American military, government, and society.

The Pentagon has protested that these images are a violation of international law. The hypocrisy here is epic. A government and military (operating under the tacit consent of the majority of its citizens) that carried out a systematic program of rendition, torture, abuse, and humiliation of prisoners of war at multiple sites now claims the mantle of international law. (In any case, how can a group considered to be "unlawful combatants" and hence beyond the bounds of international law be expected to uphold international law?)

Of course, the real issue has nothing to do with law and everything to do with maintaining morale on the home front. In the post-conscription era, civilian morale is maintained through silence, ignorance, media manipulation, and emotional displays. In general the less that people know about the actions of their military the better it is for the military. To the extent that information must be shared, it should be edited by the military or media agents co-opted by the military. Symbolic and emotive support is solicited by the military, but only so long as critical thinking is not engaged. Americans are to support "their troops," a reductive and affective rhetoric that seeks to efface the military as an organization. In other words, there is a clear role assigned to the civilian population and for the most part they have stuck to their script.


The Kantian logic that governs the rules of war is clear: wars should be fought in such a way as to make lasting peace possible. The brutal treatment of prisoners only serves the interests of those who seek to prolong conflicts... as does a docile and obedient population.

Labels: afghanistan, pow, south asia, us

File Photo: Afghan President Hamid Karzai, right, and Deputy Defense Minister Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum on March 21, 2002 (AP Photo/Alexander Zemlianichenko). President Karzai's government is widely perceived to be corrupt. General Dostum is accused of committing a war crime (i.e. the mass execution of Taliban prisoners of war) in 2001 which was not investigated by the Bush administration because the General was on the CIA's payroll.


The discourse of corruption and scandal is pervasive in discussions of Afghanistan.

Corruption is visualized as a kind of rot in the architecture of the state. This rot justifies the need to create a new edifice. The idealized image of a fierce sovereign, a new Abdur Rahman Khan, who will come and redeem the promise and potential of the state sustains a glimmer of hope in an increasingly disillusioned citizenry. And the discourse of corruption is useful for the occupiers in justifying the compromised sovereignty of the occupied territory.

Meanwhile, the periodic airing of scandals within the metropole upholds the promise of an imperial occupation cleansed of abuse, exploitation, and depravity. Even the quiet scandal implicit in the change of military tactics to recognize (admittedly for instrumental purposes) the humanity of the occupied civilian population evokes the possibility of a kinder, gentler form of military domination.

These discourses and tactics are well know to the student of empire. In fact, as Nicholas B. Dirks has argued, scandal and corruption are necessary features of a system of conquest, expansion, and exploitation. Thus, it is incorrect to view scandals as aberrations and corruption as a failure in a system of good governance. Scandals and corruption are the system; they can teach us hidden truths about both the occupier and the occupied.

The corruption of the occupied is a reflection of systemic constraints in an ethnocracy. Corruption lubricates and maintains an uneasy and mechanical stability. This corruption could be harnessed for productivity or unleashed to ravage the resources of the state, but it cannot be eliminated or "cleaned up."

The scandals of the occupier reveal a vision of the outside world as a state of exception. There is no recognition of human rights for those outside the Constitution. Only those civilizations which can compel recognition on an equal footing are accorded a sense of humanity. The rest are objects of pity or scorn; they are treated as children or animals.

Labels: afghanistan, corruption, scandal, south asia, us

Photo: A soldier stands watch during Operation Panther's Claw in Afghanistan's Helmand province, Monday July 13, 2009. It is hoped that the operation will clear and secure the Malgir and Babaji areas of insurgents, in order to set the conditions for the forthcoming Afghan elections in August. Over 700 British troops are involved in the operation, intimately supported by 300 personnel from the Afghan National Security Force (AP Photo/Sergeant Dan Harmer, Royal Logistic Corps, MOD).

"Colonial conquest was not just the result of the power of superior arms, military organization, political power, or economic wealth -- as important at these things were. Colonialism was made possible, and then sustained and strengthened, as much by cultural technologies of rule as it was by the more obvious and brutal modes of conquest that first established power on foreign shores." -Nicholas B. Dirks

At the start of the conflict in Afghanistan, I believed that the farcical reliance on a "Loya Jirga" to legitimate a puppet government heralded the revival of a colonial project inherited from the Britons. The idea of a Loya Jirga reminded me of the Great Darbar that one of my maternal ancestors attended in Delhi. But perhaps I was wrong to imagine history repeating itself.

