File Photo: A U.S. soldier of the 101st Airborne Division destroys opium poppies growing in a field during a patrol with Afghan police in Tani district of Khost province, Afghanistan, Wednesday, April 16, 2008. (AP Photo/Rafiq Maqbool)


There has been a relatively constant interest in the media about the levels of opium production in Afghanistan. The revenue from the opium trade is properly understood as a lifeline for insurgents, warlords, and criminals. Hence, eradication of the crop is viewed as a way to expedite the counter-insurgency campaign.

The concern regarding opium cultivation is generally stated in the media without any context. In reality, aggregate levels of opium cultivation are trending downward. According to the UNODC's January 2009 report, 18 out of 34 provinces are poppy free and 4 more may become poppy free in the foreseeable future. Notably, 11 of those 18 provinces have weather conditions which are favorable to opium cultivation. Ninety-eight percent of opium production came from seven provinces in the south and south-west in 2008. The area with the highest level of production is Helmand province, but even there cultivation is decreasing.

Why is cultivation of this lucrative crop decreasing? The reasons are very complex and vary by province. Two major reasons, according to the UNODC report, are related to the rising price of wheat coupled with the declining price of opium, and the low availability of water to irrigate the water-intensive poppy fields due to drought in the south and south-west provinces. The latter reason is more plausible than the former since dry opium is selling for approximately $85.16 per Kg, while wheat sells for $0.60 per Kg (and rice is $1.12 per Kg). Of course, there are other reasons for decreased cultivation including a range of incentives and disincentives.

Incentive strategies for transitioning away from poppy cultivation are centered on providing farmers with improved seeds and fertilizer, as well as electricity, transportation infrastructure, irrigation canals, flood prevention dykes, etc. However, economic support and even direct cash advances to poor farmers may not work to curb opium cultivation in all provinces. The farmers may simply take the cash advance and raise both licit and illicit crops. The reason we know this scenario is probable is that while agricultural assistance has generally been correlated with reduced cultivation in most regions (and the absence of such assistance with continued cultivation), in the southern provinces agricultural assistance has not made a notable impact in reducing opium cultivation.

Disincentive strategies, such as crop eradication by government authorities, have some utility in deterring farmers according to surveys of farmers. But these strategies also encounter subversion as farmers know they can avoid crop eradication by bribing government officials. In any case, with over a hundred thousand hectares being cultivated in Helmand province alone, an eradication strategy by itself is highly unlikely to work. Excessive reliance on crop eradication will increase corruption and generally negate the notion that farmers are citizens rather than subjects of the state.

Thus, a broad strategy with multiple policy instruments is most likely to yield optimal behavioral changes among farmers. Farmers should not be treated simply as economic agents or as social miscreants. The most important factor correlated with reduced cultivation seems to be security. Areas which are the most secure are the least likely to cultivate opium, even where the weather and terrain favors opium cultivation. The reason for this correlation may have something to do with the role of legitimate governance in reinforcing the religiously informed ethics of farming communities. Secure areas are also more accessible to development agencies which makes incentive programs more visible to farmers in remote areas. However, too much weight should not be placed on the role of development agencies and incentive programs as several areas which are stable but not receiving assistance have reduced cultivation (farmers cite the drought as the major reason for reduced cultivation).

Ultimately, however, mitigating the cultivation of opium in Afghanistan cannot be handled without looking at the global dimensions of the narcotics trade. There needs to be a renewed effort to reduce demand for heroin in the high income countries. Without an effective demand management strategy, success countering opium cultivation in Afghanistan will only shift production from the Golden Crescent (centered around Afghanistan) back to the Golden Triangle (centered around Myanmar), which was the leading source of opium prior to 1991. Moreover, if demand surges, any progress which has been made to date will be undone.

Labels: afghanistan, heroin, opium, south asia