The Obama administration's foreign policy strategy for South Asia will either tilt toward Pakistan or India; it cannot and should not seek to be neutral or balanced. Any talk of seeking a "balanced" strategy in the region is a de facto capitulation to Pakistan, since these are not even remotely equal states in terms of their political culture, political institutions, military strength, or economic potential.

The US will need to choose its main ally in the region (although it certainly can and should be friendly to both countries if Pakistan makes more progress in reforming its intelligence services, military institution, educational infrastructure, and outlawing extremist religious parties). The US cannot continue to play both sides of the fence -- and Indian diplomats should make this logic clear to their new counterparts in the Obama administration. If the US wants to finally dismantle the terrorist networks that emanate from the region (as opposed to making only short term gains without fundamental changes), continue to obtain access to a major emerging market, and acquire an enduring alliance partner for its soft containment of China, the US will need to tilt toward India.

Here is the core of a pro-India South Asian foreign policy strategy:

1. No Issue Linkage: The link between terrorism and the "Kashmir issue" is spurious. It is important to understand that the cultivation of terrorist organizations by the Pakistani government is: A) a rational (if amoral or immoral) strategic response to a small industrial base which cannot generate the military resources to match the potential of the Indian political economy; and B) the manifestation of the failure of state and nation formation in Pakistan. In other words, Pakistan's use of terrorist militants in Kashmir and the rest of India is a strategy to pin down a much larger military and a means of creating the semblance of a domestic national purpose. The Kashmir issue should be kept separate from issues of terrorism in order to avoid a quid pro quo blackmail by the Pakistani government. If Indian counterinsurgency actions in the portion of Kashmir that it administers violate human or civil rights, those violation can and should be administered through India's judiciary. Although Pakistan is an ethnocracy, it has no legitimate claim to serving as the homeland for South Asian Muslims (nor would the majority of Muslims in South Asia accept such a status for Pakistan, particularly since 1971).

2. Regional Hegemony: The US will need to accept sub-regional (i.e. sub-continental) hegemony by India. The alternative to sub-regional Indian hegemony is letting a secular liberal democracy be pinned down by a state which has rational, strategic and economic incentives to use militant groups; in other words, it involves conceding defeat in the War on Terrorism. At the heart of the use of terror as a tactic is not religion or ethnic grievance but a political economy of violence that must be understood by the US. The only way to end this cycle of militancy is to disabuse the Pakistani military of its ambition of achieve parity with India. The way to permanently disabuse the Pakistani military of its ambition is to firmly support Indian sub-regional hegemony, including a strong Indian presence in Afghanistan which will force the Pakistani military to focus on internal integrity rather than power projection.

If a pro-India policy is formulated, the immediate US concern will be how to exert leverage against Pakistan. It is important for Americans to remember that the US has many levers of influence; it is not necessary to sell out the Indians to achieve American objectives in the war on terror. The most important carrots which can be offered to Pakistan are clearly access to US markets, educational assistance, and military training in counterinsurgency. The US should resist any transfer of military hardware which is not specifically intended for counterinsurgency efforts(i.e. no more fighter jets or tanks). The sticks to prod Pakistan to do what it should have been doing all along, include increased violations of Pakistan's territorial sovereignty, a curtailment of bi-lateral and multi-lateral financial assistance, diplomatic isolation, and placing Pakistan on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. While a roll-back of Pakistan's nuclear option may be desirable, it is not currently feasible. A "Kosovo" option for the provinces of FATA, NWFP, and Baluchistan can be put on the bargaining table if Pakistan still does not cooperate.

It was said by Vice President-elect Biden that the Obama administration would be tested early in his tenure. It is clear that test has come even before he has taken office. Now, it is time for the Obama team to formulate a clear South Asia policy.