Unlike the Iraq War, the demand to gain a command of the language of command is weak. In fact, the entire cultural project of control, which is so essential to domination and subordination of foreign peoples, seems highly underdeveloped for such a prolonged conflict. Of course, there are well rehearsed talking points which circulate on the need to liberate women from their burqas, the imperative of brining modernity/development to this traditional society, and the revival of a colonial pseudo-anthropology on tribes, but these are half-hearted and generally lack the support of the academy.

Only the most gullible, provincial, and stupid of Westerners believe that their governments actually care about the welfare of women in foreign societies. One would only need to look at rates of reported rape in Western countries to question whether these governments even care about gender repression in their own societies. Moreover, the discourse of modernity generally rings hollow to an enemy and an occupied population that takes fierce pride in its customs and selectively appropriates what it deems valuable. An end to warfare is prioritized even higher than the promise of economic development amongst many (if not most) Afghanis. In any case, few in the West believe that after thirty years of constant war, Afghanistan will be a functional polity or economy by the end of the next decade. Finally, the academy (with a few notable exceptions) seems quite unwilling to participate in a revival of colonial anthropology to support Western governments. The military is certainly keen to collect statistics and develop classificatory schematics, but the academy remains reluctant. And without the academy, there is little chance that the military will develop a robust and sophisticated knowledge of the people it dominates.

Perhaps this will all change if the military phase seems to result in pacification of the rural areas. After all, it took decades for the original configuration of colonial power/knowledge to emerge in South Asia. But for now, the West seems exhausted with itself and its well rehearsed modes of domination. Perhaps this exhaustion is the fruit of the post-structuralist and deconstructionist revolutions in the academy. It is difficult to know at this point. But one thing is for sure: without a cultural technology of rule, a military occupation is unsustainable.

Labels: afghanistan, power/knowledge, south asia

Photo: Afghan presidential candidate and former foreign minister Dr. Abdullah Abdullah waves to his supporters during a campaign rally in Fayz Abad district of Badakhshan province, north of Kabul, Afghanistan. Afghans will head to the polls on Aug. 20 to elect a new president. (AP Photo/Musadeq Sadeq)


The end game of the current "surge" in Afghanistan is to clear the way for elections on August 20th. This is why Afghan and NATO soldiers are laying down their lives in places like Helmand Province.

The hope is that the writ of the Kabul government can be extended to lawless provinces in time to provide the semblance of a free and fair election. If the southern provinces are not stabilized, the electoral result may create a strong ethnic imbalance which is not adequately reflective of the role of the Pashtuns in Afghan society. As the country is essentially an ethnocracy, an ethnically imbalanced government would threaten the legitimacy of the state.

Despite the sacrifices being made, the election results are almost a foregone conclusion. The incumbent, President Hamid Karzai is expected to win by a large majority without a run-off. The only two other candidates who even have a shot are Abdullah Abdullah (the former Foreign Minister) and Ashraf Ghani (a former Finance Minister, former World Bank official and Chancellor of Kabul University). Dr. Ghani has a superb resume but no real political base; in fact, he only recently renounced his American citizenship to compete in the carpet-bagger Olympics. Abdullah is better known both domestically and regionally but he is still a long shot. Barring massive vote fraud, Karzai will win.

It is worth noting that NATO and foreign donors are paying to hold these elections. Security for the leading candidates is being provided by the Kabul government (and thus the foreign forces which are helping to prop up the government). Campaign events appear to be highly stage managed as photo opportunities for foreign journalists.

So what are the differences between Karzai and his opponents? Short answer: not much.

Karzai's opponents all charge that the current regime is corrupt. While the charge seems righteous, it is mainly ridiculous. In a country like Afghanistan, corruption exists on one end of a continuum with civil war on the other end. In other words, it is corruption that prevents even greater hostilities in the country. It is extremely unlikely that anyone could rule the country without cutting deals. The Kabul government does not have the manpower to suppress the Taliban and other warlords and the foreign forces lack the will to supply the number of troops necessary for complete pacification.

