The Core of a South Asia Strategy
The Obama administration's foreign policy strategy for South Asia will either tilt toward Pakistan or India; it cannot and should not seek to be neutral or balanced. Any talk of seeking a "balanced" strategy in the region is a de facto capitulation to Pakistan, since these are not even remotely equal states in terms of their political culture, political institutions, military strength, or economic potential.
The US will need to choose its main ally in the region (although it certainly can and should be friendly to both countries if Pakistan makes more progress in reforming its intelligence services, military institution, educational infrastructure, and outlawing extremist religious parties). The US cannot continue to play both sides of the fence -- and Indian diplomats should make this logic clear to their new counterparts in the Obama administration. If the US wants to finally dismantle the terrorist networks that emanate from the region (as opposed to making only short term gains without fundamental changes), continue to obtain access to a major emerging market, and acquire an enduring alliance partner for its soft containment of China, the US will need to tilt toward India.
Here is the core of a pro-India South Asian foreign policy strategy:
1. No Issue Linkage: The link between terrorism and the "Kashmir issue" is spurious. It is important to understand that the cultivation of terrorist organizations by the Pakistani government is: A) a rational (if amoral or immoral) strategic response to a small industrial base which cannot generate the military resources to match the potential of the Indian political economy; and B) the manifestation of the failure of state and nation formation in Pakistan. In other words, Pakistan's use of terrorist militants in Kashmir and the rest of India is a strategy to pin down a much larger military and a means of creating the semblance of a domestic national purpose. The Kashmir issue should be kept separate from issues of terrorism in order to avoid a quid pro quo blackmail by the Pakistani government. If Indian counterinsurgency actions in the portion of Kashmir that it administers violate human or civil rights, those violation can and should be administered through India's judiciary. Although Pakistan is an ethnocracy, it has no legitimate claim to serving as the homeland for South Asian Muslims (nor would the majority of Muslims in South Asia accept such a status for Pakistan, particularly since 1971).
2. Regional Hegemony: The US will need to accept sub-regional (i.e. sub-continental) hegemony by India. The alternative to sub-regional Indian hegemony is letting a secular liberal democracy be pinned down by a state which has rational, strategic and economic incentives to use militant groups; in other words, it involves conceding defeat in the War on Terrorism. At the heart of the use of terror as a tactic is not religion or ethnic grievance but a political economy of violence that must be understood by the US. The only way to end this cycle of militancy is to disabuse the Pakistani military of its ambition of achieve parity with India. The way to permanently disabuse the Pakistani military of its ambition is to firmly support Indian sub-regional hegemony, including a strong Indian presence in Afghanistan which will force the Pakistani military to focus on internal integrity rather than power projection.
If a pro-India policy is formulated, the immediate US concern will be how to exert leverage against Pakistan. It is important for Americans to remember that the US has many levers of influence; it is not necessary to sell out the Indians to achieve American objectives in the war on terror. The most important carrots which can be offered to Pakistan are clearly access to US markets, educational assistance, and military training in counterinsurgency. The US should resist any transfer of military hardware which is not specifically intended for counterinsurgency efforts(i.e. no more fighter jets or tanks). The sticks to prod Pakistan to do what it should have been doing all along, include increased violations of Pakistan's territorial sovereignty, a curtailment of bi-lateral and multi-lateral financial assistance, diplomatic isolation, and placing Pakistan on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. While a roll-back of Pakistan's nuclear option may be desirable, it is not currently feasible. A "Kosovo" option for the provinces of FATA, NWFP, and Baluchistan can be put on the bargaining table if Pakistan still does not cooperate.
It was said by Vice President-elect Biden that the Obama administration would be tested early in his tenure. It is clear that test has come even before he has taken office. Now, it is time for the Obama team to formulate a clear South Asia policy.
The US will need to choose its main ally in the region (although it certainly can and should be friendly to both countries if Pakistan makes more progress in reforming its intelligence services, military institution, educational infrastructure, and outlawing extremist religious parties). The US cannot continue to play both sides of the fence -- and Indian diplomats should make this logic clear to their new counterparts in the Obama administration. If the US wants to finally dismantle the terrorist networks that emanate from the region (as opposed to making only short term gains without fundamental changes), continue to obtain access to a major emerging market, and acquire an enduring alliance partner for its soft containment of China, the US will need to tilt toward India.
Here is the core of a pro-India South Asian foreign policy strategy:
1. No Issue Linkage: The link between terrorism and the "Kashmir issue" is spurious. It is important to understand that the cultivation of terrorist organizations by the Pakistani government is: A) a rational (if amoral or immoral) strategic response to a small industrial base which cannot generate the military resources to match the potential of the Indian political economy; and B) the manifestation of the failure of state and nation formation in Pakistan. In other words, Pakistan's use of terrorist militants in Kashmir and the rest of India is a strategy to pin down a much larger military and a means of creating the semblance of a domestic national purpose. The Kashmir issue should be kept separate from issues of terrorism in order to avoid a quid pro quo blackmail by the Pakistani government. If Indian counterinsurgency actions in the portion of Kashmir that it administers violate human or civil rights, those violation can and should be administered through India's judiciary. Although Pakistan is an ethnocracy, it has no legitimate claim to serving as the homeland for South Asian Muslims (nor would the majority of Muslims in South Asia accept such a status for Pakistan, particularly since 1971).
2. Regional Hegemony: The US will need to accept sub-regional (i.e. sub-continental) hegemony by India. The alternative to sub-regional Indian hegemony is letting a secular liberal democracy be pinned down by a state which has rational, strategic and economic incentives to use militant groups; in other words, it involves conceding defeat in the War on Terrorism. At the heart of the use of terror as a tactic is not religion or ethnic grievance but a political economy of violence that must be understood by the US. The only way to end this cycle of militancy is to disabuse the Pakistani military of its ambition of achieve parity with India. The way to permanently disabuse the Pakistani military of its ambition is to firmly support Indian sub-regional hegemony, including a strong Indian presence in Afghanistan which will force the Pakistani military to focus on internal integrity rather than power projection.
If a pro-India policy is formulated, the immediate US concern will be how to exert leverage against Pakistan. It is important for Americans to remember that the US has many levers of influence; it is not necessary to sell out the Indians to achieve American objectives in the war on terror. The most important carrots which can be offered to Pakistan are clearly access to US markets, educational assistance, and military training in counterinsurgency. The US should resist any transfer of military hardware which is not specifically intended for counterinsurgency efforts(i.e. no more fighter jets or tanks). The sticks to prod Pakistan to do what it should have been doing all along, include increased violations of Pakistan's territorial sovereignty, a curtailment of bi-lateral and multi-lateral financial assistance, diplomatic isolation, and placing Pakistan on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. While a roll-back of Pakistan's nuclear option may be desirable, it is not currently feasible. A "Kosovo" option for the provinces of FATA, NWFP, and Baluchistan can be put on the bargaining table if Pakistan still does not cooperate.
It was said by Vice President-elect Biden that the Obama administration would be tested early in his tenure. It is clear that test has come even before he has taken office. Now, it is time for the Obama team to formulate a clear South Asia policy.
Labels: american politics, failed states, india, ir, obama, pakistan, political economy, south asia, terrorism, us
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