Labels: american politics, failed states, india, ir, obama, pakistan, political economy, south asia, terrorism, us

A Time magazine interview with President-elect Obama, in which he briefly discussed the Kashmir issue is troubling Indian strategic analysts this week. And while I am an Obama supporter, I agree with the Indian analysts on these issues. Here is what Mr. Obama said:

[Barack Obama] ... So, building a different relationship with the Pakistani government, the Pakistani military, the ISI. Working with Pakistan, this government to deliver for its people so it gains legitimacy, in all regions of the country. Working with Pakistan and India to try to resolve, and Kashmir, crisis in a serious way. Those are all critical tasks for the next administration. Kashmir in particular is an interesting situation where that is obviously a potential tar pit diplomatically. But, for us to devote serious diplomatic resources to get a special envoy in there, to figure out a plausible approach, and essentially make the argument to the Indians, you guys are on the brink of being an economic superpower, why do you want to keep on messing with this? To make the argument to the Pakistanis, look at India and what they are doing, why do you want to keep on being bogged down with this particularly at a time where the biggest threat now is coming from the Afghan border? I think there is a moment where potentially we could get their attention. It won’t be easy, but it’s important.

From the Indian perspective, the Kashmir issue is a dispute between India and Pakistan (notably neither the Indians nor the Pakistanis see it as a three way dispute involving the indigenous voice of all the Kashmiri people). The Indian government lost its faith in a UN brokered solution in the early days of the conflict. The US also came to be seen as unhelpful and untrustworthy after the first time it was brought in as an "honest broker."

The real problem expressed by President-elect Obama, in the eyes of Indian analysts, is that he appears to have already mentally succumbed to blackmail by Pakistan. In other words, Mr. Obama's outlook seems to give in to Pakistani pressure for a resolution to the Kashmir issue in a quid pro quo exchange for their cooperation in the war on terrorism. Given that elements in the Pakistani intelligence services have openly funded ruthless terrorist organizations and backed the Taliban since the mid-nineties, this is a rather serious lapse in the President-elect's judgment. If the Pakistani government did genuinely renounce terrorism in 2002, then it should provide support against militants unconditionally. An end to Pakistan's reliance on militants will make the Indian government more likely to work for a negotiated solution to the dispute, and some fresh thinking on the issue has emerged since 2002.

In my opinion, President-elect Obama is mistaken in his belief that the Kashmir dispute is at the heart of the militancy problem in the region. The underlying problems are actually much more complex, they are the product of inadequate nation and state formation in Pakistan after the 1947 Partition and again after the 1971 Civil War. India's (occasionally brutal) domination of Srinagar is mainly used as an excuse which serves to provide the semblance of a coherent national project and purpose for the state and people of Pakistan. (There are actually strong parallels here between the Palestinian issue and the overstated states of the Middle East.) Western politicians prefer to imagine that regional instability can be solved through a peace accord and a ceremonial handshake. However, actually fixing the root problem, i.e. tackling the issue of nation and state re-building after some false starts, may take decades of grassroots effort and the harshest reality is that some post-colonial states may simply not be feasible or "fixable" in their current parameters. (Of course, none of this should be seen as excusing the violation of human rights by Indian counter-insurgency forces in Kashmir).

The interview continues:

[Q] Sounds like a job for Bill Clinton.

[BO] Might not be bad. I actually talked to Bill, I talked to President Clinton about this when we had lunch in Harlem.

This is wishful thinking. While former President Clinton remains popular in India for his accomplishment of setting a new course in Indo-American relations in 2000, he simply does not have the stature to act as a Special Envoy on the Kashmir issue. His administration achieved the success that it did, by learning to butt out of issues that it did not understand and to listen to the local actors instead of trying to force a solution to regional problems.

At the end of the day, the President-elect will need to keep in mind that the relationship with India is multifaceted. America is hoping to rely on India as an integral part of its soft containment policy (although this does not mean that India will let itself be used as a cat's paw) and the US has growing economic ties to India. Mr. Obama will need to do more listening and less dreaming about dangerous places to send Bill Clinton.

The interview continues...

[Q] …Should we be talking to the Taliban? I don’t mean you.