Several candidates have expressed a desire to negotiate with the Taliban to end the war. Of course, Karzai has expressed similar sentiments, so this is a non-issue.

Dr. Abdullah has claimed that the troop surge represents a failure and that Afghanistan needs "real change." This seems to be an empty slogan. His main policy solution is better coordination between Afghans and foreign forces.

With this kind of opposition, it is no wonder that Karzai is slated to win.

Okay, so if the elections are a foregone conclusion and there are few legitimate differences between the candidates why hold the elections? The answer is that the ritual of an election is about making power visible. In this case, it is not just the power of the Kabul government but the true sources of power in Afghanistan (i.e. NATO). This ritual performance will eventually have to be sublimated through the extension and routinization of other governmental procedures. Until that time, however, power must be made legible to the masses.

Labels: afghanistan, elections, security, south asia

I thought with all the images of the on-going war, it is nice to see an alternate picture of daily life in Afghanistan.



Photo: In this photo taken Saturday, July 11, 2009 an Afghan elderly man offers prayer in the Jurm district of the Badakhshan province north of Kabul, Afghanistan. (AP Photo/Musadeq Sadeq)

Labels: afghanistan, south asia

Photo: A U.S. Marines from the 2nd MEB, 1st Battalion 5th Marines carries his weapon on his shoulders as they reach the end of a patrol in the Nawa district of Afghanistan's Helmand province Tuesday July 7, 2009. (AP Photo/David Guttenfelder)


The operation in Helmand Province, "Operation Khanjar", is the first major offensive in Afghanistan under the Obama administration. The operation is centered near the town of Khan Nesin, which is near the Helmand river. The aim is to restore control of this province before the elections scheduled for August 20th.

Few in the US probably realize just how dangerous this province has become. There were an average of 10.6 insurgent attacks per day from January to the end of April 2009. That is six attacks more than the next most hostile region, Kandahar. Notably, January through March are winter months and thus generally experience fewer insurgent attacks than June through August.

To the extent that there is any media attention of the war, much is being made of the casualties suffered by coalition forces in recent days. The concern expressed is completely understandable given the devastation that these lives lost have on families and communities in their home countries. However, media reports tend to paint a distorted image of the overall conflict by focusing on losses to NATO troops.

In particular, reading American and European papers, one tends to gain the impression that coalition troops are taking the lion's share of the risks in the country. The Western media also gives the illusion that the occupation is less deadly than it actually is, since reports of casualties are rather infrequent and numbers are small.

Nevertheless, in the last two years the overwhelming majority of casualties have been members of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan National Army (ANA). The ANA is also playing an increased leadership role. Since the start of this year over half of the average 83 deliberate military missions per week were conducted and led by the ANA according to unclassified ISAF documents. In day to day affairs, the ANP, local shuras, and the ANA are generally perceived to be the main providers of security by the local population according to the ANQAR survey.

Of course, statistics are not neutral -- particularly in wartime. Nevertheless, a view of the aggregate data may help to paint a more complex picture than the standard narrative being conveyed to American and European audiences.



Photo: Soldiers of the Afghan National Army (ANA) jump down from their pick-up truck during a search operation for pro-Taliban fighters in Baghlan Jalid, Baghlan province of northern Afghanistan, Wednesday, July 8, 2009. The province's only ANA battalion started an operation Wednesday to search for insurgents in the Qandahari Valley with the assistance the Ohio National Guard and the Hungarian Army. (AP Photo/Bela Szandelszky)

Labels: afghanistan, helmand, security, south asia, taliban, us

Photo: Supporters of a Pakistani religious group 'Tanzeem-e-Islami' hold a rally against the suspected U.S. drone missile strike on the country's tribal areas, Wednesday, April 8, 2009 in Karachi, Pakistan. Pakistan has criticized the drone strikes, saying they are a violation of the country's sovereignty and kill innocent civilians. The government has said such deaths generate sympathy for the militants. But the U.S. believes the attacks are an effective tool to combat militants in the region. (AP Photo/Shakil Adil)


Reports of drone attacks in Pakistan are so common now that few in the US bother to take note except to read the headline. With only a few notable exceptions, Americans are almost completely indifferent to the use of these weapons, even though it is quite clear that they often result in the indiscriminate killing of civilians.

