Photo: Afghan National Army soldiers, right, and United States Marines from Golf Company, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Regiment, 2nd MEB, left, stand at attention during the playing of the Afghan national anthem at a flag raising ceremony of the new combat outpost in the village of Dahaneh Friday, Aug. 14, 2009 in the Helmand Province of Afghanistan. The ANA will occupy the outpost. (AP Photo/Julie Jacobson)


At a certain point in every imperial occupation, the occupier becomes frustrated with their lackeys. The imperialist will moan:

"Why can't they fight their own war?"
"Why won't they help themselves?"
"When will they take responsibility for their own country?"
"When will they stand up so we can stand down?"

The amnesia required to ask these questions would be startling if it weren't so common. The logic involves forgetting that the occupying forces overthrew the existing government and installed a puppet regime. The imperialist must convince themselves that their use of military force is actually part of a civilizing mission. It is only in this way that one can imagine that the subjects of occupation actually want to fight for the occupier and their puppet government. At this point the occupier assumes the role of a parent offering some tough love to a spineless son.

Very rarely does the occupier ask more fundamental questions:

"Why should they fight to achieve the objectives we set out?"
"Why don't we pay them the exact same salary that we pay our own soldiers?"
"Why don't we completely integrate their forces and ours?"
"Why don't we let their officers command our soldiers?"

To answer such questions honestly, one would need to admit that imperialism is at the heart of the Occupation.

At other times, the imperial frustration hinges on the assumption of native barbarism. In this scenario, the occupied subject is inhibited from their natural instinct to fight by foreign methods and training. The imperialist will argue that the native will actually fight more effectively, as they have for decades or centuries, if we just get out of the way. The critique here shifts slightly from paternalistic condescension to a Machiavellian manipulation of the political economy of violence. The objective also switches from the creation of "modern and professional" army to a desperate struggle to defeat the insurgency. Nevertheless, the fundamental question as to why these subjects should fight to impose our vision remains unasked and unanswered.

Labels: afghanistan, imperialism, nato, security, south asia, us

Photo: British Foreign Secretary David Miliband gestures while speaking during a media conference at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Monday July 27, 2009. Miliband said Monday that the Afghan government must use the opportunity created by the allied military surge to reconcile with moderate Taliban guerrillas willing to join the political process. Twenty British soldiers have died in Afghanistan in July, the deadliest month of the war, setting off a heated political debate about Britain's role in the war and raising doubts over whether the military has the proper equipment. (AP Photo/Virginia Mayo)


There are probably no more than about 12,000 gun-toting members of the Taliban in Afghanistan arrayed against almost 180,000 combined troops of the European, American, and Afghan governments. The numbers alone do not even begin to measure how fully mismatched the fight is. The Taliban have no heavy artillery, no tanks, no armored transports, no helicopters, no fighter jets, no predator drones, and no cruise missiles... The Taliban have yet to overrun and hold a single NATO base.

And yet we repeatedly hear talk of reconciliation and compromise with the Taliban from Western leaders and the Kabul government.

What is happening? The short answer is that there is a desire to expedite the conclusion of this war by all parties, except the Taliban. So why aren't the Taliban interested in a negotiated settlement?

First, it is important to note that the logic of the reconciliation strategy assumes that the Taliban are a fragmented group on the verge collapse. This is wishful thinking. In fact, the Taliban appear to be increasingly centralized (they've even issued a new manual to all of their fighters on how to treat prisoners of war) and the organization is hardly on the verge of defeat. Since the organization is relatively unified, a reconciliation process would need to negotiate directly with the central leadership of the Taliban. The problem for the Kabul government, which is almost completely propped up by foreign forces and foreign financing, is that Mullah Omar has rejected any reconciliation talks as long as foreign troops are present in the country (there is a historic parallel here with the mujahideen's rejection of the Afghan communist government's call for a ceasefire and national reconciliation in January 1987).

Second, even if Mullah Omar were in the mood to negotiate, there would still be a problem. The terms of the most recent reconciliation offer indicates that the government is only interested to negotiate with "moderate Taliban" or those who have no ties to international terrorism. This clearly excludes Mullah Omar and his immediate associates who have bounties on their heads.

Third, even if we suppose that a reconciliation process could be started with "moderate Taliban" leaders of some notoriety and legitimacy, there is no guarantee that such a process would endure. In neighboring Pakistan, the government has made multiple peace treaties with their Taliban only to have these treaties scrapped by one of the parties within a few months. While a truce or treaty is not the same as a reconciliation process, a true or treaty is usually a precondition for the start of a reconciliation process. One wonders why there is an assumption that reconciliation will necessarily result in a lasting peace. The most likely outcome from the start of a reconciliation process would be a fragmentation of the Taliban and a repudiation of any agreement by those who do not participate in the reconciliation process. At best this would weaken the Taliban, but it would not bring peace. The Taliban are not dumb and have anticipated this result of the reconciliation strategy, this is why Mullah Omar has forbidden any of his subordinates from negotiating with the Kabul government.

Finally, reports that the notoriously corrupt Karzai government has been willing to bribe Taliban leaders to secure temporary ceasefires before the upcoming election generally undermines the idea of a legitimate reconciliation process. If peace must be purchased, war is likely to return when the funding runs dry. Provincial Taliban will certainly take money from the Kabul government for a temporary truce, but this only increases their incentive to keep fighting.


Setting aside the absurdity of the reconciliation strategy, it is curious that any party to the conflict would want to include members of the Taliban in the legitimate government of Afghanistan. What does one say to the women and minorities who were oppressed by these thugs? Would one ask women and minorities to sit next to a Taliban legislator and try to have a rational debate on why the rights of women and minorities should be restricted? While it is true that the Taliban are Afghans, not all members of a nation have a right to participate in government... some belong in prisons. It is bad enough that the current Kabul government has included notorious warlords in critical positions, to add Taliban members would truly create a pitiful state.

The guiding spirit of the call for reconciliation is an abstract pragmatism divorced from both reality and morality. Unfortunately, there are enemies which must be defeated. Defeating the Taliban may not need to be done by the West alone, but it cannot be circumvented through wishful thinking.

Labels: afghanistan, nato, reconciliation, south asia, taliban, us