[BO] You know, I think that this is one useful lesson that is applicable from Iraq. The Great Awakening, the Sunni Awakening changed the dynamic in Iraq fundamentally. It could not have occurred unless there were some contacts and intermediaries to peel off those who are tribal leaders, regional leaders, Sunni nationalists, from a more radical Messianic brand of insurgency. Well whether there are those same opportunities in Afghanistan I think should be explored. I can't guarantee that they are and one of the problems that we had and we've historically had, the Russians historically had it, the British historically had it, is our intelligence there is poor and our understanding of the culture is poor. And our understanding of the tribal and clan ties that exist there are complicated. But the Afghans don't see things in the same black and white terms on many of these issues that we legitimately do because we're concerned about our safety and our security. But what we're going to have to do is to have folks on the ground who do develop that understanding, I was very impressed with McKernan, very impressed with a lot of the folks who are there. My impression is that those who have a chance to stay there a little bit longer and develop clear understanding of the formidable complexities are going to achieve a lot more than simply us rotating in folks on a rapid rotation and I think that people on the ground tend to agree with me on that.

I would argue (and I think most Indian analysts would agree) that any idea of "talking to the Taliban" is deeply problematic, particularly from a moral perspective. There is no such thing as a moderate Taliban, at least from a Western feminist and Western human rights perspective, and those voices need to be heard in any US policy decision of this nature. Moreover, a regime dominated by former Taliban in Afghanistan is probably not acceptable to any of Afghanistan's neighbors (except Pakistan) given the reputation of the Taliban for seeking to spread Islamist extremism and a history of atrocities toward minority communities and even foreign diplomats. I would assume that India, Iran, and Russia will not accept any regime dominated by former Taliban or other Pakistani agents, nor would the American people I imagine. Even the Chinese, who are a long standing ally of Pakistan, would probably not agree to a regime dominated by former Taliban types given China's concerns about its Uigher Province. The Taliban are not a legitimate government like Iran. Thus, this idea of dialogue with moderate elements is a non-starter. Unfortunately for the US and NATO, the Taliban needs to be fought and weeded out without alienating the civilian population. This will involve many more troops and an end to the use of unmanned drones.

There are tribal structures which could be used to dampen (through non-compliance) the efficacy of the Taliban insurgency, but that involves talking to Pushtun tribal leaders not the Taliban. The Taliban may be drawn from Pushtun stock, but they are not elder tribal leaders as far as I can tell. The whole idea of a talib-led (i.e. a student-led) movement is a repudiation of tribal and clan based warlordism in the post-Soviet era.

A more serious solution involves playing hardball with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and recognizing that the Taliban are merely pawns in a proxy war with Iran (and to a lesser extent, India). In this regard, America's polarizing and Israel-centric approach toward Iran needs to be reconsidered. As the US worked with Iran after 9/11 to overthrow the Taliban, cooperation is clearly possible and feasible, particularly if Khatami returns to power. Of course, engagement with Iran raises its own moral issues as Iran is known to have funded its own share of militants. Nevertheless, if a fresh page could somehow be turned with Iran (particularly if Iran turned its own page on sponsoring militants), a triumvirate with America, Iran, and India could foster lasting regional stability by declawing the Pakistani military and its misguided ambition for "strategic depth" in Afghanistan. Of course, the first steps in such a policy would involve much greater pressure on the flow of Saudi money through Pakistan and into Afghanistan. Moreover, the US would need to at least threaten Pakistan with isolation if it does not liquidate all militant outfits on its territory (stronger threats are probably necessary, but not credible given Pakistan's nuclear deterrent).

The fact that the President-elect would even contemplate talking to the Taliban indicates either a lack of historical understanding or an amoral Realist posture (which in this case is unfortunately more naive than strategic).

The Taliban issue is one of those rarities in international relations: it is a situation where moral clarity and strategic thinking reinforce one another. The Kashmir issue is more ordinary: it is a veil, not an underlying cause of regional conflict.

Labels: afghanistan, american politics, failed states, india, ir, obama, pakistan, south asia, us

It is likely that President Obama's administration will be one of the first American administrations since Ronald Reagan which will need to foreground policy toward South Asia, rather than relegating the region to a marginal strategic status. In other words, the administration may actually need to lay out a vision for the region rather than scurrying to stamp out regional crises as they emerge. The most obvious reasons for prioritizing South Asia is the wind-up of the war in Iraq and the promised shift in focus back to the unfinished and intensifying guerrilla war in Afghanistan (i.e. "The Long War") as well as increased US raids across the Durand Line into America's erstwhile client state, Pakistan. Moreover, South Asia is home to one of America's newest strategic and economic partners, India. The subcontinental behemoth symbolizes not only a set of well worn cliches about the virtues of liberal democratic governance and economic opportunities for capitalist developing countries in an era of globalization, but also a key strategic pivot in America's soft containment of a rising China.