"The United States has carried out about 45 drone air strikes since the beginning of last year, most since September, killing about 424 people, including many foreign militants, according to a tally of reports from Pakistani intelligence agents, district government officials and residents." Source: Reuters

US military advisors citing Pakistani data put the estimate of the number killed at closer to 700 over the last three years. The number of terrorists killed is about 14, implying that approximately 50 civilians are slaughtered for each terrorist killed. This is a 2% effectiveness rate. Thus, the principal reason for using these weapons is to avoid US casualties. Let me be blunt: this is cowardly and it is criminal.

Undoubtedly there will be attempts to justify the use of these weapons as the only alternative in a situation where the host country is unwilling to act against terrorists and officially unwilling to tolerate foreign troops on their soil.

However, one need only imagine a soldier who killed 50 civilians for each enemy combatant per mission. Would such a soldier be permitted to continue? I doubt it. It is more likely that the soldier would face a military court. Of course, this is precisely why drones are favored by the military. The idea of mechanization provides the illusion of a lack of agency and accountability.

If the US is serious about changing tactics to protect civilians, then armed drones should be completely banned from the war.

Labels: afghanistan, drone, south asia, us

Photo: Presidential nominees, from right, Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, to be general and Commander, International Security Assistance Force and Commander, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan; Adm. James G. Stavridis, for reappointment to the grade of admiral and to be Commander, U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; and Lt. Gen. Douglas M. Fraser, to be general and Commander, U.S. Southern Command, testify on Capitol Hill in Washington, Tuesday, June 2, 2009,before the Senate Armed Services Committee. (AP Photo/Manuel Balce Ceneta)


General McChrystal has issued new tactical orders. Here are the portions that have been made available to the public (bold emphasis is mine):

Our strategic goal is to defeat the insurgency threatening the stability of Afghanistan. Like any insurgency, there is a struggle for the support and will of the population. Gaining and maintaining that support must be our overriding operational imperative – and the ultimate objective of every action we take.

We must fight the insurgents, and will use the tools at our disposal to both defeat the enemy and protect our forces. But we will not win based on the number of Taliban we kill, but instead on our ability to separate insurgents from the center of gravity – the people. That means we must respect and protect the population from coercion and violence – and operate in a manner which will win their support.

This is different from conventional combat, and how we operate will determine the outcome more than traditional measures, like capture of terrain or attrition of enemy forces. We must avoid the trap of winning tactical victories – but suffering strategic defeats – by causing civilian casualties or excessive damage and thus alienating the people.

While this is also a legal and a moral issue, it is an overarching operational issue – clear-eyed recognition that loss of popular support will be decisive to either side in this struggle. The Taliban cannot militarily defeat us – but we can defeat ourselves.

I recognize that the carefully controlled and disciplined employment of force entails risks to our troops – and we must work to mitigate that risk wherever possible. But excessive use of force resulting in an alienated population will produce far greater risks. We must understand this reality at every level in our force.

I expect leaders at all levels to scrutinize and limit the use of force like close air support (CAS) against residential compounds and other locations likely to produce civilian casualties in accordance with this guidance. Commanders must weigh the gain of using CAS against the cost of civilian casualties, which in the long run make mission success more difficult and turn the Afghan people against us.

I cannot prescribe the appropriate use of force for every condition that a complex battlefield will produce, so I expect our force to internalize and operate in accordance with my intent. Following this intent requires a cultural shift within our forces – and complete understanding at every level – down to the most junior soldiers. I expect leaders to ensure this is clearly communicated and continually reinforced.

The use of air-to-ground munitions and indirect fires against residential compounds is only authorized under very limited and prescribed conditions (specific conditions deleted due to operational security).
(NOTE) This directive does not prevent commanders from protecting the lives of their men and women as a matter of self-defense where it is determined no other options (specific options deleted due to operational security) are available to effectively counter the threat.

We will not isolate the population from us through our daily conduct or execution of combat operations. Therefore:

Any entry into an Afghan house should always be accomplished by Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), with the support of local authorities, and account for the unique cultural sensitivities toward local women.

