"The event on which the interest of the story depends is exempt from the disadvantages of a mere tale of spectres or enchantment. It was recommended by the novelty of the situations which it develops; and, however impossible as a physical fact, affords a point of view to the imagination for the delineating of human passions more comprehensive and commanding than any which the ordinary relations of existing events can yield."

-Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley

The most popular trope in contemporary Pakistan is that the state has created a Frankenstinian monster which it may no longer be able to control or put down. In fact, there are over a thousand articles in the Lexis-Nexis database which used both keywords monster and Pakistan in the last ten years. This monster is, of course, Islamic radicalism which the dominant organs of the state (i.e. the military and intelligence services) have been fostering on and off for decades as a mechanism to subvert democracy and project power into neighboring territories.

Unfortunately, this narrative of an uncontrollable monster is somewhat of a myth. The Pakistani government has not made any serious effort to dismantle key terrorist organizations (e.g. Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed) operating on its soil, to execute their leadership, or to seize and liquidate their property. In fact, the government has been willing to permit terrorist organizations to simply change their names as a response to foreign pressure to ban these organizations. The Pakistani civilian government, military, and intelligence services are all well aware of the headquarters and leadership structures of organizations like Lashkar-e-Toiba, which renamed itself Jamat-ud-Dawa, after being banned in 2002. Far from declaring war on all extremist groups, the Pakistani state has achieved a modus vivendi with some of the most notorious ones.

In public, the Pakistani state seeks to convince critics that its externally mandated war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda also includes a full scale assault against all cross-border terrorist organizations operating on Pakistani soil. Foreign journalists, who are not well schooled in the differences between militant groups, are easily confused. But it is not that difficult to see through the deception. As a rational actor, the Pakistani state has no interest in eliminating all terrorist organizations operating within its territory. The Pakistani military and intelligence services selectively benefit from the presence of some of these organizations. These radical groups may be used to foment instability (in Kashmir and Afghanistan) and discipline democracy. Their presence and occasional street protests can also be used as a means of securing resources from the United States by conjuring media images of an emerging anarchy or Islamic revolution. Although the presence of many of these organizations is currently a liability, they will undoubtedly be useful again when the US retreats from the region. Hence, it is in Pakistan's interest to keep radical groups around but encourage them to maintain a low profile.

But even if the Pakistani story is akin to a myth, perhaps the story tells us something about Pakistani society. In other words, I am interested to understand what work this complex allusion does for the Pakistani elite.

First, the narrative shows a desire by the story tellers to claim the mantle of victimhood. Pakistan's elite are eager to negate charges of criminal neglect and conspiracy by pointing to its own victimization by extremist organizations. And while Pakistani civilians are increasingly victims of extremist violence, the state is still not quite able to convince the world of its innocence, perhaps because the metaphor itself implies a measure of guilt on the creator of the monster. The status of innocent victim is somewhat easier to accord when the story is recounted by Pakistani elites who are not associated with the state, as these elites often use the story as a criticism of both the monster and its creator(s).

Second, the myth reveals deep disgust toward the religious fundamentalists brought to life by elements within the state of Pakistan. One will recall that the horror of Dr. Frankenstein's monster stems from his fabrication of a living being from several dead bodies. The monster is monstrous because it exists in a nether region between death and life, and because it is the product of mingling parts from separate wholes. In essence the monster represents a fundamental categorical confusion and contradiction. One wonders if the repetitive allusion to the Frankenstein myth does not reflect a similar belief that the members of extremist groups themselves merely pre-figure death, i.e. that they are not quite living human beings. As Jasbir K. Puar and Amit S. Rai have argued, paraphrasing Judith Butler in a different context, the terrorist is "always already dying." Their desires are structured by death; they are technologies of death.

Third, and quite predictably, the monster while clearly loathed by the elite is also occasionally portrayed as a moral, misunderstood, generous, noble savage. Of course, this slippage between a romantic creature and an object of disgust is a contradiction. But perhaps this is why the monster metaphor is so apt: the allusion to Frankenstein's creature helps to hold together this tense contradiction of sentiments.

Fourth, the idea of a monster conjures a shifting internal balance of power or perhaps a sense of disempowerment. At another level, perhaps the discourse also reveals a fear of foreign intervention in the face of an incompetent and impotent state apparatus which "cannot control" what it created. I do not think this is a plea for help ... far from it. It is a plea for sympathy, patience, and a demand to obtain resources to improve state capacity.

Finally, I would argue that the reference to Frankenstein's monster is a means of pointing to the inherent pathological potential of religion. Whereas Shelley's text was intended as a critique of the science and technology associated with the Industrial Revolution, the Pakenstein myth is a critique of the inability of fundamentalist religious ideology to generate well rounded human beings. In other words, religious ideology is the alchemical "science" of the Pakistani state. The supplanting of the indigenous, mystical Sufi religious tradition in favor of more conservative interpretations of Islam, particularly since the Zia regime, have produced perverse individuals. These monsters could not have been created without this perverse "science" and it is perhaps not surprising that many Pakistanis now agree the only way to permanently prevent new monsters from emerging is to fix the content of religious ideology as it is imparted to new generations of school children.

Labels: failed states, pakistan, terrorism