What should South Asians, particularly Indians, expect from the new American administration? Will President Obama maintain the bi-partisan posture toward the regional hegemon set by the Clinton administration and carried forward by the Bush regime? Will the US-India civilian nuclear agreement passed under the Bush & Singh administrations help set a precedent for a new era of bi-lateral cooperation? Or, will the United States be drawn toward stabilizing Pakistan in a manner that once again harms relations with India diplomatically, economically, and strategically? In other words, will America return to trying to treat India and Pakistan on an equal footing despite vastly different capabilities and potential?

Early clues toward Obama's perception of the region seem to tilt toward a continuation of the Clinton-Bush posture privileging India. Obama's campaign staff seemed remarkably well attuned to South Asian issues throughout the campaign. In fact, the presidential candidate was one of the first Americans to express his condolences to the Government and people of India when one of the country's war heroes died over the summer. The kind words from Obama raised eyebrows in Delhi (and perhaps in D.C.) since the Obama team seemed more cognizant of South Asian issues than the sitting President's staff, not to mention the McCain Camp. It was clearly evident that Mr. Obama had employed a shrewd and sophisticated South Asia team, even though such an approach was superfluous in a national election campaign.

Candidate Obama's comments expressing a willingness to violate Pakistan's sovereignty if Pakistan was unwilling or unable to kill Osama bin Laden, also reflected a hard nosed approach toward Pakistan. In any case, Obama's comments, although diplomatically problematic, actually seemed more thought through than Senator McCain's argument during a presidential debate in which McCain actually stated that Pakistan was a "failed state" before Gen. Musharraf's coup d'etat.

Moreover, while some elite Indian conservatives might have regarded the Bush administration and the Republican party in a kinder light than elites in other countries, the general population was clearly intrigued and perhaps even inspired by the possibility of a cosmopolitan, charismatic, and African-American President of the United States. Stories that the presidential candidate carried around a "Hanuman" or "monkey god" charm and kept a portrait of the Mahatma on his wall also garnered a measure of goodwill amongst Indians. In other words, there seemed to be great potential for warm and cordial relations.

Nevertheless, an array of India's chattering class have expressed some reservations after learning of Mr. Obama's desire to limit the outsourcing of jobs to India as well as his desire to advance the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which India views as a way of restricting India's nuclear deterrent. (The CTBT issue is actually a red herring since even the US military does not support the treaty. Moreover, restricting India's nuclear arsenal runs counter to America's soft containment or congagement policy toward China.) Indians have also expressed concern, based on Mr. Obama's comments in a recent interview, that he might seek to meddle in the bi-lateral Kashmir dispute in order to placate and shore-up the ever fragile and paranoid Pakistani regime. Finally, the popular press in India has also perceived a diplomatic slight at the fact that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was not prioritized for a telephonic communication with the president-elect after the election. These fears are probably just overreactions (on a slow news day) to early missteps by an administration which has not even been sworn into office.

At the moment, the Obama transition team is preoccupied by the financial crisis which is roiling American markets. A more detailed strategic vision for global leadership is likely to emerge only as the financial markets begin to stabilize.

In the meantime, even nominal efforts to improve America's image in the world (e.g. closing the prison of Guantanamo Bay or firmly renouncing torture) will generally be well received by Indians. Indian elites clearly recognize that the reduction of tensions with the Muslim world may redound to India's benefit as it is the home to the largest Muslim minority in the world.

Personally, I am looking forward to seeing how President Obama's foreign policy team articulates their strategic policy for the area. The South Asian region is incredibly complex to negotiate from a diplomatic perspective and America has been caught flat footed time after time. I will try to document some of this articulation as the policies unfold over the coming months.