No ISAF forces will enter or fire upon, or fire into a mosque or any religious or historical site except in self-defense. All searches and entries for any other reason will be conducted by ANSF.

The challenges in Afghanistan are complex and interrelated, and counterinsurgencies are difficult to win. Nevertheless, we will win this war. I have every confidence in the dedication and competence of the members of our force to operate effectively within this challenging environment. Working together with our Afghan partners, we can overcome the enemy’s influence and give the Afghan people what they deserve: a country at peace for the first time in three decades, foundations of good governance, and economic development.

Obviously, this attempt to create a human face to the counter-insurgency only makes plain some of the "risks" which were shifted onto the civilian population over the previous seven years. "Risks" which the new strategy implicitly acknowledges were potentially both immoral and illegal. However, this new tactical approach is not without its own flaws. This seemingly humane approach is actually about a calculus or political economy of violence, not the sanctity of civilian lives. Commanders are asked to weigh the gains of the use of force over the costs in terms of civilian lives; commanders are not forbidden from choosing in favor of an acceptable level of civilian casualties. The reason not to destroy civilian lives is mainly tactical; moral and legal reasons are thus implicitly insufficient.

What is perhaps most interesting is that this pronouncement signals an end to a key component of the Powell doctrine: the use of massive force. American forces have clearly recognized the limits of a preponderance of force in Afghanistan. Instead of defeating their enemies, the allies have only been multiplying their enemies through civilian casualties.

I am not yet convinced that General McChrystal's approach is much more than a public relations ploy aimed at the domestic audience which pays for the occupation. I will wait until the number of civilian casualties are compared before and after this shift in tactics (i.e. if anyone is counting). It is also worth noting what is not stated here: there is no discussion of how to treat civilians on the other side of the Durand Line where drone attacks continue.

Labels: afghanistan, security, south asia, us

Photo: In this May 11, 2009 file photo, soldiers from the U.S. Army First Battalion, 26th Infantry take defensive positions at firebase Restrepo after receiving fire from Taliban positions in the Korengal Valley of Afghanistan's Kunar Province. Spc. Zachary Boyd of Fort Worth, Texas, far left was wearing "I love NY" boxer shorts after rushing from his sleeping quarters to join his fellow platoon members. From far right is Spc. Cecil Montgomery of Many, La. and Jordan Custer of Spokan, Wash, center. Defense Secretary Robert Gates says American soldiers have more than their military might and training on their side in the war in Afghanistan. Some have pink underwear. (AP Photo/David Guttenfelder, File)


This photo above by David Guttenfelder (Associated Press) of Spc. Zachary Boyd wearing pink boxer shorts with the "I love NY" logo while fighting Taliban insurgents on May 11th, 2009 will probably be one of the most remembered images of the war in the years hence. The image is both comical and courageous as the soldier chose to go to help his comrades without bothering to put on his uniform. In addition, the idea that a Texan would wear pink boxer shorts with the "I love NY" logo is itself an implicit red-state joke. Of course, the photo can also easily be seen as a depiction of a country and a military perpetually caught off guard.



My own pick for the most iconic photo of the US-Afghan War (so far) is different. The controversial image above by Veronique de Viguere published in Paris Match on September 4th, 2008 shows members of the Taliban wearing parts of the uniform of ten French paratroopers which they killed about 30 miles from Kabul. (There was some debate as to whether the soldiers were killed by gunfire or had their throats slit by these Taliban while lying wounded on the ground).

The photo seems to me to capture much of the essence of the Taliban network or organization. The picture depicts the end product of a rather brutal act, i.e. the execution and scavenging of the uniforms and equipment as trophies from dead soldiers. (Of course, trophy acquisition has been a commonplace activity throughout history among any poorly equipped and minimally disciplined guerrilla force or professional military.) Nevertheless, the result is a curious image of these young Afghans as some strange hybrid between modernity and tradition.

Despite simplified media reports, the Taliban are not medieval barbarians even though they are often brutal and thuggish. In fact, the Taliban is an organization which is often explicitly anti-traditional. As Barnett Rubin once noted, while some of the Taliban's policies seem rooted in conservative Pashtun tribal traditions (e.g. their restrictions on women's mobility) other policies (e.g. the banning of the celebration of spring New Year (Nawruz), which is derived from pre-Islamic Persian tradition) are anti-traditional. Moreover, the ways in which the Taliban enforced their policies when they were in power was alien to traditional tribal customs in much of Afghanistan.

This image also reveals something more disturbing. The Taliban who are modelling these clothes for the photographer are effectively gloating over their prowess. The image is upsetting to Europeans and Americans not only because it seemingly violates the norms of "civilized warfare" but because it is the image of a group, which against all odds, is defeating much better trained and equipped adversaries. One can hope that this image does not foreshadow the future resolution of the conflict.

Labels: afghanistan, photos, south asia, taliban

US and NATO troops are pushing into Helmand Province today, the biggest offensive since 2001. The push is supposedly a test for the Obama administration's Afghanistan policy. According to the AFP:

Success in Afghanistan is important not only for the Afghan population, but also for war-weary Americans, the Obama administration has insisted.

"I think what we are saying simply is that we think that the strategy needs to show some signs that it's working," Defense Secretary Robert Gates told lawmakers during a June congressional hearing.

"It's very important for us to be able to show the American people that we are moving forward by the end of the year or a year from now," he said.

"I think the American people will be willing to sustain this endeavor if they believe it's not just a stalemate."

The idea that the success of this particular mission is important is not a very convincing argument. The war in Afghanistan is far from the headlines of most news services in the US. People are more interested in Sarah Palin's resignation, Michael Jackson's death, etc. There will be some coverage of the war today in the US because it is America's Independence Day, but that is really about it. In large part, one cannot blame the American people for being distracted from one of the longest wars in modern US history.

If Afghanistan were a serious or urgent threat to national security, it would not have been neglected for seven years by the Bush administration. As incompetent as that administration was, it would not have ignored a lethal threat to pursue an optional war in Iraq. The truth is that there is only a very modest threat to the US mainland from the Taliban and Al Qaeda today. In fact, the Taliban never possessed the capability to harm the US mainland. The main crime of the Taliban vis-a-vis the US was failing to hand over Osama Bin Laden in 2001. There is much hype about the territorial gains of the Pakistani Taliban, but most of this talk is alarmist nonsense. The Taliban have zero chance of acquiring Pakistan's nuclear weapons or of defeating the Pakistani army in Punjab. As for Al Qaeda itself, their operational capability has been highly degraded since 2001. The main threat posed by these groups today is regional, not global.

Moreover, the US has a limited strategic interest in the region. As Lord Cromer once observed (with regard to Egypt): whenever one sees a coalition occupying a country one can usually surmise that the threat from the resistance groups and the value of the territory is insufficient for one of the occupying powers to bear the burden alone, or the use of a coalition prevents open hostility between great powers by hedging the perception that one country is making a grab for territory. In the case of Afghanistan, while there was initially some interest amongst the great powers and regional powers in gas and oil pipelines from Central Asia, few of the great powers believe that the cost of occupying Afghanistan would be worth the profits from the pipelines. Hence, one can safely conclude that the presence of a coalition of countries is indicative of limited US interests in the region.

The Secretary of Defense is correct that the American people are bored by this war. This flagging interest combined with the low strategic value of the territory is why the Obama administration has been desperate to find an honorable exit strategy since day one. (The previous Bush administration chose a rather dishonorable "exit strategy," i.e. starting a second war to distract from the failure to conclude the first war). Unfortunately, defeating guerrilla insurgents (who tend to melt back into the population) in one province is unlikely to actually generate forward momentum in resolving the conflict. This well scripted "surge" is unlikely to work in the long run to defeat the Taliban. Nevertheless, the administration may be hoping that it will provide enough breathing space to conclude a hasty exit with a group of hand picked successors and some "reconciled insurgents." While this formula is understandable given the election-cycle logic on which it is based, it is short-sighted. A durable solution to Afghanistan requires that the Taliban be defeated, but this does not have to be America's task.

It may be time for a real re-think of US strategy (as opposed to the re-cycling and re-packaging of ideas left over from the Bush adminstration). A long-term strategy to actually restore durable stability to Afghanistan most likely entails handing over power to regional actors (i.e. Russia, Iran, China, India, and perhaps Pakistan).

Labels: afghanistan, gates, helmand, south asia, us