Labels: afghanistan, american politics, failed states, globalization, india, ir, obama, pakistan, south asia, us

"What is that gun firing for?" said Boxer.

"To celebrate our victory!" cried Squealer.

"What victory?" said Boxer. His knees were bleeding, he had lost a shoe and split his hoof, and a dozen pellets had lodged themselves in his hind leg.

"What victory, comrade? Have we not driven the enemy off our soil-the sacred soil of Animal Farm? "

"But they have destroyed the windmill. And we had worked on it for two years!"

"What matter? We will build another windmill. We will build six windmills if we feel like it. You do not appreciate, comrade, the mighty thing that we have done. The enemy was in occupation of this very ground that we stand upon. And now-thanks to the leadership of Comrade Napoleon-we have won every inch of it back again!"

"Then we have won back what we had before," said Boxer.

"That is our victory," said Squealer.

-George Orwell, Animal Farm

Labels: american politics

Does blogging promote intellectual isolation and extremism? Cass Sunstein has an interesting article in the Financial Times about the construction of information cocoons and the polarization of political views. He cites an "off-line" experiment:

About 60 US citizens were put into 10 groups. They deliberated on controversial issues, such as whether the US should sign an inter­national treaty to combat global warming and whether states should allow same-sex couples to enter into civil unions. The groups consisted of predominantly either leftwing or rightwing members, with the former drawn from left-of-centre Boulder and the latter from Colorado Springs, which tends to be right of centre. The groups, not mixed, were screened to ensure members conformed to stereotypes. (If people in Boulder liked Vice-President Dick Cheney, they were cordially excused.) People were asked to state their opinions anonymously before and after the group discussion .

In almost every group, people ended up with more extreme positions. The Boulder groups favoured an inter­national treaty to control global warming before discussion; they favoured it far more strongly afterwards. In Colorado Springs, people were neutral on that treaty before discussion; discussion led them to oppose it strongly. Same-sex unions became much more popular in Boulder and less so in Colorado Springs.

Aside from increasing extremism, discussion had another effect: it squelched diversity. Before members talked, many groups displayed internal disagreement. These were greatly reduced: discussion widened the rift between Boulder and Colorado Springs

Sunstein argues that this experiment has parallels in the blogging world:

Group polarisation clearly occurs on the internet. For example, 80 per cent of readers of the leftwing blog Daily Kos are Democrats and fewer than 1 per cent are Republicans. Many popular bloggers link frequently to those who agree with them and to contrary views, if at all, only to ridicule them. To a significant extent, people are learning about supposed facts from narrow niches and like-minded others.

This matters for the electoral process. A high degree of self-sorting leads to more confidence, extremism and increased contempt for those with contrary views.

I do think that many bloggers form intellectual cocoons by linking only to like-minded thinkers. Moreover, anyone who surfs the Internets knows that there is often a lack of civility toward alternative ideologies.

However, I don't agree with Sunstein's conclusion that polarized views are harmful for democracy. Sunstein seems to take the view that democratic debate must be moderate and centrist. He is confusing cause and effect. I do not work on American politics, but I would think that if US political institutions structually push politicians to court median voters in the majority of electoral battles, then it would seem that the real impact of intellectual cocoons is to make polarized thinkers less relevant to the electoral process, particularly after the intra-party primaries. Thus the reason to avoid intellectual cocooning is mainly to make oneself rhetorically relevant outside of a small community of like-minded thinkers.

Labels: american politics, blog

Glass Booth is a website designed to help you find the 2008 Presidential candidate with whom your views on substantive issues most closely align.

The site is interesting because it attempts to link voter preference to substantive issues. There is detailed information on how the candidates view several "major" issues as well as notes on their voting records. (One might quibble with whether the issues listed are sufficient. Is medical marijuana really a national issue in the current election?)

I tend to think that voting in American elections is mainly an expression of aesthetic preferences. There is often little substantive difference between the major political parties. To the extent that voters choose their candidate on substantive issues, this is a useful site. However, the logic of the site is still based on a liberal democratic model in which voters choose on the basis of self-interest rather than an attempt to ascertain the general will. Nevertheless, it is a step in the right direction.

Labels: american politics, web technology